original notions of quality, either in morals or in any thing else.

3. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived from association ?

The term association, is used to designate two habits of mind, considerably alike. The first is that, by which the sight or recollection of one object, calls to recollection some other object, to which it stands in some particular relation. Thus, the sight of a hearse may recall to recollection the death of a friend; or the sound of his native language, in a foreign country, may awaken in the breast of an exile all the recollections of home. The second case is, where a particular emotion, belonging to one train of circumstances, is awakened by another, with which it has no necessary connection; and this first emotion comes at last to be awakened by the accidental, instead of by the necessary, antecedent. Thus, the countenance of a person may be suited to awaken no emotion of pleasure in itself; but, if I become acquainted with him, and am pleased with his moral and intellectual character, a degree of pleasure is, at last, excited by his countenance, which in the end appears to me agreeable, or, it may be, beautiful.

Now, in both these cases, it is evident that no new idea is gained. In the one case, a well known idea is revived; in the other, two known ideas are connected in a new relation but this is all. Association is the faculty by which we transfer; but we can transfer nothing which did not previously exist. We could never use the idea of right and wrong by association, unless we had already acquired it. In the acts of judgment and association, therefore, as the existence of the notion must be presupposed, neither of these acts will account for the origin of the notion itself,

4. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived from the idea of the greatest amount of happiness?

Thus, it is said that our notion of right and wrong is derived from our idea of productiveness of happiness, or, in other words, that an action is right or wrong because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness.

When the affirmative of this question is asserted, it is, I presume, taken for granted, that the idea of right and wrong, and of productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, are two distinct ideas. If they be not, then one cannot be derived from the other; for nothing can correctly be said to be a cause of itself. We shall, therefore, consider them as different ideas, and inquire, in what sense it is true that the one is the cause of the other.

When we speak of two events in nature, of which one is the cause of the other, we use the word in one of the following senses. First, we use it to denote stated antecedency merely; as, when we say that sensation is the cause of perception, or, that a man perceives an external object, because an impression is made upon an organ of sense. Secondly, we use it to signify the fact, that the event or change of which we speak, may be referred to some law or fact, more general than itself. We say in other words, that the fact in question is a species under some genus, with which it agrees as to generic qualities; and from which it is distinguished by its specific differences. Thus, when asked why a stone falls to the earth, we reply, because all matter is reciprocally attractive to all other matter. This is the generic fact, under which the fact in question is to be comprehended; and its specific difference is, that it is a particular form of matter, attracted by a particular form of matter, and probably unlike the matter of the planets, the comets, or the sun.

First. When it is said that an action is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, suppose because to be used in the first of these senses. It will then mean, that we are so constituted, that the idea of the greatest amount of happiness is always the stated antecedent to the idea of right, or moral obligation. Now, this is a question purely of fact. It does not admit of a reason à priori. And, if it be the fact, it must be the universal fact; that is to say, this consequent must always, under similar conditions, be preceded by this antecedent, and this antecedent be followed by this consequent.

To facts, then, let us appeal. Is it a fact that we are conscious of the existence of this connection? When we are conscious that an act is right, is this consciousness preceded by a conviction that this action will be productive of the greatest amount of happiness? When we say it is wrong to lie or to steal, do we find this consciousness preceded by the notion, that lying or stealing will not produce the greatest amount of happiness? When we say that a murderer deserves death, do we find this notion preceded by the other, that murder will not produce the greatest amount of happiness, and that putting a murderer to death will produce it? When we say that a man ought to obey God, his Creator and Preserver, do we find this conviction preceded by the other; that the exercise of this affection will produce the greatest amount of happiness? Now, I may have greatly mistaken the nature of moral affections; but I am much deceived if many persons will not be found, who will declare, that often as they have formed these judg-ments, the idea of the greatest amount of happiness never actually entered into their conception.

Or take the case of children. When you would impress upon a child the duty of obeying its parents, or of loving God, do you begin by explaining to it the idea of the greatest amount of happiness? Are we obliged to make use of this

antecedent, in order to produce this consequent? If so, it surely would take a much longer time than is actually required, to produce in a child any moral sensibility. Do we not find children well instructed into the consciousness of right and wrong, who could not be made to comprehend the notion of the greatest amount of happiness?

How do we attempt to arouse the consciences of the heathen? When we tell them that they ought to obey God, and believe on Jesus Christ, do we begin by explaining to them that this course of life will produce the greatest amount of happiness? Suppose we could never arouse them to duty, until we had produced a conviction of the amount of happiness which would result to the universe from piety, would a single one of them ever listen to us long enough to understand our doctrine?

Does the Bible any where assert, that the conviction of the greatest amount of happiness is necessary to the existence of moral obligation? If I mistake not, it presents a very different view of the subject. It declares that the heathen are without excuse. But why? Because disobedience to God interferes with the greatest amount of happiness? No, but for a very different reason. "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them; so THAT they are without excuse." Rom. i. 19, 20. St. Paul here seems to assume, that the revelation of God's eternal power and divinity, and the manifestation of his will, are sufficient, of themselves, without any other consideration, to make whatever he shall command obligatory upon his creatures.

It seems, then, to me, by no means proved, that an action is right because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness; if we mean by it that the one idea is the stated antecedent to the other, in our conceptions.

Secondly. But let us take the other meaning of because. Suppose it said, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea comprehended under, and to be referred to, a more general idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness. Now, if this be the case, then, manifestly, either the notion of the greatest amount of happiness and the notion of right must be equally extensive; that is, must extend precisely to the same number of individual instances: or else their extent must be different; that is, the generic notion of the greatest amount of happiness must comprehend cases which are excluded from its species, the idea of right. If the latter be the case, then, there will be some cases in which an action would produce the greatest amount of happiness, which would not contain the moral element; and besides, if this were the case, it would become those who make this assertion, to show what is that other element, which, combining with the idea of the greatest amount of happiness, designates the subordinate and different idea, as the idea of moral obligation. This, however, would not be attempted, and it will be at once admitted, that these two ideas are, in their nature, coextensive: that is, that whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, is right; and that whatever is right, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness.

Let us suppose it then to be assumed, that the terms are precisely coextensive, viz. that they apply exactly to the same actions and in the same degrees. It would then be difficult to assign a meaning to the word because, corresponding with either of the senses above stated. Nor, if two terms are precisely coextensive, do I see how it is possible to discover which of the two is to be referred to the other; or, whether either is to be referred to either. If A and B are equally extensive, I do not see how we can determine whether A is to be referred to B, or B to be referred to A.

The only meaning which I can conceive as capable of