The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known, as that which it is,... Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition - Página 246por Borden Parker Bowne - 1912 - 439 páginasVista completa - Acerca de este libro
| 1858 - 392 páginas
[ Lo sentimos, el contenido de esta página está restringido. ] | |
| Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 376 páginas
...preliminary to any inquiry concerning the religious consciousness in particular. Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever...is, by being distinguished from that which it is not (1). But distinction is necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
| Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 378 páginas
...preliminary to any inquiry concerning the religious consciousness in particular. Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever...by being distinguished from that which it is not. W But distinction is necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
| 1859 - 806 páginas
...stated are referred to their ground in the conditions of human consciousness. Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever...between one object and another. To be conscious, we most be conscious of something ; and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being... | |
| Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 389 páginas
...preliminary to any inquiry concerning the religious consciousness in particular. Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever...by being distinguished from that which it is not. W But distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
| John Young - 1860 - 368 páginas
...unsatisfactory in many respects, and is accompanied with statements not only not supported, but untenable. " To be conscious, we must be conscious of something,...is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation." (p. 70.) Why so? Do I limit something, when I say it is not nothing? In the sense of distinguishing,... | |
| Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 446 páginas
...is coexistence, there is not identity. Any special modification (if consciousness is discerned to be that which it is by being distinguished from that which it is not ; and in this manner consciousness is only possible on the condition of a relation, not merely between... | |
| Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 428 páginas
...coexist^ ence, there is not identity. Any special modification of consciousness is discerned to be that which it is by being distinguished from that which it is not ; and in this manner consciousness is only possible on the condition of a relation, not merely between... | |
| Herbert Spencer - 1862 - 528 páginas
...understood. The following extracts, which I take the liberty of making from his pages, will suffice. " The very conception of consciousness, in whatever...may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction betwecn one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something ; and that something... | |
| Jesse Henry Jones - 1865 - 236 páginas
...aiid he begins the statement of its conditions in the following language : " Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever'...by being distinguished from that which it is not." In this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very question at issue ; for, the... | |
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