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CHAP. VI.

AFTER the above-mentioned philofophers, the business with Plato next fucceeds, who in many things followed thefe Pythagoreans, but who also had fome peculiar doctrines different from the philofophy of the Italics. For, when he was a young man, affociating firft of all with Cratylus, and being familiar with the opinions of Heraclitus, that all fenfible things are perpetually flowing, and that there is no fcience refpecting them, he afterwards adopted thefe opinions. But as Socrates employed himfelf about ethics, and entirely neglected the speculation respecting the whole of nature; in morals, indeed, investigating the univerfal, and being the first who applied himself to definitions; hence Plato, approving this his investigation of univerfals, adopted thus much of his doctrine, that these definitions refpect other things, and are not converfant with any thing fenfible. For he was of opinion, that it is impoffible there should be a common definition of any fenfible nature, as fenfibles are always changing. Things of this kind, therefore, he denominated ideas*, but afferted that all fenfible things were denominated as different from, and as subsisting according to, these. For, according to him, the multitude of things fynonymous is homonymous to forms according to participation; but he only changed the name participation. For the Pythagoreans say that beings are imitations of numbers; but Plato, changing the name, calls them participations of numbers. They omit, however, to investigate in common what the participation or imitation of forms is. Further ftill, befides things fenfible, and forms, they fay that the mathematics are things of a middle nature, differing indeed from fenfibles in that they are eternal and immoveable, but from forms in that they are certain fimilar multitudes, every form itself being only one thing. But, fince forms are causes to other things, he was of opinion that the elements of thefe are the elements of beings. He thought, therefore, that the great and the fmall were principles as matter, but the one as effence. For from thefe, through the participation of the one, forms are numbers. He afferted, indeed, that the one is effence, and that

* Of the Platonic doctrine of ideas we shall speak largely in our notes to the thirteenth book of this work.

+ All this, as likewife all that follows refpecting ideas and numbers, will be largely difcuffed, and the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans on thefe fubjects folidly defended, in the notes to the thirteenth and fourteenth books of this work.

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nothing else is called the one, in this respect speaking in a manner fimilar to the Pythagoreans'; and, like them, he alfo confidered numbers as the causes of effence to other things. But this is peculiar to him, to make the duad inftead of the infinite confidered as one, and to compose the infinite from the great and the fmall.

Further ftill: Plato afferts that numbers are different from things fenfible; but the Pythagoreans fay that they are things themselves, and do not place mathematics between thefe. The one, therefore, and numbers, were confidered as different from things themfelves, and not as the Pythagoreans consider them; and, as well as forms, were introduced in confequence of dialectic investigation. For the more antient philofophers were not skilled in dialectic. Through the fame inveftigation, alfo, Plato made the duad to be a different nature from the one, because numbers, except thofe that rank as first, are aptly generated from it, as from a certain express refemblance of a thing; though, indeed, the contrary to this happens to be the cafe. For it is not reasonable it should be fo. For now they make many things from matter, but form generates once only. But one table appears to be produced from one matter. However, he who introduces form makes many tables. The male, too, is in a fimilar manner related to the female. For the female is filled from one copulation, but the male fills many. And yet thefe are imitations of those principles. Plato, therefore, has thus defined refpecting the objects of investigation.

matter.

But it is evident, from what has been faid, that he uses only two causes; that which relates to what a thing is, and that which fubfifts according to For forms, according to him, are the caufes to other things of effence; but the one is the cause of this to forms. And what is this cause which fubfifts according to matter? It is that fubject matter through which forms are said to belong to things fenfible; and the one is faid to be in forms, because this is the duad, or the great and the small. Further ftill: he attributes to the elements the cause of fubfifting well and ill, each to its proper element; and this, we fay, fome of the more antient philofophers, viz. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, have investigated. In a brief and fummary manner, therefore, we have discussed who those were that have spoken, and how they have spoken, respecting principles and truth *.

* It is well obferved here, by Alexander Aphrodifienfis, that Ariftotle, conformably to his ufual manner of speaking, calls contemplative philofophy truth; and this, as it appears to me, with the greatest propriety, for the end of this philofophy is the perception of the highest truth. But,

