first, of what it is consonant with Infinite Wisdom, all things considered, to do, no one who is not infinitely wise, is competent to judge. We are sure that there cannot be more in the Effect than there is in the Cause; but we can never be sure that there is not more in the Cause than is seen in the Effect. But were the infidel objection valid, it would amount to nothing higher than a probability, a presumption, that the Creator, though wise, and powerful, and benevolent, is not infinitely so. Which probability, deduced altogether from present appearances, is to be set against the demonstration derived from the very nature of the Divine existence, that, in all his perfections, he must be infinite.

It is easy, and it may be useful, to shew, that even in the display of those perfections, the proofs of Divine wisdom and goodness infinitely preponderate over the apparent exceptions; because the mind is more apt to be affected by sensible illustrations than by mathematical certainties. It is proper to vindicate the ways of God against the cavils of infidels; but yet, this should not so be done as to rest the Divine character on a balance of probabilities-on the preponderance of good over evil, or the doctrine of future retribution. This is, we think, a very dangerous representation. It is to suspend man's first and highest obligation on the degree of satisfaction he may be able to attain to respecting the Divine character from the evidence of his works; a view of things which alike overlooks the relation in which he stands to his Creator, and the higher proof, implanted in his moral nature, of the Absolute Perfection of God. To argue the Divine Perfections from present appearances and probable anticipations, is, it seems to us, to argue from what is uncertain to what is certain, instead of setting out from certainty, and applying the fundamental axiom of all theology, morals, and philosophy, to the explanation of what is problematical. If any thing in knowledge is certain, it is this; first, that God exists, and secondly, that, being God, "He is light, and in Him is no "darkness at all."

If there is a God, the atheist himself cannot but admit that this is the true notion of the Being whose existence he denies. No one who confesses his belief in a God, pretends to believe that he can be other than a being absolutely perfect. Thus, every argument aimed against the perfection of the Divine Being, strikes at the belief in his existence, because it calls in question something which is essential to his being and nature, and inseparable from the idea of God. But, if the existence of God be demonstrated, including under that idea his necessary perfections, all the little cavils of infidels

against it, it has been justly remarked, must signify nothing, • because the same thing cannot be both true and false. If those persons who suffer themselves to entertain and dwell upon such sceptical cavils, while they would start back with horror from the conclusion to which they lead, did but well consider this alternative-either God is absolutely perfect, and all appearances to the contrary signify nothing, or the atheist is right,-this might save them both the pain and the guilt of dallying with blasphemous suggestions.

These volumes contain an Essay written for the Premiums bequeathed by the late John Burnett, Esq. of Aberdeen, to the authors of the best and next best treatises, in the estimation of the judges appointed by the Testator, on the evidence in favour of the Divine existence and attributes. The advertisement which announced this bequest, first appeared in the year 1811, and the time allowed for the composition of the treatises, extended to the 1st of Jan. 1814. The competition excited by the munificent premiums, (12001. to the best, and 4001. to the next in merit,) does not appear to have been so great as might have been expected. Mr. Drew's production, in company with about fifty competitors, was submitted to the inspection of the appointed judges. But he was not so fortunate as to carry off either premium. The first prize was awarded to the Rev. Dr. Brown, the Principal of Marischal College ; the second to the Rev. J. B. Sumner. Both of the prize Essays were published; and we must plead guilty to a misdemeanour, in having failed to give an account of them at the time of their appearance. We must frankly confess, however, that the omission did not proceed altogether from inadvertency. It appeared to us an invidious task, to review the decision of another tribunal; and we felt extremely glad that we had not on that occasion to determine, by our decision, the award of the 16001. It appeared to us, that the piety of the Testator's intentions was more unequivocally indicated by his bequest, than the soundness of his judgement. He seems to have assumed two positions, both of which might admit of a question: first, that the religious condition of society is, in a considerable degree, implicated in the prosecution of the metaphysical argument in proof of the Being and Attributes of God; and secondly, that the validity and influence of this argument would be materially assisted by the purchase, every fortieth year for ever, of two Essays upon the subject, at the price of sixteen hundred pounds. We are not aware that, hitherto, such an expectation has been adequately realized

Dr. Brown's Essay is rertainly a ble performance.

Without making a high pretension to originality of thought, it presents, in a perspicuous, popular, and in many respects able manner, the various topics of argument which the terms of the question embraced; and it will at least answer the purpose of informing the reader as to what it is usual to advance on the several branches of the subject. The chief faults of the work are frequent and rather forced references to the politics of the day, and occasional digressions not strictly in accordance with the dignity of the subject. We might have been disposed to rate Mr. Sumner's treatise rather more highly, but have felt bound to distrust our own judgement after the sentence of the Aberdeen judges. Mr. Drew's Essay yields to neither of the successful treatises in point of original talent; but as its intrinsic value is by no means equal to the ingenuity and acumen which it displays, we see no room for arraigning the decision respecting it. The Author, however, was not disposed to consign it wholly to oblivion, and having submitted it to the inspection of several literary friends, who encouraged him by their approbation, committed it to the press. It has, we perceive, been published some years; but it has so happened that we never met with it, or heard of it, till a copy fell into our hands some few months ago. The interest of such a work does not, however, in any measure depend upon its date.

