advise the leaft alteration either in matter or expreffion.

I do not mean by this to fay, that I am abfolutely and wholly in the sentiments of the ingenious author. As for the fubjects of her curfory Thoughts, they are fo abstruse and nice, that I can hardly fay, what fentiment I am of: for I am apt to hearken and incline to every fine reafoner upon them; and it is perhaps for this reason, (perhaps for a better) that if I were at this very time to declare which of the writers on thefe fubjects I most approve of, I should answer, Mrs Cockburn.

But as to the other and principal Subject of thefe papers, (which I now thankfully return) concerning the foundation of moral virtue and moral obligation, I am not yet so satisfied with any of the accounts I have met with as I could wish to be; and am ftill apt to think, there are fome diftinctions yet wanting to be hit of, which would reconcile the advocates of Dr Clarke, and Dr Waterland, with each other.

i am, indeed, altogether with the learned lady in what she fays, and oppofes to those, who would lay this foundation in such low and ungenerous principles as felf-love, and

felf

felf-interest. And I am alfo ready to admit, that the reason, nature, and fitness of things, as they now appear to a moral agent, would be a foundation of obligation. So would the moral fenfe likewife, if they were not both of them refolvable into a nobler principle ftill, which can bé no other than the will of God, Perhaps in this I come the closest to Mr W, though I think our prefent author has fairly catched him tripping in one pofition. Nor do I fee how he can be able to an

fwer her last query put to him.

The things wanting yet to be fettled in this controverfy, are, I conceive,

ift, What is meant by the word foundation, as it is commonly used by the writers in it?

2dly, Whether moral virtue, and moral obligation, muft needs have the fame foundation, and in the fame sense ?

3dly, Whether the reafon, nature, and fitnefs of things, confidered as antecedent to the divine will, do appear under that confideration to be obligatory to morality? Or thus :

Whether rules of action, and obligation to action, be not quite diftinct, and may not have diftinct foundations, in like manner as

the reafon and fitnefs of a law are diftin&t from the authority of a law?

!

I must confefs, for my own part, I have fuch an undistinguishing head, that I could never tell how to separate the effential differences of things (as they now appear to moral agents) from the will of God. All created nature is an expreffion of his will, in thefe ve, ry effential differences, and relations, and fitneffes flowing from them. And therefore I like, and I adhere to that expreffion of Mrs Cockburn's; Thy perfect will in the effential dif ferences of good and evil.

Why may not morality, confidered in the mind of God before creation, like metaphyfical truths, be ultimately refolved (as your learned lady is pleased to word it) into the divine understanding? And morality, confidered in its obligations on rational creatures, be ultimately refolved into the divine will? Is there any inconfiftency in this distinction?

Though morality, as a rule, was eternally in the mind of God, like mathematical proportions, yet there could be no obligation to conform to this rule, till it became practicable by the actual fubfiftence of things, expreffing thofe relations and fitneffes; that is, till God

had

had expreffed his own will, as well as his wifdom, in a system of works, exhibiting all' thofe eternal ratios, &c. Therefore, I am inclined to conceive, that the foundation of ob-' ligation to conform to thefe fitneffes could not be antecedent to the divine will, whatever the ratios themselves were.

Mrs Cockburn's Answer to Dr Sharp.

I

AM much encouraged in the defign of printing my papers, by the favourable opinion of fo good a judge as Dr Sharp; who, no doubt, upon a thorough confideration, would be much better able than I am, to clear up the difficulties he finds in Dr • Clarke's scheme. But fince he is fo condescending to my weak attempts, I fhall freely give my Thoughts upon them. It is, I think, a good step towards removing them, that he is intirely against thofe, who would lay the foundation of moral obligation on

fuch low principles, as felf-love and felf-in

tereft; for, I believe, upon a farther reflec⚫tion it will appear, that we must either lay

it there, or upon the nature, relations, and ⚫ fitnefs of things.

As to the word foundation, though metaphorically applied to thefe fubjects, I do not find, that there is any ambiguity in the ufe of it, or that any misunderstanding has happened for want of explaining it. When it is fpoke of moral virtue, it is commonly, I suppose, understood (at least I have always ⚫ taken it) to mean the ground on which moral virtue folely arifes, or that, without which there could be no fuch Thing as virtue. And such a foundation, I think, can

be no other than the neceffary relations and ⚫effential differences of things; for upon these

even the virtue of obeying the will of God must be founded; fince, on a fuppofition. that there were no effential differences, or fitneffes refulting from them, there could be no more goodness in obedience, than in the contrary.

As to the fecond question, whether moral ⚫ virtue and moral obligation must have the ⚫ fame foundation, and in the fame fenfe? it ⚫ feems clear to me, that if the nature and reafon of things is the foundation of moral virtue, it must be the foundation of moral • obligation