him alive, and Calvin and Beza contended they acted right. In Italy, France, Spain, and many other countries, popery was established; of course the pope, his cardinals, and all the popish priests were thought ministers of God's word, those who opposed their doctrines they denounced as heretics, and delivered over to the civil power to be burned. Who will dare

to say they had not as much right to judge of heresy, and burn those they thought heretics, as John Calvin and the magistrates of Geneva? The cruelties of the court of inquisition, and all the religious murders committed in popish countries, are defensible, if the principle be admitted that heretics are to be destroyed, and that the prevailing party have a right to deter mine who are heretics. In attempting to justify themselves, the reformers adopted a mode of reasoning which would equally justify the cruel massacre of their protestant brethren by the papists. It is impossible to vindicate the persecutors of Geneva, without at the same time vindicating the whole tribe of religious murderers, and justifying persecution by whatever party practised.

T 2

SECTION III.

The reformers guilty of manifest inconsistency.

Men who claim liberty themselves and deny it to others, who practise what they condemn, are very inconsistent characters. This is in some degree the case with all persecutors, as they use a liberty which they will not allow to others; but it was most glaringly the case with respect to the persecutors of Servetus. Calvin and his associates had claimed liberty for themselves, they had dared to oppose the pope and the whole catholic church, they had boldly avowed opinions which the church of Rome condemned, and established a system of ecclesiastical polity agreeable to their own views, without regarding how dissimilar it might be to what the christian world had for ages adopted; yet they would not allow those who differed from them the liberty of judging for themselves, nor suffer them to oppose their notions with impunity: they condemned the papists for burning those who opposed popery; yet they themselves burnt Servetus for opposing some of their doctrines. In condemning others for using the same liberty which they

had long exercised, of judging for themselves and publishing their own views on religious subjects, they condemned themselves; for either they were culpable in setting up their judgment in opposition to the whole catholic church, or they were culpable in restraining others from taking the same liberty as they had done.They acted like tyrants, who will bear no control themselves, but who rule over others with a rod of iron. Again, they condemned themselves, when they condemned the catholics for persecuting those who differed from them, seeing they did the same thing. Thus the perse

cutors of Servetus stand convicted of injustice on their own premises, and are condemned out of their own mouths.

SECTION IV.

Persecution is irrational.

It is impossible to defend persecution on any rational ground. Reason revolts at the idea of punishing men for their opinions. It is irrational, because, if the persecuted be in error, persecution is not calculated to inform the mind, or produce a conviction of truth; its tendency

is to confirm them in those opinions in defence of which they suffer. Dungeons and fetters, gibbets and devouring flames, are no way calculated to enlighten the understanding; and till the understanding be enlightened men will continue in their mistakes. It is irrational, because not calculated to retard the progress of those opinions in support of which the persecuted become martyrs; it is rather calculated to give them a wider spread; for it gives them greater publicity; the sufferings of the persecuted excite attention and pity, and many will be the more anxious to become acquainted with their sentiments. It is irrational, because, though it may make some hypocrites, through the fear of suffering, it can make no sincere converts to the cause of the persecutors; they will rather be abhorred by all sensible and humane persons for the cruelty they exercise upon their opponents, and their doctrines will be the more disliked so far as they are supposed to produce such unchristian conduct. It is irrational, because it is a substitution of brutal force, pains and tortures, in the place of reason and sober argument, which it aims at crushing by the strong arm of power, and a system of terror. It is the more irrational if the persecutors have trata on their side, and the persecuted be in

error; for truth is able to maintain itself by sober argument, and can derive no advantage from the persecution of its opposers; on the contrary it is always disgraced and injured when the unholy weapons of the bigot and the persecutor are forced into its service. Thus on the supposition that the persecuted are in error persecution is irrational; but when it is remembered how often the victims of persecution have been on the side of truth, how seldom, if ever, truth has been with the persecutor, and that there can be no infallible certainty on either side, as all are liable to err, persecution must appear a mixture of insanity and brutality.

SECTION V.

Persecution is altogether antichristian.

Christianity gives not the least countenance to persecution in any form. It is altogether an antichristian practice, because directly contrary to the spirit and example of Jesus Christ: he was meek and lowly, mild and gentle, kind and compassionate towards all men: he would not suffer those to be persecuted who refused to receive him he had many persecutors, but he