Book I. ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS. 5 But, among thefe, to know all things neceffarily belongs to him who in the most eminent degree poffeffes univerfal science *. For fuch a one in a certain respect knows all fubjects. But things moft eminently universal are nearly moft difficult too for man to know. For they are most remote from the fenses. But the most accurate of the sciences are those which especially relate to things firft. For those sciences which confift from fewer things, are more accurate than those which are denominated from addition; as arithmetic than geometry. But indeed that science is more doctrinal which speculates the causes of things. For those teach others, who about every thing relate the causes. But to know, and to know scientifically for the fake of fuch knowledge, especially belongs to the science of that which is most eminently the object of scientific knowledge. For he who chooses to know scientifically for the fake of such knowledge, especially chooses that which is most eminently science. But fuch is the science of that which is most eminently the object of scientific knowledge. And objects of this kind are things first and causes. For, through and from these, other things are known, but these are not known through things in fubjection to them. But the most principal of sciences, and which is more a principle than the science which is in subjection, is that which knows on what account every thing is to be done. But this is the good of every thing; and univerfally that which is best in every nature. From all therefore that has been said, that name which is the object of our investigation falls into the fame fcience. For it is neceffary that this should be fpeculative of first principles and caufes. For the good alfo, and that for the fake of which a thing fubfifts, is one among the number of causes. But that this fcience is not employed in making, is evident from those who first philofophifed. For, both now and at firft, men began to philofophife through wonder : at firft indeed admiring fuch dubious particulars, as were of a more easy solution; but afterwards proceeding in this manner gradually, they began to doubt about things of greater importance, fuch as concerning * The science of beings, fo far as they are beings, is the most univerfal science; and he who poffeffes this science, in a certain refpect knows all things: for he fees particulars comprehended in univerfals, and effects in their causes. + As the defign therefore of modern philofophy, i. e. the pursuit of matter through her dark and infinite labyrinths, feems rather calculated to excite than to remove wonder, it may be truly faid, that philofophy now ends where it formerly began. the gene the properties participated by the moon, the fun, and the ftars, and the ration of the univerfe. But he who doubts and wonders, is of opinion that he is ignorant; and, on this account, a philofopher in a certain refpect is a lover of fables *. For a fable is compofed from things wonderful. So that if now and at firft men philofophifed, in order to fly from ignorance, it is evident that they pursued fcientific knowledge for the fake of knowing, and not for the fake of any use. But the truth of this is alfo teftified by that which has happened. For nearly all fuch things as are neceffary being prefent, and which contribute both to cafe and the conduct of life, prudence of this kind began to be investigated. It is evident therefore, that we seek after scientific knowledge for the fake of no other utility than that which arifes from itself; and that as we call him a free man who exifts for his own fake, and not for the fake of another, so this alone among the sciences is liberal for this alone fubfifts for its own fake. On this account, too, the poffeffion of it may juftly be confidered as not human. For in many respects human nature is fervile; fo that, according to Simonides, divinity alone poffeffes this honor; but it is unbecoming that man fhould only investigate the science which pertains to himself t. But, if the poets fay any thing to the purpose, and a divine nature is naturally envious, it is likely that it would especially happen in this particular, and that all those would be unhappy who furpass the rest of mankind. But neither does a divine nature admit of envy; and poets (according to the proverb) fpeak falfely in many things. Nor is it proper to think that any other science is more honorable than a fcience of this kind: For that which is divine is also most honorable. But a thing of this kind will alone fubfift twofold. For the fcience which divinity poffeffes is efpecially divine; and this will likewife be the cafe with the fcience of things divine ‡, if there be fuch a fcience. But the fcience of * A philofopher may be faid to be a lover of fables, becaufe he studies to learn things which, from being unknown, are admirable; for fables are compofed from things admirable and incre dible. + The word μovov is evidently wanting in the original in this place. Instead, therefore, of ανδρα δ' ουκ άξιον μη ζητειν την καθ' αυτον επισημην, we fould read ανδρα δ' ουκ αξιον μη μόνον, &c. Ariftotle has already informed us that the science which is the subject of this work, fpeculates first principles and caufes, and he now further intimates that