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owned by themselves unoperative, without being in some degree affected, especially if a warm and affecting voice accompanies them; as suppose wise, valiant, generous, good, and great. These words, by having no application, ought to be unoperative; but when words commonly sacred to great occasions are used, we are affected by them, even without the occasion. When words, which have been generally so applied, are put together without any rational view, or in such a manner, that they do not rightly agree with each other, the style is called bombast. And it requires, in several cases, much good sense and experience to be guarded against the force of such language; for when propriety is neglected, a greater number of these affecting words may be taken into the service, and a greater variety may be indulged in combining them." SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL, part

the 5th, sec. 3.

The soul of man is essentially indivisible; and although it is endued with distinct faculties, yet, as we have before said, there is no absolute division in the soul itself, for it is the whole soul that wills, thinks, or remembers. "No man," says the author of the Remarks on Scepticism," can think in two separate places at the same time; nor again, is his consciousness made up of a number of separate consciousnesses; as the solidity, the colour, and motion of the whole body is made up of the distinct solidities, colours, and motions of its parts." Remarks on Scepticism, page 89.-The unity which is essential to a thinking being, forms a very principal argument against the absurd doctrines of materialism. But this unity is not essentially requisite to the OPERATIONS of a thinking being. We are not acquainted with the precise boundaries of the operations of intellect; neither

do we know at all times, the actual limits nor extensiveness of any one of our individual thoughts. The fact is, generally speaking, we hardly know what our thoughts are; at least, all that we know of them is by parts; and if we happen to be blinded by either appetite or passion, we know not even the good or evil tendency of any one particular thought. If these premises be granted, it will then unquestionably follow, that the vocal expression of intellect must be composed of parts, to correspond with the progress and completion of thought, and that a single WORD would be altogether inadequate for the purpose. But it has been already said that the mere naming of an object amounts to no one part of intellect or thought, or the expression of it; the thing must be said to live; it must be affirmed to have or have not existence; language must give or deny it being, acting, or sufferance; and it is not in the power of one single external sign to effect this: further, to effect the most simple purposes of communication, another sign must be employed, either expressed or understood. It is to be here noticed, that the writer whose singular opinions I am now opposing, affirms, that "the VERB is itself a SENTENCE, as are the imperatives go, come, forbear, hark! hist!" &c. "that it is the only part of speech which is capable, on occasion, of being by itself a WORD" (sentence). Without resting on the authority of grammarians, who say, that the imperative mood is nothing more nor less than the simple verbal name, unattended with the inference of affirmation-and that if we say to a servant "Bread, or bring some bread," nothing more is intended than that we wish him to bring us bread,-the object only being named in the first instance, and the name of the action as well as the object, in the second ;

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I say, without resting on nice philological distinctions, it is merely requisite to state, that the individual parts of speech, bread! as in the above instance, silence! order! &c. and vocative cases, especially as in calling a servant, Thomas! John! &c. are all as much sentences as the

imperatives go, come, &c. "In order to suit the purposes of speech, the verb," it is said, "is made capable of being less comprehensive, and instead of being itself a sentence, it can, when necessary, be a mere sign to indicate a sentence." In the examples, "George is tall, George is walking, the artificial verb," it is added, "merely indicates that a thought or judgment is expressed; for the phrases tall George and George walking, sufficiently designate the objects conceived, and it is only the absence of the artificial verb, that forbids them to be understood as sentences." The general tenour of this remark applies only to the construction of English; and not to the nature and philosophy of language in general. It may, notwithstanding, be remarked, that tall George and George walking are not analogous terms; WALKING George would be analogous, in construction, to the term TALL George. Tall George is a mere name, and nothing else; but George WALKING, I apprehend, is something more. The participial adjective following the noun, the order is not the English order. Something appears to be affirmed of George, viz. that he is walking. Little children uniformly leave out the verb in their first attempts to unite words in a sentence. "George walking, mamma:" and this sentence, I conceive, every parent would understand. This exactly accords with the idiomatic construction of Greek and Latin, and particularly with that of the Hebrew language. Indeed, as the compilers of Systematic Education have remarked,

"The connecting link in language needs not always be stated. In the infancy of language it could not exist: and in the language of childhood it does not exist. Words are joined together, and it is easily understood, that the corresponding ideas are connected in the mind. 'Mother milk good,' would surely be understood by any one; and, in similar cases, depending upon the case of inference, the ancient writers left it to the mind of the reader to form it for himself." But it is asserted, that "without the aid of a verb, the WORD (sentence) cannot be formed," and that the verb is "the only part of speech which is capable, on occasion, of being by itself a woRD" (sentence). "Mr. Speaker! My Lord and Gentlemen of the Jury!" Each of these phrases is elliptical, and each may be called a virtual sentence-more so, I am inclined to think, than the imperatives, go, come, &c. Sentences of this sort are exceedingly common in the Hebrew construction. The scholar needs not be told, that the ellipsis of the verb to be occurs continually in the Greek and Latin languages: in the Hebrew writings it is observable almost in every verse. "Howl, O gate, cry, O city; thou whole Palestina (art) dissolved; for there shall come from the north a smoke, and none (shall be) alone in his appointed times." Isaiah 14."In God (is) my salvation and my glory; the rock of my strength (and) my refuge (is) in God. Trust in him at all times; ye people, pour out your heart before him: God (is) a refuge for us. Surely men of low degree (are) vanity, (and) men of high degree (are) a lie: to be laid in the balance, they (are) altogether (lighter) than vanity." Ps. 62.-But there are ellipses in the sacred writings more striking than these: viz. as in the first four verses of the Proverbs, and Psalm 109 and 4th verse.

The Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel;

To know wisdom and instruction, to perceive the words of understanding;

To receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, and judgment, and equity;

To give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion."

In these four verses the principal verb or sign of affirmation is not, even in our translation, expressed, but understood. The ellipsis in the fourth verse of the 109th Psalm is exceedingly striking:-"I (give myself unto) prayer."

We have before stated, that every separate word, as it stands connected with others in a sentence, does not of itself convey a definite meaning; but it is not to be understood, that the general order of each word in a sentence is dissimilar to the order and progress of every operation or act in the thought; for this would be to destroy all analogy whatever, and all grammatical construction. Still, possibly, it may be again said, that a thought is one; that there is no division in a thought, nor is a thought capable of being divided. What, therefore, cannot be divided, must not be said to have parts. It is one. Without recurring to what has been before advanced on the unity of a thinking being, and, on the other hand, on our total incompetency oftentimes to examine into the nature of our thoughts, we will endeavour to prove at once, by actual experiment, that all which we can know of the growth and progress of the mind, is by calmly attending to its incessant operations while it is developing and expressing the limits or extensiveness of an individual thought, as set forth in a

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