many of our orthodox brethren, but almost their Bible. I have heard it quoted from the pulpit and referred to in private conversations with as much veneration, and often apparently with more effect, than even the Bible itself; and, from its simple, pleasing, pious and popular style, I have no doubt but that it will long continue to be so read. I am persuaded, therefore, that if it should be reprinted with some such alterations as those alluded to by Mr. Howe, it would be made highly useful in the dissemination of Unitarian principles; and should the respectable gentleman referred to by Mr. Howe, and who has the honour of being ranked amongst the number of his friends, undertake the work, I am satisfied he would additionally entitle himself to the thanks of the Unitarian body, as I know of nothing more likely to obtain general circulation, especially with the juvenile reader, and particularly coming before the public through so able and respectable a channel.

SIR,

YOU

B. MARTEN.

Lewes, March 9, 1821. OU will do me a favour if you will allow me, through the medium of your liberal publication, to seek from some of your ingenious and learned correspondents a solution of certain queries which have considerably perplexed my mind as a professor of the Unitarian faith. They are as follows:

The phrases Logos," or "Word of God," " Only-begotten image of God," Brightness of his glory," "Beginning" or origin "of his works," "First-born of every creature," and other similar expressions, I understand to have been in use, by Platonic and other philosophers, before and in the time of the apostles; and that those philosophers meant by such phrases a properly divine principle or power (not to say person) belonging to the Deity, by which he effected the creation of the whole universe. I also understand the apostles to have adopted the language in question, applying it in the New Testament to Jesus Christ. Now if the apostles did not intend by so doing to be understood as meaning that Jesus Christ was he by whom the universe was made, why did they apply

language to him which, in its original and (in their day) current meaning, was used of that divine principle by which the creation of all nature was effected? Or rather, I would ask, is not their application of the said language to Jesus Christ a proof that they considered him as the maker of the universe? I am aware that it is said they used the language in a new or figurative sense; and I must confess there are some passages where it occurs in the New Testament which are plausibly explained as figurative. But as the apostles have given no notice that they did not speak according to the common acceptation of the phraseology in question, I think nothing can warrant a figurative explanation of it in their writings but its being self-evident in the passages where it occurs that it cannot there be otherwise than figuratively used. There should be one passage, at least, of this description, to fix the meaning of the rest. I am not aware that there is one. On the other hand, I think there is one, if not more, which will not admit of any other than a literal sense, and which thus determines the meaning of all others of the same class to be literal, if, indeed, that point be not previously decided by the original meaning of the language used in the passages referred to. The particular place to which I now allude is in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is said, "Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne," &c., and, "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands." Here the creation of the natural heavens and the earth is ascribed to the Son in language as clear and definite as can be used, and I am persuaded that any principle of explanation which imposes upon this passage (or any other) a meaning different from what it decidedly expresses, can never be justly admitted as a legitimate principle of interpretation. With deference to the learning and integrity of the Editors of the Improved Version of the New Testament, I must dissent from their note or paraphrase upon the place alluded to, as being liable to the above objection, in that, by the introduction of a perfectly gratuitous sentence, it imposes upon the passage a meaning altogether arbitrary and

SIR,

IN

Na conversation in the House of Commons on the Catholic Disabilities' Removal Bill, Lord NUGENT observed, in reply to some charges of bigotry and intolerance against the Roman Catholic religion, "that in no part of the service of the Roman church was there any thing of an exclusive nature to be found. It contained no such damnatory creed as the Athanasian Creed, which formed part of our own service."

Now, Sir, pleased as I am to find the "monstrous Creed," as it has been called, thus spoken of in Parliament, I cannot but feel surprise at Lord Nugent's statement, and beg to ask of your correspondents whether the Athanasian formulary be not in the Romish Missal, (it is certainly adopted by the Church of Rome,) and whether it do not form at times part of the Romish service?

CANTAB.

pose, that he wills the transport of A towards B for no other purpose, but only for the sake of this impulse. Therefore A must be transferred towards B by the shortest way, or by a right line. For if the body A were transferred to B by a crooked line, that would shew either that the transporter knew no other way, or else that he did not only will the concourse of these bodies, but also the means to effect it, otherwise than in relation to the concourse itself, which is against the supposition. Again, says he, there is as much more action requisite to transfer a body from A to B by a crooked line, than by a right line, as the crooked is greater than the right. If therefore God should transfer Ä to B by a crooked line, double to a right, half the action of God would be wholly useless. And so one half of it would be done without design, and without any end, as well as without effect. Moreover, says he, action in God is will. Therefore there must be more will in God to make A to be trans

REFLECTIONS MADE IN A COURSE OF GENERAL READING.

