interefere by injunction, but leave the parties to their legal remedy.

Thus, where a tramroad had been made by the defendants across the farm of the plaintiff, with the license and permission of the occupying tenant, but without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, who resided at a distance, and the plaintiff filed a bill for an injunction to prevent the defendants from entering upon the land and using the tramway, the court refused to interefere. "The thing here complained of," observes the Lord Chancellor, "has been done. The tramroad has, with the leave of the tenant in possession, been completed, and the court is asked by the bill to restrain the defendants, who, having finished the undertaking, are now in the daily use and occupation of it, from continuing so to use it, and from interrupting the servants and workmen of the plaintiff in their attempts to destroy it. In other words, the court is virtually asked to eject the defendants and authorize the plaintiffs themselves to take possession of the tramroad. The case may originally have been a case of waste occasioned by the cutting of the tramroad, and the laying of the iron rails over the plaintiff's land; but what is now claimed by the defendants is simply a right of way; and if they are entitled to that right, they are mere trespassers, and the plaintiffs have their proper legal remedy against them as such. (4)

However, in cases where irreparable injury would be caused before the right could be properly determined at law, a court of chancery will interfere by injunction to restrain trespasses by a stranger. (4)

(4) Deere v. Guest, I My. & Cr. 522. London & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Lan

caster, &c., R. R. Co., L. R., 4 Eq. Cas. 174.

CHAPTER VII.

TROVER-TITLE TO CHATTELS.

510. What things are comprehended
under the words 66
'goods and
chattels."

511. What possession is within the stat

ute.

512. Reputation of ownership.
513. Things sold by the bankrupt, and
left in his possession-Raw ma-
terials of manufacture.

514. Goods and chattels which have
never been the property of the
bankrupt.

515. Possession by manufacturers, work-
men, and depositaries.

516. Factors and commission agents.
517. Non-consent of the true owner.
518. Possession by a bankrupt cestui que

trust.

519. Possession by bankrupt trustees.
520. Goods in the apparent possession
of the bankrupt within the Bills
of Sale Act.

521. Title to trust property.
522. Right of property in things taken
and converted after recovery of
judgment in an action for the
conversion of them.

SECTION III.-Remedies for the wrongful
onversion of chattels.

523. Reception of goods wrongfully

seized or stolen.

524. Of the plaintiffs in actions of tres

pass and conversion.

525. Joinder of joint-owners as plaintiffs ---Joint-tenants and tenants in common of chattels.

526. Parties to be made defendants.

527. Of the staying of proceedings on the delivery of the chattels to the plaintiff.

528. Declarations for a trespass, or for

the conversion of chattels.

529. What may be given in evidence under the plea of not guilty.

530. Pleas denying the plaintiff's right
of property in, or his right to the
possession of, the chattel.

531. Pleas of justification.
532. Evidence at the trial-Proof by
the plaintiff.

533. Proof of constructive possession of
chattels.

534. Proof of title of trustees of bankrupts, executors, and nominal parties.

535. Proof of conversion.

536. Evidence for the defence.

537. When the defendant is estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff.

538. Evidence under pleas of justifica
tion.

539. Of the assessment of damages.
540. Assessment of damages, where the

plaintiff has only a limited or doubtful interest in the goods. 541. Of the damages recoverable, where the plaintiff has offered to return the goods, or the defendant has received them back after the commencement of the action.

542. Damages, in the nature of interest over and above the value of the goods.

543. Damages under Customs' Acts.

SECTION I

TROVER.

466. Trespass upon personalty.-If one man meddles with the goods and chattels of another, either by laying hold of, removing, or carrying away inanimate things, or by striking, chasing, or driving cattle, sheep, and domestic animals in which the owner has a valuable property, he is guilty of a trespass,' and is responsible in damages, unless the act can be

• Any unlawful interference with or control over the property of another, is a tres

justified on the ground that it was done in necessary self-defence of the person, or of property, or of one's absolute or relative rights, or in obedience to some legal or personal authority, or can be excused on the ground that it was the result of inevitable accident, or was caused by the negligent or wrongful act of the plaintiff himself (a); as where a man wrongfully suffers his cattle to trespass upon my land, or leaves thereon corn or hay which he ought to have removed, and his cattle get injured, or his corn or hay is eaten by my beasts. In these cases he has no remedy for the injury, as it was caused by his own default (b).

