been relieved; would any one say, in this case, that what the king had done was labour thrown away? Would they not rather say, that he had done his duty, and had thus removed the possibility of being accused of neglecting his subjects?

It will be objected perhaps, that if this king be supposed to be omniscient, and to know that his subjects would make no appeals to such confidential officer, would not such appointment be useless? We answer: That to deprive men of an excuse, in this respect, is of the utmost importance; because no one, excepting the king himself, could possibly know that men would not make such appeals, or suppose that he was unable to afford redress. For people would naturally say, that the administration of justice was the concern of the king had he appointed proper officers we should have obeyed. But, when such officers have been appointed, this excuse is effectually met, and the king is justified in punishing the offender. It must appear then, that there are certain advantages derived from the mission of a Prophet or his successor, which might not occur to common observation: but as these have been detailed at length by Theologians, want of room will justify their omission here.

Such objections, therefore, can have no real weight with considerate people because it is well known both from history and tradition, that many Prophets have been sent for the instruction

of mankind, who have not only been disregarded, but in many instances put to death. Others, like Noah, have preached for years without exciting the least attention; but at last have made a few converts. The preaching of Noah, we learn, was continued through a period of nine hundred and fifty years; and when at last circumstances became pressing, and he determined to destroy mankind by the flood, those who had joined him and were admitted to the ark, did not exceed eight persons. But if the want of Prophetic missions had been the cause why such did not believe, such missions would surely never have been undertaken. The objection must therefore be vain; and it must appear, which it is indeed our object to shew, that it was incumbent on the Deity never to have left mankind without an Apostle; and that the same will hold good to the end of time; for this reason, that his ways may be vindicated, as in the instances alluded to. If in such a case people obey, well; but if they do not, it will be but right, as in the present instance, that such Apostle should withdraw himself. Because mankind will confessedly become his enemies and opposers. Such then, let it be remembered, is the scope of the divine counsels on this point; and to disregard which, has ever been attended with much error and consequent misery.

It is one of the sayings of the Padre, that he wished to see a good metaphysical proof made

out, in support of the Shiah faith. The author of this Tract has, without intending personal offence, or, being unnecessarily captious afforded him the proof he required: the next point to be ascertained is, whether the Padre is really in quest of the true religion or not as the present enquiry has been conducted by such argument alone, as must be sufficient for every candid enquirer. Verse, "If the person be at home, a word will suffice." It appears from some passages in the Padre's Tracts, that he believes Jesus to have been the last Prophet; and, as he also believes that he was put to death, and has ascended to heaven, it must follow that mankind, thus left without a divine leader and guide, must be reduced to a degree of want and misery, which it is incompatible with sound reason to allow.

SECTION II.

ON THE PADRE'S REPLIES TO MIRZA IBRAHIM.

Ir should be observed, that the Tract of the Professor is written in the Arabic, and those of the Padre in the Persic Language. It is our intention to translate, the Professor's Tract into the Persic, that the scope of both may the more plainly appear, and particularly the object and failure of the Padre.

The Professor had said (p. 2.) that a miracle is an effect which exceeds common experience.

"True," replies the Padre,

"for the very object of a miracle is to shew, that he who performs it has been sent from God, &c." (p. 80-1.) "And hence it appears, that a miracle must exceed universal, and not particular, experience." We reply; It appears from these words of the Padre, viz. "This cannot be known except by some act exceeding human power," that he carries human experience to the utmost limit of possibility; which is to mistake the question in the very outset, as we shall presently shew: for the wonders+ wrought by the saints, although contrary to experience, do not exceed human power: the only difference between a miracle and a wonder being, that the miracle must be accompanied by a challenge to produce the like‡, which is not necessary for the wonder.

If however it be objected, that the wonders wrought by the saints are not brought about by human power alone; because man, considered as such, can have no power by which he can effect a change in the essence of things, otherwise any individual could do the same; and that these

In making the citations from the foregoing tracts, I shall, in order to avoid repetition, give the beginning and end only of the passages, referring the reader to the pages in which they are found.

+ See the definitions pp. 2 and 3.

This is not wholly true, for, according to the definition, the miracle must also be accompanied by a claim to Prophecy.

wonders are effected by the divine energy with which they have been favoured in consequence of their self-denial and piety. And hence, as they have arrived at that state of perfection, which designates them as the servants of the Most High, and subdues their will to the obedience of his, works done by them should rather be referred to God as their proper author: We answer: What then must be said with regard to those extraordinary acts, which are occasionally performed by infidels, such, for example, as the Brahmans of India? Who are so far from possessing purity of mind, that they are immersed in every spiritual impurity.

Hence also will appear the futility of another of the Padre's assertions, namely, "The very object of a miracle is to shew, that he who performs it has been sent from God." For when we have seen that extraordinary acts have been performed by infidels, how are we to know by any such act, that he who performs it has come from God, but by the addition of some particular, disabling the pretender from passing himself off as a Prophet? And when this has been done, what necessity can there be, that such act exceed universal experience? If then the claim of any pretender be thus rendered abortive, the inability of that people, to which any Prophet has been sent, to produce the like, will be quite sufficient to establish his claim. But, if this be not sufficient, the perform

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