that the theory would be viewed as an innovation, and so be liable to censure. Now this was evidently advanced to the exclusion of the disquisitions contained in the voluminous treatises of Dr. Hutcheson on the passions, the best, perhaps, extant: books which had been published only a few years before, and which caused controversy sufficient to produce ample illustrations of the moral sense; books which prove to us, in direct terms, that there can be no exciting reason previously to affection, instinct, or the moral faculty; and that the conscience is distinct from the sense of moral good and evil; so, we conclude that what taste is to natural discernment, conscience is to the moral sense,-improved by knowledge and care.

The qualities or effects produced from the faculties of the soul might not unaptly be called volition, judgment, and knowledge.* Dr. Lawson defines passion to be the will acting with vehemence; but I think it appears pretty evident that passion is feeling, modified by intellect and the experience of sensation. "Writers," says Dr. Lawson, "agree in mentioning two faculties of the mind, of undoubted reality, and altogether different, the understanding and the will. Next after which they place, as different springs of action, the passions; in this last, it seems, they are mistaken: for look into your own breasts," says the Doctor," is not the case thus? You apprehend a certain object to be good; you instantly desire to obtain it; if it be of much importance, vehe mently. What then is will, what passion? are they not the same operation, differing but in degree? For observe, the general act of desiring we name willing;† add

*This is similar to the division of St. Bernard.

It was the opinion of Locke, that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind.. But his illustrations do not appear to be

hereto heat, ardour, it is passion. Passion then," says the Doctor, "is the will acting with vehemence."* Now to disprove the accuracy of this corrected definition, we need only refer to the faculties of volition, judgment, and knowledge. Independently of reason and experience, the first, "volition," includes only instinct and appetite, but, connected with them, it comprises every other modification of feeling, from the calmest of all possible desire, to the most violent impetus of emotion, and astonishment, and every feeling of energetic passion; and however the second, "judgment," may be said to comprehend abstract as well as concrete ideas, and to discover differences, excitement to the faculty of judging is, in a manner, dependent on the will; for were there none other power in the soul but contemplation, says Dr. Hutcheson, there would be no affection, volition, desire, or action; further, without some motion of will, no man would voluntarily persevere in contemplation, there must be a desire of knowledge and of the pleasure which attends it; and this too is an act of willing.

conclusive. "A man," says Locke, "whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail upon him. In this case," continues Locke, "'tis plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary." The reason, I humbly conceive, is because a stronger conquers the weaker desire. Again, "A man, who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for where there is pain there is desire to be ridden of it) though yet whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove the pain." What does this prove more than that the will is prudently restrained by the superior energies of the intellectual faculty?

* Lectures concerning Oratory; by John Lawson, D.D. page 156,

Taking this for granted, Dr. Lawson and the writers quoted by him, are all partly wrong and all partly right. Passions are not springs of action different from the will, but they are the will, or feelings of the will, modified by experience.

Having been furnished with the elaborate treatises of Dr. Hutcheson, and the subsequent disquisitions of the learned Dublin Professor, Mr. Lawrence might have been convinced that the passions are not the result of material organization. And it is a matter of surprise that E. Burke, Blair, Ward, Herries, Sheridan, Walker, and other men of eminence, have not given more ample definitions of the passions, than as feelings or organs of the soul, modifications, affections, or instincts; so that appetites, affections, and passions, three distinct modifications of feeling, are mingled and thrown confusedly together.

It is plain, from the definition of the passion of love in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, that the ideas of Locke on passion were imperfect; "Thus," says the author, "any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love.* For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are none, that, he loves grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of the taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer." To disprove this description, which

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* That is, the passion of love; for having next defined hatred, the writer observes, were it my business here to inquire any farther than into the bare idea of passions," &c.

+ Locke's Essay, chap. 20.

indeed is none other than of appetite, it may be merely noticed, that it is the union of affection with another modification of feeling, called appetite, which constitutes PASSION: So that if "alteration of health or constitution” produces an effect in the animal system, similar to the above illustration of Locke, it is possible for the affection of love still to remain perfect. Does not the story of Eloisa and Abelard exemplify this? or is there not in the world such a feeling of the mind as affection between the sexes? "Love," says Dr. Smith, " is a violent, hot, and impetuous passion: esteem is a sedate, and cool, and peaceable affection of the mind." This is beautifully illustrated by a modern dramatist : "Listen to me, child. I would proffer you friendship, for your own sake for the sake of benevolence. When ages, indeed, are nearly equal, nature is prone to breathe so warmly on the blossoms of friendship between the sexes, that the fruit is desire; but Time, fair one, is scattering snow on my temples, while Hebe waves her freshest ringlets over yours. Rely then on one who has encountered difficulties enough to teach him sympathy; and who would stretch forth his hand to a wandering female, and shelter her like a father."

*

Appetite is peculiar to the animal, and discovers itself antecedently to any idea of good in the object, by uneasy sensation. This seems to be an admirable contrivance of the Deity to counterbalance the absence of reason; that animals, without it, may provide for their necessities, and regulate the ties, the nice dependencies which bind them to their species. The affections of man may be said properly to belong to the soul: they are

*Mr. George Colman, the younger.

D

feelings of calm desire or aversion, instituted by catenation or association of idea; or, in other language, established by affinity of mind or correspondence of spiritual substance. Now the passions are feelings which seem to be confused bodily and mental sensations, either of pleasure or of pain; they are feelings or springs of action which connect our rational or imaginary ideas of good or evil. The outward attributes of the passions are visible in the face and other parts of the body.

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If we regard the structure of the human mind, as only capable of attending to one object or set of objects at a time, we shall immediately conceive, that, unless the organs of the body and faculties of the soul are adequately attuned, confusion of thought, idea, and expression, will be the natural consequence. Further: when the mind is in action, any sudden impetus of congenial, pleasurable, or painful bodily motion, will so prolong or invigorate the existing affection, as frequently to distract and confound still more the reasoning faculty, and so pervert altogether the moral sense. Thus the thief is deluded by the idea of gain and riches; and this keeps him from considering or having any dread of the evil, which lies sheltered under the false notion of gain; of the desire that degrades his soul, and taints it with injustice. And then, as for any apprehension of discovery, imprisonment, and punishment, which are the only calamities dreaded by men of this description, his excessive eagerness utterly overlooks and stifles all these; for he presently represents to himself what a world of men do such things, and yet are never found out.* On the other hand, when the passions are animated by the moral sense, they serve as so many springs to virtuous actions.

* Sulpicius's Commentary upon Epictetus, chap. 2.