it is the fcience of things divine. There are therefore, according to Ariftotle, divine principles and causes; and these are the intelligibles which in the twelfth book he places over the ftarry fpheres, and which in reality are no other than thofe incorporeal caufes denominated by Plato ideas. which we are speaking alone poffeffes both thefe prerogatives. For divinity appears to be a cause and a certain principle to all things; and either alone, or in the most eminent degree, divinity poffeffes fuch a science as this. All other sciences therefore are more neceffary, but no one is better than this. But it is requifite in a certain respect to establish this fcience in an order contrary to that of the inquiries which men made from the beginning. For all men, as we have faid, begin from wonder to investigate the manner in which a thing fubfifts; juft as it happens to thofe, who have not yet contemplated the cause of those wonderful figures that move fpontaneously, or the cause of the revolutions of the fun, or the reafon of the incommenfurability of the diameter of a square to the fide. For it seems admirable to all men, that a thing which is not the least of things, fhould not be measured. But it is requisite they should end in the contrary, and in that which is better, according to the proverb, as is the cafe in these things when they learn them. For there is not any thing which would appear more wonderful to a geometrician, than if the diameter fhould become commenfurable to the fide. And thus we have declared what the nature is of that science which is the object of our investigation, and what the mark to which the inquiry and the whole method ought to be directed. BUT, fince it is evident that it is requifite to confider the science of causes from its principle (for we then say that each particular is known when we know the first cause of it), and causes are faid to subsist in a fourfold respect, one of which we affert to be essence *, and the fubfifting as a certain particular thing (for the inquiry, On what account a thing exifts, is referred to the laft reafon †) and caufe and principle form the first why: but a fecond caufe is matter; and that which fubfifts as a fubject: a third is that whence the beginning of motion is derived: but the fourth is the caufe oppofite to this, that for the fake of which a thing fubfifts, and the good (for this is the end of all generation). This being the cafe, though we have speculated * By essence here Aristotle means form; for every thing is that which it is through form, Hence things defined are defined through this. + That is, to definition; but this is the formal cause. fufficiently fufficiently concerning these causes in our Physics, yet, at the same time, we fhall take along with us in our inquiry thofe who prior to us have engaged in the fpeculation of beings, and have philosophised about truth. For it is evident that they also affert that there are certain principles and causes. A repetition, therefore, of what they have faid will be of advantage to the prefent difcuffion. For, either we shall find another genus of cause, or we shall more firmly believe those we have just now enumerated. The greater part then of those that first philosophised were of opinion that the principles of all things alone fubfifted in the fpecies of matter. For that from which all things fubfift, from which they are first generated, and into which they are finally corrupted, the effence indeed remaining but becoming changed by participations, this, fay they, is the element, and this is the principle, of things. Hence they were of opinion that neither is any thing generated nor corrupted, because this nature is always preserved. Juft as we say that Socrates is neither fimply generated, when he becomes beautiful, or a musician, nor is corrupted when he loses these habits, because the subject, Socrates himself, remains; in like manner, neither is any one of other things, either generated, or corrupted. For it is requifite there fhould be a certain nature, either one, or more than one, from which other things are generated while it is itself preserved. But with respect to the multitude and form of this principle, all philofophers do not affert the fame. For Thales indeed, who was the leader of this philofophy, faid that this principle is water. On this account he afferted that the earth is placed upon water, entertaining perhaps this opinion from seeing that the nutriment of all things was moist, that the hot it was generated from this, and that from this animals lived. But that from which any thing is generated is the principle of that thing. On this account, therefore, he formed this opinion, and because the feeds of all things have a moift nature. But water is the principle of nature to things moift. But there are some who think that men of the greatest antiquity, who flourished long before the prefent generation, and who firft theologized *, entertained the very fame opinion refpecting nature. For they made Ocean † and Tethys the parents of generation, and the folemn oath of the gods water, which is called Ariftotle here doubtless means Orpheus, Homer, and Hefiod. By Ocean the antient theologifts fignified the divine caufe of all motion, and by Tethys the cause which feparates all the different kinds of motion from each other. |