An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volumen1William Fessenden, 1806 |
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Página 10
... evident Propofition , it needs Proof 19. That a man fhould be bufy in thinking , and yet not retain it the next moment , very improbable .. 20-23 . No Ideas but from Senfation or Reflection , evident , if we obferve Childrens 24. The ...
... evident Propofition , it needs Proof 19. That a man fhould be bufy in thinking , and yet not retain it the next moment , very improbable .. 20-23 . No Ideas but from Senfation or Reflection , evident , if we obferve Childrens 24. The ...
Página 12
... evident . 8-10 . Ideas of Senfation often changed by the Judg-- ment . 11-14 . Perception puts the Difference between Ani-- mals and inferior beings . 15. Perception the Inlet of Knowledge . SECT . CHAP . X. Of Retention . 1 ...
... evident . 8-10 . Ideas of Senfation often changed by the Judg-- ment . 11-14 . Perception puts the Difference between Ani-- mals and inferior beings . 15. Perception the Inlet of Knowledge . SECT . CHAP . X. Of Retention . 1 ...
Página 17
... evident , that all children and idiots have not the leaft apprehenfion or thought of them ; and the want of that is enough to deftroy that uni- verfal affent , which muft needs be the neceffary concom- itant of all innate truths : it ...
... evident , that all children and idiots have not the leaft apprehenfion or thought of them ; and the want of that is enough to deftroy that uni- verfal affent , which muft needs be the neceffary concom- itant of all innate truths : it ...
Página 18
... evident that there are no fuch impreffions . For if they are not notions naturally imprinted , how can they be innate ? And if they are notions imprinted , how can they be un- known ? To fay a notion is imprinted on the mind , and yet ...
... evident that there are no fuch impreffions . For if they are not notions naturally imprinted , how can they be innate ? And if they are notions imprinted , how can they be un- known ? To fay a notion is imprinted on the mind , and yet ...
Página 22
... evident these maxims are not in the mind fo early as the use of reason ; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falfely affigned , as the time of their discovery . How many inftances of the use of reafon may we ob- ferve in ...
... evident these maxims are not in the mind fo early as the use of reason ; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falfely affigned , as the time of their discovery . How many inftances of the use of reafon may we ob- ferve in ...
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Términos y frases comunes
action affent againſt alfo amongſt anfwer becauſe body cafe caufe cauſe complex ideas confequence confider confideration confifts conftant conftantly defire determined difcourfe diftinct ideas diftinguish diſcover diſtance duration elfe exift exiſtence extenfion faculties faid fame farther feems fenfation fenfes fenfible ferve feveral fhall fhould fhow fignify fimple ideas fince firft firſt fleep folidity fome fomething fometimes foul fpace fpeaking ftand ftill fubftance fubject fucceffion fuch fufficient fuppofe happineſs hath himſelf idea of infinite impoffible impreffions infinity inftances innate ideas innate principles itſelf knowledge leaft leaſt lefs liberty lordship meaſure mind modes moft moſt motion muft muſt neceffary obferve occafion ourſelves pafs pain perceive perception perfons pleaſes pleaſure poffible pofitive idea prefent propofitions purpoſe reafon reflection reft ſhall ſpace ſpeak ſtand thefe themſelves theſe things thofe ideas thoſe thoughts tion truth underſtanding underſtood uneafinefs univerfal uſe wherein whilft whofe
Pasajes populares
Página 83 - Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Página 143 - ... for wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another.
Página 98 - All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.
Página 132 - I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem ; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them...
Página 148 - ... do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning ; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles.
Página 271 - Who will render to every man according to his deeds: To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life : But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil...
Página 16 - I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects ; and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in...
Página 103 - I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt ; and when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true, distinct notions of sounds.
Página 233 - The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.
Página 126 - The first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend. The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.