FIRST PRINCIPLES.

GOOD's Book of Nature, and Butler's Analogy, have, in some measure, broke the way to a restoration of those original principles of science, on which modern speculation has too often and too presumptuously innovated. The tendency of these popular works, to which we more particularly refer, is to a connexion of metaphysics with physics in one general system, aptly called "the universal science," since it comprehends all things, natural and spiritual; a connexion in respect to analogy, whereby some comprehension at least of things invisible may be gathered from things visible or literally known. Who would think of beginning to build at the top of an edifice? or that it was of no consequence whether an edifice had any foundation at all? of soaring into the regions of intellect and utter abstraction for the first principles of science? Yet, if we examine the subject, we shall perhaps find, that so far as any first principle is concerned in whatever is more characteristic of the superstructure of modern physics and metaphysics, such is too often and too really the case.

But "to do something to instruct, yet more to undeceive the timid and admiring student-to excite him to place more confidence in his own strength and less in the infallibility of great names-to help him to emancipate his judgment from the skackles of authority-to teach him to distinguish between showy language and sound sense-to warn him not to pay himself with words-to show him, that what may tickle the ear or dazzle the imagination, will not always inform the judgment—to dispose him rather to fast on ignorance than feed himself with error,"-has long since be

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come a motto in our thriving age for the advancement of that liberality of sentiment, which is growing into results more and more auspicious, and which no where finds such an asylum as here. But there is an extreme in free inquiry to be especially avoided; a too licentious speculation; a reckless vanity of intellect, prone to transgress the laws of common sense, and the general understand ing of mankind; a spirit favorable to aristocracy or the condemnation of the populace, so opposed to our political institutions; yet the grand fault, which has extensively prevailed in Protestant times, whatever may have been the benefits of the Reformation, and more peculiar perhaps to modern bigotry, than to the free-thinker. We here refer, more particularly, to an enormous gulf between things physical, and metaphysical, or spiritual, set off by speculation, and which, as if by Satanic influence, has long been widening to the almost entire removal of any shore, or any existence in the latter more than what is nominal; a reduction of substance to quality; a tendency to mere materialism and infidelity. Who now hears any thing about pneumatology in metaphysics? Who, indeed, is allowed to indulge the least conception of such a thing as spirit, by forming any idea thereof from analogy or things sensible, the only way in which any idea whatever may be formed; the only source of science, or from which the very name is derived. (Science, sense, scio, low, idea, idéw.) Even the word, metaphysics, has grown old-fashioned, because it may imply perhaps somewhat of spiritual existence, or some analogy therein to things physical; the more current phrase, intellectual, has long been transplanting it. So the terms, soul, spirit, ghost have given way to the term, mind, because this implies something more intellectual or less tangible; perhaps, indeed, those terms would now be wholly unheard-of, were it not for the sanction of Scripture, where as in all original languages, they are universally used instead of a corresponding word to the term, mind, which is derived from other terms, (as, mens, vóos, gemind,) denoting a mere intellectual faculty of the soul, rather than the soul itself, or any distinct essence whatever. In the Encyclopædia Britannica, under the article Metaphysics, we read: "By pneumatology, metaphysicians mean the knowledge of all spirits, angels, &c. It is easy to conceive, that

infinite art is necessary to give an account of what we do not absolutely know any thing, and of which, by the nature of the subject itself, we never can know any thing." But if all this be admitted, where is Christianity? where is that characteristic faith, which is "the evidence of things not seen"? or if there be a spiritual entity," what recks the world to know" any thing about it, for where is the application of a doctrine wholly beyond the sphere of human comprehension? Surely, then, we may not altogether deplore the progress of materialism under such a state of things, or any other means of bringing men to look after this subject, to break this Satanic spell on Christian knowledge, this glamour of magic. "It is high time," says Dr. Good, "to be more accurate, and to have both determinate words and determinate ideas."

But it is not enough to make these ravages in spiritual entity, a crusade has been levied against the existence of matter also, in this chaos of modern speculation, this airy castle-building, this driving of the crazy ship without a helm. How can men expect to move the world with Archimedes' lever without something to stand upon? What hazard from this neglect of a choice of ground lest the enemy seize upon it first, and themselves be hove from the field where their banners are now floating. It is said, that we know no more of matter than of spirit; the first principles of knowledge being placed in the internal operations of the mind, distinct from sense, in the single word, Cogito, that is, I think, the famous dogma of Descartes, (Princ. Pars. I.) gratuitously assumed in open defiance of common sense and the universal consent of mankind. Yet even so the Edinburgh Review; (Jan. 1804.) "It has been said, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world, as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions.-Now this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness; that alone is certain-all the rest is inference." Thus, the evidence of sense and our knowledge of matter are cast below our knowledge of mind, however uncertain this may be; and that too, on the evidence of a certain consciousness, so called, which is wholly distinct from sense; an internal operatian of mind, evidently consisting withal of "such

stuff as dreams are made of." The term, consciousness, instead of cogitation, or mere speculation, is thus artfully superinduced to gloze over in some degree the imperficiences of this system. Consciousness is derived from sense, or may not be fairly used to denote mere thought, the proper foundation of the system, for we are never so conscious of any truths, as of those derived from sense. Hence this term is not wholly synonymous with "thoughts, conceptions," or the principle, Cogito; which in fact gives to the fantasy of the lunatic, the temporary impressions of the poet and novel reader, and to every idle dream, a reality superior to that of immediate sense; so wild is this speculation, and so blind has been the reception of it.

In latter years, however, metaphysicians have been rather disposed to wave in some measure an open profession of this principle, or indeed of any first principle. Dr. Reid, after discovering some of its absurdities, openly allowed, (Inquiry into the Mind, chap. 7.) that we "must admit the existence of what we see and feel as a first principle, as well as the existence of things whereof we are conscious; " whence his pretended, common-sense system. But how far has either he or his successors practically admitted this innovation on Cartesianism? "Mr. Stewart, " says the Edinburgh Review, (Jan. 1804) "answers with irresistible force, (that is, to the objection of the materialist against the gratuitous assumption of the existence of mind,) that the philosophy of Dr. Reid has in reality no concern with the theories, that may be formed as to the causes of our mental operations, but is entirely confined to the investigation of those phenomena, which are known to us by internal consciousness and not by external perception." The evidence of sense being, after all, so far neglected, what wonder at the dogma, that we know no more of matter than of spirit, and that "of the essence of matter we know nothing"?

"Is the essence of the human soul," says Dr. Good, (Book of Nature, Ser. 3, Lec. 1,) " material or immaterial? The question at first sight, appear to be highly important.-Yet, I may venture to affirm, that there is no question, which has been productive of so little satisfaction, or has laid a foundation for wider and wilder errors within the whole range of metaphysics. And for this