The name of Samuel Drew must be well known to our readers as that of the author of two very ingenious and meritorious volumes on the Immateriality of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body. At the time of writing those works, he was living in the greatest obscurity, dependent, we believe, altogether for support on a mechanical occupation, and indebted to the almost unaided powers of his own mind for the proficiency he had made. He is now a preacher in the Wesleyan Connexion, and as such, commands very considerable attention. It is impossible, in reading these volumes, not to perceive the marks of a very strong and original mind. In the days of the Schoolmen, the Author, on whichsoever side he had enlisted, would have been a welcome champion and a formidable antagonist,-provided only that he could have quoted Aristotle. The work is divided into three parts. Part I. consists of arguments a priori; and the first of these has at least boldness and novelty to recommend it: it is as follows. Space exists positively; it is a visible display of the Divine immensity, and 'affords proofs of the existence of God-Space, being an infi⚫nite perfection, proves the existence of an infinite substance.' The second argument is drawn, in the same words, from the existence of Duration.

We e suspect that we have not many readers who will feel tempted to launch out into this boundless, trackless region; but we will endeavour to keep as near the coast as possible. It is evident, that, by giving the first place to this argument, Mr. Drew lays no small stress upon it; that the Divine existence can be demonstrated from the existence of Space. It is, however, an obvious objection to this mode of argument, that what is assumed or premised, stands more in need of being demonstrated than what is inferred. That God exists, is more obviously certain than that Space exists. But, waiving this objection, we consider his definition of Space as altogether built on a sophism,

Space,' he says, has been exalted by some to the dignity of the Supreme Being; by others it has been debased to a perfect nonentity; others, again, have denominated it the mere privation of body; while those of a different class have contended, that it is nothing more than a mere abstract idea. But, while these men have wearied themselves in settling the geography of error, and have invented arguments to give plausibility to their theories, other writers, of superior talents, more extensive views, and deeper penetration, have asserted the reality of space, and, contending for its universality and eternity, have pointed out its intimate connexion with unlimited existence, and with our ideas of unoriginated and unbounded being. Among these, the illustrious names of Newton, Locke, and Clarke may be placed in the foremost rank.'

Now it rather unfortunately happens, that Dr. Clarke, one of our Author's three authorities, has these words on the subject of infinite space, in his " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." Infinite Space is nothing else but an abstract idea of immensity or infinity; even as infinite Duration is of eternity; and it would not be much less proper, to say that Eternity is the essence of the Supreme Cause, than to say, that Immensity is so. Indeed, they seem both to be but attributes of an Essence incomprehensible to us; and when we ' endeavour to represent the real substance of any being whatsoever in our weak imaginations, we shall find ourselves in like manner deceived.' This question, if it be one, is not, however, to be settled by authorities; and though we cannot allow Mr. Drew the benefit of these names, yet, if he can prove that Dr. Clarke is wrong, the credit due to him will only be the greater. Let us then examine his argument.

A material world exists.' This is his first position; yet, he is aware that this has been controverted. But to reason with those who assert the whole to be a mere illusion, is,' he says, a task which I am not disposed to undertake.' In undertaking to reason with those who assert the notion of God to

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be a mere illusion, he has, however, undertaken a task not more superfluous; for we must deny that the proof of the existence of the material world, as attested by the evidence of our senses,' is so strong as the proof of the Divine existence supplied by reason. But we give him this position: a material world exists. Then, that in which it exists, that is space, must, he argues, be either an entity or a non-entity.

Now, if we suppose the world and its appendages to exist in an absolute nonentity, we cannot avoid concluding that these positive properties are actually existing in that from which all positive e properties are necessarily excluded. But how this can be possible, I must leave for others to discover. If the world exist in an absolute nonentity, this nonentity must have extension and capacity; otherd. wise, that which is extended, must exist where there is no extension, and be contained in that which has no capacity; which conclusions are evidently absurd. And, if we admit an absolute nonentity to have extension and capacity, we must ascribe these positive properties to that which we grant to be the reverse of existence. But, since nothing positive can be predicated of a nonentity, since extension and capacity are positive properties, and matter cannot be where extension and capacity are not,-it follows, that an absolute nonentity cannot contain the material world.'

In the following sections, he argues that motion cannot 'exist in an absolute nonentity;' that absolute nonentity is devoid of all assignable dimensions,' which cannot apply to Space; that Space, and our idea of it, are both positive, its reverse being a negation; yet, that Space is not a substance, nor the mode of one; that it has no parts; that, as well as our idea of it, it is strictly simple; that it differs from the idea of mere emptiness; that, if Space were an absolute nonentity, all bodies would be in contact; that Space is a visible display of immensity, yet, that it does not follow that that immense substance to which Space belongs, must be extended.

Now, as the word Space may to many of our readers appear a mysterious, metaphysical sort of a word, we propose, with submission, to substitute the word Somewhere. The argument, then, will run thus. A material world exists; it must exist somewhere, and that somewhere must be either an entity or a nonentity. But it cannot be a nonentity, having extension and capacity, which are positive properties. Moreover, both somewhere, and our idea of it, are positive, since the reverse of somewhere is no-where, which is a negation, and the physical 'reverse of a pure negation must exist positively.' Yet, this somewhere is not a substance, nor the mode of one; nor is it mere emptiness; it is not a mere abstract idea, because it contains real existence; it has no parts; it is strictly simple, This, we think, is no unfair representation of Mr. Drew's argu