No. CCCLXXVIII. Simplicity of the Divine Proceedings. An eminent author has made this a character of the Divine conduct and wisdom,-to act always by the most simple ways. Upon which principle he lays a great weight, drawing from it consequences of the greatest importance to the order both of nature and grace. Now I must needs say, that this appears to me a very clear and certain proposition with respect to God, which our most excellent author thus briefly at once demonstrates and explains: I suppose, says he, that God would have the body A should strike against the body B. Now since God knows all things, he well knows that A can go to strike B by innumerable crooked lines and by one only right one. But God only wills that A should strike B. And we sup

now we have already supposed that God had no will as to the motion of A, but only with respect to the impulse. Therefore there is not will enough in God to move A by a crooked line. And, consequently, 'tis a contradiction that A should move by a crooked line to B. And so it is a contradiction that God should not act by the most simple ways, unless we suppose that God in the choice of the ways he makes use of to execute his designs, has something else in view besides those same designs, which in our supposition is a contradiction. Other considerations he has to this purpose, and from the whole concludes, that, according to this manner of conceiving things, God cannot employ more will than he needs must to execute his designs. So that he always acts by the most simple ways with relation to them. Norris's Treatise of Christian Prudence. Pp. 137139.

ART. 1.-The Edinburgh Review. No. LXIX. March, 1821.

HIS Journal having placed our Repository at the head of one of its articles, we return the compliment, in order to take the opportunity of making a few extracts from two of the papers in the number above designated, with some remarks upon the interesting subjects to which they refer. The first article to which we allude is entitled "Dissenters' Marriages," and the work professed to be reviewed is our XIVth Volume. The subject really is the Unitarian Marriage Bill: the amended petition relating to which is here quoted [Mon. Repos. XIV. 198], as is also Mr. Dillon's account of his marriage-protest (XIV. 179– 181). Marriage and mirth are near akin: we must not therefore blame the Reviewer for being a little jocose, especially as he has more than made amends for his levities by asserting ably and boldly the great and generous principles of religious liberty. He opens his paper with a prediction, exceedingly startling to orthodox Church

men:

"Strange as the assertion may appear to many Clergymen of that Establishment, the English Church is mortal; and ages hence, though the rivers and the hills remain, there may be no Bishops and no Deans. Now, the receipt we would propose for the prolongation of the existence of this venerable system, is the diminution of needless hostility, a display of good humour, liberality and condescension, and an habit of giving way in trifles, in order to preserve Essentials. Every nation of Europe has its ecclesiastical Establishment, to the sup. port of which the community at large contribute. This is all very well; we quarrel with nothing of this kind. But, the Establishment once made and well provided for, any exclusive privilege conferred upon its members is mere mono

poly and oppression; against such unjust pretensions of Establishments, we have always contended; they are not religion, but greediness and insolence wrapt up in a surplice."-Pp. 62, 63.

The Reviewer repeats from us, that "before the Marriage-Act, the marriage of Dissenters, in the face of their own congregation, was good in law," and he states very correctly the claim of the Unitarian Dissenters for relief.

Referring to the Bill which was once read in the House of Commons, he

says,

"If this bill passes (and we sincerely hope it may pass), the provisions of the bill should be to this effect. The Disclergyman of the parish, stating his dissenter should lodge his petition with the sent from the doctrines of the Church, his desire to be excused from assisting at the marriage-service, and his intention to appear at the altar on the hour pointed out by the clergyman, with the documents and sureties required by the act, in order to the registration of his marriage; which petition shall be read in church, and alluded to in the register as the cause of the omission of the marriage-service ;— and Dissenters' marriages so performed shall be good in law.

"This we consider to be a far better arrangement than any request to omit parts of the service. To say, Don't pray with us at all, we do not require your spiritual assistance,' may not be unreasonable language from Dissenters to the Church; but to say, 'We will tell you which of your prayers you may omit, and which you may use,' is bad taste, and not suitable to the state of the parties.”—Pp. 65, 66.

if the Unitarians have ventured to Beggars must not be choosers; and point out the mode of relief, it has been only to shew that their object was practicable. They have no fondness for one mode of relief in preference to another. All that they ask is to be tolerated in the dissent from Trinitarian worship; and in any measure for providing such toleration that the Legislature shall enact they will cheerfully acquiesce. The method pointed out by their Bill appeared to them less likely to offend the Church than any other, since it secures to the clergy