If a man's goods and chattels obstruct me in the exercise of my right of way, I have a right to remove them. If he places a horse and cart in the way of the access to my house, or before my door, so that I cannot drive up to it, I have a right to lay hold of the horse and lead him away, and, if necessary, to whip him to make him move on (c). So, if a person's goods are placed on my ground, I may lawfully remove them (d); and if his cattle or sheep come upon my land, I may chase them and drive them out. Where the defendant with a little dog chased the plaintiff's sheep out of his grounds, where they were trespassing, and the sheep went into another man's land next adjoining, and the dog pursued them there, and the defendant did his best to recall his dog, but the dog could not be recalled at once, and the plaintiff sued the defendant for chasing and worrying his sheep, it was held that the action was not maintainable. as the defendant had not incited the dog to chase. the sheep after they had left his premises, but he had done

(a) Ante, pp. 2, 19–22; post, ch. 8. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

(6) Webb v. Paternoster, Godb. 282, pl. 401; Farmer v. Hunt, Brownl. 220.

(c) Slater v. Swann, 2 Str. 872.

(d) Cole v. Maundy, Roll. Abr. TRESPASS, 1. pl. 17, p. 566. Rhca v. Seward, 2 M. & W. 426.

pass. Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wis. 319; and liability attaches, even though the act was accidental or occurred through mistake. Id. Caldweil v. Farrell, 28 Ill. 438. Thus if A seiis B an ox on his (A's) premises, and B goes upon A's land and drives away the wrong ox, he is liable in trespass as well as though the act had been intentional. Hobart v. Hackett, 3 Fairfax (Me.) 67. So when one takes the property of another and uses it to manufacture an article, as a boat, the owner may lawfully take the boat unless the timber is mingled with other timber in the construction of the boat. Burris v. Johnson, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 196. It makes no difference what change of form property has undergone, if the owner can identify the original materials, he may take it in. its new form. Parker v. Walrod, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 296; 16 Id. 514; Betts v. Lee, 5 John. (N. Y.) 348; Curtis v. Groat, 6 Id. 168.

his best to call the dog off (e). But the chasing of trespassing beasts with a mastiff dog is unlawful, and if any damage is done to them by such a dog, the plaintiff will be responsible for a trespass (.

If a dangerous animal is let loose by a man who is acquainted with its ferocious disposition, and the animal bites or otherwise violently injures another, an action for a trespass is maintainable against the person who set it free (g.

If a dog chases conies in a warren, or game in a preserve, or deer in a park, or sheep in a fold, he may be killed by the owner of the animals to prevent their destruction (h), but not after the chasing is discontinued and the peril has ceased (2).

If a chattel has been lost by one man and found by another, the finder has an implied license or authority from the owner to take the chattel and keep it for his use (k). But though the taking of a chattel may be lawful in the first instance, yet if the person who has taken it abuses it, uses it, or wastes it. he may render himself a trespasser ab initio, and disable himself from justifying or excusing the original taking, as well as any of his subsequent dealings with the property (7).1

(e) Mitten v. Faudrye, Poph. 161, cited 4 Burr. 2094.

(f) King v. Rose, 1 Freem. 347. (g) De Grey, C. J., 3 Wils. 410. Leame v. Bray.

(4) Wadhurst v. Damme, Cro. Jac. 45. Barrington v. Turner, 3 Lev. 28.

(i) Janson v. Brown, 1 Campb. 41. Wells v. Head, 4 C. & P. 568.

(k) Isack v. Clarke, 1 Roll. Rep. 130. (7) Oxley v. Watts, 1 T. R. 12. Attack v. Bramwell. 32 Law J., Q. B. 146. And see post, ch. 11. s. I.

1 An action of trover is a special action on the case, in favor of any person who has a special or general property in goods to the possession of which he is immediately entitled, which are withheld from him by another unlawfully. It is a proper remedy for the wrongful detention and conversion of any species of personal property, and in many instances is a concurrent remedy with trespass and case. In all instances where the goods are forcibly taken and converted, trover as well as trespass will lie. As if A forcibly enters upon the premises of B and takes away B's horse, or any species of personal property, B may bring either trespass or trover, but when the property has rightfully come into defendant's possession, unless it has been actually converted, there must be a demand for the property before the action is brought, or it cannot be maintained; but while it is true that trover or trespass either may often be brought for the wrongful conversion, yet in a majority of instances it is the only remedy. As when goods go lawfully into the possession of the defendant, but are wrongfully con. verted by him. Trover is a transitory action, and may be brought in any jurisdiction ; Whidden v. Seeley, 40 (Me.) 247:

In order to maintain the action the plaintiff must, as before stated, have a special or general property in the goods, and must be entitled to their immediate possession