But, at the fame time, we obtain thus much from them, that of thofe who have spoken concerning a principle and cause, no one has faid any thing in addition to what we have delivered in our Phyfics; but all of them have spoken obfcurely, though in a certain refpect they appear to have touched upon these two. For fome speak of principle as matter, whether they fuppose there is one or many principles, and whether they confider principle as body, or as incorporeal: as Plato, when he speaks of the great and the small; Empedocles, of fire and earth, water and air; and Anaxagoras, of the infinity of fimilar parts. But all these touched upon a cause of this kind; and, befides thefe, those who have established as a principle either fire or water or that which is more dense than fire, but more attenuated than air; for some affert that the firft element is a thing of this kind. Thefe, therefore, had only an obfcure conception of this caufe; but certain others had fome conception whence the principle of motion is derived, viz. those who make friendship and ftrife, or intellect, or love, a principle. But no one has clearly affigned the nature and effence of this principle. However, they especially speak respecting it who adopt the hypothesis of forms, and the things which subsist in forms. For neither do they confider forms and the things which forms contain as matter to fenfibles, nor as if the principle of motion was derived from thence. For they fay that they are rather the cause of immobility, and of things being at reft. But, according to them, forms impart the particular being which each individual of other things poffeffes; and the one imparts the fame to forms. But that, for the fake of which actions, mutations and motions fubfift after a certain manner, they denominate a caufe; yet they do not affert that it is a caufe, nor do they speak of it conformably to what it naturally is. For those who speak of intellect, or friendship, place these causes as a certain good, but do not speak of them as if for the fake of these either being or any generated nature subsists, but as if from them the motions of things were derived. In a similar manner, those who say that the one, or being, is a nature of this kind, affert indeed that it is the cause of effence; yet do not fay that any thing either is, or is generated, for the fake of this. So that in a certain respect it happens that they affert, and yet do not affert, that the good is a cause of this kind; for they speak not fimply, but cafually. That we have therefore rightly determined concerning caufes, and respecting their number and quality, all these philofophers appear to teftify, fince they were not able to touch upon any other caufe. And, befides this, that principles

fhould

should be investigated, either all of them in this manner, or some one of the four, is evident. But after this it is requifite that we fhould confider in what manner each of these speaks, and what are the doubts which arise respecting principles themfelves.

CHAP. VII.

IT is evident, therefore, that thofe err manifoldly, who confider the universe as one, and as being one certain nature, as matter; and this corporeal, and poffeffing magnitude. For they only admit the elements of bodies, but not of things incorporeal, though at the fame time things incorporeal have a fubfiftence. And befides this, endeavouring to affign the caufes of generation and corruption, and phyfiologifing about all things, they take away the cause of motion. Further ftill, by placing effence as the caufe of no one thing, and not confidering the what; and befides this, thinking that there might easily be any principle of fimple bodies (except earth), they did not attend to the manner in which, according to them, the generation of these from each other is accomplished; I mean fire and water, earth and air. For fome things are generated from each other by concretion, and others by feparation. But this, with respect to the being prior and pofterior, differs much. For that may appear to be the most elementary of all things, from which the elements are generated by a first concretion: but a thing of this kind will, among bodies, confift of the smallest parts, and be the most attenuated; on which account, fuch as place fire as a principle speak in the highest degree conformably to this doctrine. But every one acknowledges that a thing of this kind is also the element of other bodies. No one, therefore, of those later philofophers who speak of the one, has thought fit to confider earth as an element, on account of the magnitude of its parts. But each of the three elements has had a certain arbitrator; for fome fay that this is fire, others water, and others air. Though why, like the multitude, do they not say that earth alfo is an element? for they say that earth is all things. Hefiod alfo afferts, that earth was the first thing generated among bodies; fo that this opinion happens to be both antient and popular. According to this reafoning, therefore, if any one should fay that any thing belonging to thefe, except fire, is more dense than air, but more attenuated than water, he will not speak rightly. But if

that

that which is pofterior in generation is prior by nature*, and that which is digefted and mingled together is pofterior in generation, the contrary of these will take place; for water will be prior to air, and earth to water. And thus much may fuffice refpecting those who establish one caufe fuch as we have mentioned.

But the fame things may be faid, if any one should think that there are many corporeal principles, as Empedocles, who fays that the four elementary bodies are matter: for it is neceflary that partly the fame things, and partly fuch as are peculiar, should happen to him. For we fee that the elements are generated from each other, as the fire and earth of the fame body do not always remain. But we have spoken refpecting these in our Physics †, and also respecting the caufe of things moving, whether it is to be confidered as one or two; nor is it to be thought that this has been afferted in a manner altogether irrational. But, in fine, those who speak in this manner must neceffarily take away internal mutation. For the cold is not from the hot, nor the hot from the cold. And what contraries themselves will fuffer, and what that one nature will be, which becomes fire and water, Empedocles does not say.

But if any one should think that Anaxagoras afferts there are two elements, he will, in the highest degree, think according to reason; for though he does not clearly affert this, yet it follows from neceffity, if any one fpeaks conformably to his doctrine. It is indeed abfurd to fay, that at firft all things were mingled together; both because it must happen that all things prior to this ought to have fubfifted unmingled, and because every thing is not naturally adapted to be mingled with every thing. To which it may be added, that from this doctrine, participated properties and accidents must be separated from fubftances (for mixture and feparation belong to the fame things); yet if any one follows, and at the fame time accurately confiders his affertions, he will perhaps appear to have advanced fomething new. For, at the timewhen nothing was feparated, it is evident nothing could be faid respecting that. effence. I fay, for instance, that it was neither white nor black, nor of any colour between thefe; but that it was from neceffity colourlefs: for other

* That is to say, that which is perfect is prior by nature to the more imperfect, although it is rendered pofterior by generation. But that which pre-exifts in time, is more imperfect.. Thus the foundation is more imperfect than the house, and the boy than the man.

t Viz. in lib. iii. de Cœlo.

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