$5. Hatred.

ON the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing prefent or abfent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my bufinefs here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paffions, ás they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I fhould remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our fenfes, though with their deftruction but hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight, which we find in ourselves arifing from a confideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in refpect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused

in us.

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$6. Defire,

THE uneafinefs a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whofe prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneafinefs is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only fpur to human industry and action, is uneafinefs. For whatever good is propofed, if its absence carries no difpleasure or pain with it, if a man be eafy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity the term ufed to fignify the loweft degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint wifhes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is ftopped or abated by the opinion of the impoffibility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far

as the uneafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it feafonable in this place.

§ 7. Foy.

For is a delight of the mind, from the confideration of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffon of a good; and we are then poffeffed of any good, when we have it fo in our power, that we can use it when we pleafe. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of ufing it and a father, in whom the very wellbeing of his children caufes delight, is always, as long as his children are in fuch a state, in the poffeffon" of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleafure.

§ 8. Sorrow.

SORROW is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft which might have been enjoyed longer; or the fenfe of a present evil.

9. Hope.

HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one. finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him. f 10. Fear.

FEAR is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

§ 11. Despair.

DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good which works differently in men's minds, fometimes producing uneafinefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

§ 12. Anger.

ANGER is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge.

13. Envy.

ENVY is an uneafinefs of the mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think fhould not have had it before us.

§ 14. What Paffions all Men have.

THESE two laft, envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them; but all the reft terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in refpect of pleafure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately in fine, all these paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the caufes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred ufually to the fubject (at least if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, becaufe the fear it leaves is a conftant pain: but we do not fo conftantly love what hath done us good; because pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fa ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

15. Pleafure and Pain, what. By pleasure and pain, delight and uneafiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatfoeyer delight or uneafinefs is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflec

tion.

$16.

It is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the paffions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleasure; and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

17. Shame.

THE paffions too, have most of them in moft perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it, which, not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion. For fhame, which is an uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will

leffen the valued efteem which others have for us, has hot always blufhing accompanying it.

§ 18. Thefe Inftances do fhow how our Ideas of the Paffions are got from Senfation and Reflection.

I WOULD not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a difcourfe of the paffions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger and more accurate difcourfe. I have only mentioned these here as fo many inftances of modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleafure and pain more fimple than these, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleafure of eating and drinking to remove them: the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of mufic; pain from captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational converfation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the fearch and difcovery of truth. But the paffions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from fenfation and reflection.

CHAP. XXI.

OF POWER.

1. This Idea how got.

THE mind being every day informed, by the fenfes, of the alteration of thofe fimple ideas it obferves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exift which was not before; reflecting on what paffes within itfelf, and obferving a conftant change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffion of outward objects on the fenfes, and fometimes by the determination of its own cho'ce: and concluding, from what it has fo conftantly obferved to have been, that the like changes

will for the future be made in the fame things by like agents, and by the like ways; confiders in ene thing the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas changed, and in another the poffibility of making that change; and fo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we fay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deftroy the confiftency of its infenfible parts, and confe quently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: that the fun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the fun, whereby the yellowness is deftroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like cafes, the power we confider is in reference to the change "of perceivable ideas for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing, but by the obfervable change of its fenfible ideas: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of fome of its ideas.

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§ 2. Power active and paffive.

POWER, thus confidered, is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: the one may be called active, and the other paffive power. Whether matter be not wholly deftitute of active power, as its author GOD is truly above all paffive power; and whether the intermediate state of created fpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that inquiry; my prefent bufinefs being, not to fearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But fince active powers make fo great a part of our complex ideas of natural fubftances (as we fhall fee hereafter) and I mention them as fuch according to common apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fo truly active powers, as our hafty thoughts are apt to reprefent them, I judge it not amifs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the confideration of GOD and fpirits, for the clearest idea of active pow

ers.

3. Power includes Relation.

I CONFESS power includes in it feme kind of relation (a re