But there are seasons in our mental history, when the mind does not seem to be under the influence of any governing desire; when it seems to relax, and its thoughts appear to flow on without any regulating principle. At such times the vividness of leading conceptions, which at other times is determined by desire, seems to depend upon our past experience. Those objects which in past experience have been associated with emotion, are those which the mind selects, and which thus begin to glow in the distinct lineaments, with which emotion at first invested them. In past experience all conceptions which are attended with emotion, are most distinct and clear, and therefore when such conceptions return united with others, they are the ones which are most interesting, and thus most vivid and distinct. Thus in our musing hours of idle reverie, as one picture after another glides before the mind, if some object occurs, such as the home of our youth, or the friend of our early days, the emotions which have so often been united with these objects in past experience, cause them to appear in clear and glowing lineaments before the mind, and the stronger have been the past emotions connected with them, the more clearly will they be defined. Thus appears that there are two circumstances that account for the apparent selection which the mind makes in its objects of conception. The first is, the feeling that certain conceptions are fitted to accomplish the leading desire of the mind; and the second is, that certain objects in past experience have been attended with emotion.

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But there is another phenomenon in our mental history, which has a direct bearing on the nature and succession of our conceptions. When any conception, through the influence of desire or emotion, becomes the prominent object, immediately other objects with which this has been associated in past experience, begin to return and gather around it, in new combinations. Thus a new picture is presented before the mind, from which it again selects an object according as desire or

emotion regulates, which under this influence grows vivid and distinct. Around this new object immediately begins to cluster its past associates, till still another scene is fresh arrayed before the mind. In these new combinations, those objects which are least interesting continually disappear, while those most interesting are retained to form a part of the succeeding picture. Thus in every mental picture, desire, or emotion, seem to call forth objects, which start out, as it were, in bold relief from all others, and call from the shade of obscurity the companions of their former existence, which gather around them, in new and varied combinations.

Almost every object of thought, in past experience has been connected with a great number of other objects, and so great has been the variety of its former combinations, that it would seem almost impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, which of its past associates will be summoned, to aid in forming the new mental scenes which are destined to arise. Yet experience has enabled us to detect some general laws, which appear to regulate these combinations.

The first is, that those objects are most likely to attend each other, which in past experience were united, while some strong emotion was existing with them. If, for example, a retired lake had been the scene of death to a beloved friend, the conception of this object, would be almost invariably associated with the image of the friend that had perished beneath its waters, and also with the scene of his death. In like manner if some friend had expired at a certain hour of the day, or on a particular day of the year, the return of these seasons would probably be associated with the sorrowful scenes connected with them in past experience.

The second law of Association is, that long continued, or frequently repeated attention to objects that are connected at the time of this attention, will secure the connected return of these objects. Attention it may be recollected, is desire united with our conceptions; thus rendering them more vivid.

It seems to produce the same effect if this attention is long continued, or if it is frequently repeated. Thus if the mind has dwelt for a long time on a beautiful picture, has noticed all its proportions, its shading, its outline, and its colours with minute attention, one object in this picture cannot recur to the mind, without bringing with it the other objects that were associated at the time of this close attention. The frequent repetition of a sentence, is a case where oft repeated, though short attention to certain words, has the effect of recalling them to the mind, in the connection in which they were placed during this repeated attention.

The third law of Association is, that objects which have recently been associated in experience, are on this account more likely to recall each other, than to recall those which were connected with them at a more remote period of time. The passage of time, as a general fact, seems to weaken the vividness of our conceptions, and to destroy the probability of their associate recurrence. Thus a line of poetry may be repeated, and the listener may be able, the moment after, to recall each word, but the next day the whole may be lost.

The fourth law of Association is, that the recurrence of associated objects depends in a great measure, upon the number of objects with which it may have been connected in past experience. If it has existed in combination with only one object, that object will return associated with it. But in proportion as the number of its associates increases, the power of determining which will be its next companion diminishes. As an example of this fact, may be mentioned the first hearing of a beautiful air by some particular person. The next time it is heard, the idea of this performer will be associated with the sounds. But after it has been sung by a great variety of persons, other circumstances would determine what conceptions this air would recall. It is very probable, in this case, that its notes would recall from among the performers,

the friend most beloved, or some interesting circumstance that awakened emotion at the time the air was performed.

The principal circumstances which operate in recalling associated ideas have now been pointed out. The next enquiry is, what are those objects and events, which, ordinarily are most frequently united in our perceptions; and therefore are most likely to return together in our conceptions.

The most common connection of our ideas of perception are made by contiguity in place. Objects are continually passing before the eye, and they are not in single distinct objects, but in connected groups. Of course when we perceive any object, we must necessarily. observe its several relations to the objects by which it is surrounded. If it is a building which meets the eye, it is impossible to observe it, without at the same time perceiving the trees around it, the sky above it, and any other objects which are parts of the picture, of which this is the prominent object. Of course, objects that are united in one complex picture before the eye, when we gain our knowledge of them by perception, will, ordinarily return together in our conceptions.

Our ideas also are very much connected by contiguity as it respects time. When any two events occur, at the same moment of time, or in such near connection, that the conception of one remains until the other occurs, they ordinarily will recur together in our after conceptions of them. As an example of this, may be mentioned the associations of a family who have been accustomed to close each Sabbath with sacred music. As the still hour of this sacred evening drew on, wherever any wanderer might roam, it is probable that the notes of praise, so often connected with this season, would perpetually steal over the mind, bringing many another image of friends, and kindred, and home.

The mind of man is so constituted that no change can take place in any material object, without awakening the idea of some cause. An effect may be defined as some change of

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state or mode of existence in matter or mind. A cause may be defined as that without which no change would take place either in matter or mind. As the ideas of cause and effect are so constantly conjoined in all our acts of perception, these ideas will return together in our conceptions. Thus if we see an instrument which has been the cause of pain, the idea of this effect will be recalled by a conception of the cause. Or if the mind is dwelling on the memory of some beautiful painting or poetry, the author of these works will probably recur to the mind in connection with these conceptions. sometimes meet with persons, of such peculiar habits and dispositions, that whenever they are encountered, the feelings are wounded or the temper crossed, by their ill timed or ill natured remarks. The conceptions of such persons will ordinarily be attended by the memory of some pains of which they have been the cause, and the mind will involuntarily shrink from contact with them, as from the points and thorns of a bramble bush. Those events, therefore, or those objects which have the relation of cause and effect existing between them, will ordinarily be united as objects of conception.

The mind of man is continually noticing the relations which exist between the different objects of its conceptions. As no idea of relation can be gained, without comparing two or more things together, those objects which are most frequently compared, will naturally be most frequently associated together in our conceptions. It has been shown that language is founded on that principle of the mind, which enables us to notice certain qualities in things, abstracted from other qualities, and to apply names to objects according as we find cer. tain qualities united in them. Of course in the use of language, the mind is continually led to notice the particulars in which objects resemble each other, and also the particulars in which they differ. Consequently the mind, in learning, and in applying names, is continually comparing objects, both to discover the particulars in which they are alike and those in