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to; which is this, That the universal confent of mankind, in the apprehenfion of a God, is no more an argument that he really is, than the general agreement of fo many nations, for fo many ages, in the worship of many gods, is an argument that there are many.

To this I anfwer, 1. That the generality of the philofophers, and wife men of all nations and ages, did. diffent from the multitude in thefe things. They belie ved but one fupreme Deity, which, with refpect to the various benefits men received from him, had several titles bestowed upon him. And although they did fervilely comply with the people in worthipping God by fenfible images and reprefentations; yet it appears by their writings, that they defpifed this way of worship, as fuperftitious, and unfuitable to the nature of God. So that polytheifm and idolatry are far from being able: to pretend to univerfal confent, from their having had the vote of the multitude in moft nations for feveral. ages together; because the opinion of the vulgar, feparated from the consent and approbation of the wife, fignifies no more than a great many cyphers would do without figures.

2. The grofs ignorance and miftakes of the Heathen. about God and his worship, are a good argument that there is a God; because they fhew, that men, funk into the most degenerate condition, into the greatest blindnefs and darkness imaginable, do yet retain fome sense and awe of a Deity; that religion is a property of our natures; and that the notion of a Deity is intimate to our understandings, and flicks close to them, feeing men will rather have any God than none; and rather than want a Deity, they will worship any thing.

3. That there have been fo many falfe gods devised, is rather an argument that there is a true one, than that there is none. There would be no counterfeits but for the fake of fomething that is real. For though all pretenders feem to be what they really are not, yet they pretend to be fomething that really is: for to counterfeit is to put on the likeness and appearance of fome real excellency. There would be no brafs money, if there were not good and lawful money. Bristol flones would not pretend to be diamonds, if there never had been any diamonds. Thofe idols, in Henry VII's

time, (as Sir Francis Bacon calls them), Lambert Symnel, and Perkin Warbeck, had never been fet up, if there had not once been a real Plantagenet and Duke of York. So the idols of the Heathen, though they be fet up in affront to the true God; yet they rather prove that there is one, than the contrary.

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III. Speculative Atheism is abfurd, because it requires more evidence for things than they are capable of. riftotle hath long fince well obferved, how unreasonable it is to expect the fame kind of proof and evidence for every thing, which we have for fome things. Mathematical things, being of an abstracted nature, are capable of the clearest and ftricteft demonftration: but conclufions in natural philofophy are capable of proof by an induction of experiments; things of a moral nature, by moral arguments; and matters of fact, by credible teftimony. And though none of these be car pable of that strict kind of demonstration which mathematical matters are; yet have we an undoubted affu rance of them, when they are proved by the best arguments that things of that kind will bear. No man can demonftrate to me, unless we will call every argument that is fit to convince a wise man a demonstration, that there is fuch an island in America as Jamaica: yet, upon the testimony of credible perfons who have feen it, and authors who have written of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as I am from doubting of the clearest mathematical demonftration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm principle, by all those who pretend to be certain of any thing at all, That when any thing, in any of these kinds, is proved by as good arguments as a thing of that kind is capable of, and we have as great affurance that it is, as we could poffibly have fuppofing it were, we ought not in reason to make any doubt of the existence of that thing.

Now to apply this to the prefent cafe: The being of a God is not mathematically demonftrable; nor can it be expected it fhould, because only mathematical mate ters admit of this kind of evidence. Nor can it be proved immediately by fenfe, becaufe God being fuppofed to be a pure fpirit, cannot be the object of any corporeal fenfe. But yet we have as great affurance that there is a God, as the nature of the thing to be proved

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is capable of, and as we could in reafon expect to have fuppofing that he were. For, let us fuppofe there were fuch a being as an infinite fpirit, clothed with all poffible perfection; that is, as good, and wife, and powerful, &c. as can be imagined: what conceivable ways are there whereby we thould come to be affured, that there is fuch a being, but either by an internal impreffion of the notion of a God upon our minds, or elfe by fuch external and vifible effects, as our reafon tells us must be attributed to fome caufe, and which we cannot, without great violence to our understandings, attribute to any other caufe, but fuch a being as we conceive God to be, that is, one that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful? Now, we have double affurance that there is a God; and greater, or other than this, the thing is not capable of. If God fhould affume a body, and prefent himself before our eyes, this might amaze us, but could not give us any rational affurance that there is an infinite spirit. If he fhould work a miracle, this could not in reafon convince an Atheist, more than the argument he hath already for it. If the Atheift were to ask a fign in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, what could he defire God to do for his conviction more than he hath already done? Could he defire him to work a greater miracle than to make a world? Why, if God fhould carry this perverfe man out of the limits of this world, and fhew him a new heaven and a new earth fpring out of nothing, he might fay, that innumerable parts of matter chanced just then to rally together, and to form themselves into this new world; and that God did not make it. Thus you fee, that we have all this rational affurance of a God that the thing is capable of; and that Atheism is abfurd and unreasonable in requiring more.

IV. The Atheist is unreasonable, because he pretends to know that which no man can know, and to be cer tain of that which no body can be certain of; that is, that there is no God, and, which is confequent upon this, as I fhall fhew afterwards, that it is not poffible there fhould be one. And the Atheist must pretend to know this certainly for it were the greateft folly in the world for a man to deny and despise a God, if he be not certain that he is not. Now, whoever pretends to be

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certain that there is no God, hath this great disadvantage, he pretends to be certain of a pure negative. But of negatives we have far the least certainty; and they are usually hardeft, and many times impoffible to be proved. Indeed fuch negatives as only deny fome particular mode or manner of a thing's exiftence, a man may have a certainty of them; because, when we fee things to be, we may fee what they are, and in what manner they do, or do not exift. For inftance: We may be certain that man is not a creature that hath wings; because this only concerns the manner of his existence; and we feeing what he is, may certainly know that he is not fo or fo. But pure negatives, that is, fuch as abfolutely deny the existence of things, or the poffibility of their existence, can never be proved: for after all that can be faid against a thing, this will ftill be true, that many things poffibly are which we know not of, and that many more things may be than are; and if fo, after all our arguments against a thing, it will be uncertain whether it be or not. And this is univerfally true, unless the thing denied to be, do plainly imply a contradiction; from which I have already fhewn the notion of a God to be free. Now, the A. theift pretends to be certain of a pure negative; that there is no fuch being as God, and that it is not poffible there fhould be: but no man can reasonably pretend to know this much, but he muft pretend to know all things that are or can be; which, if any man fhould be fo vain as pretend to, yet it is to be hoped, that no body would be fo weak as to believe him.

V. Speculative Atheism is unreasonable, because it contradicts itself. There is this great contradiction in the denial of a God: He that denies a God fays, that that is impoffible which yet he muft grant to be poffible. He fays it is impoffible that there fhould be fuch a being as God, in faying that de facto there is no fuch being. For, eternity being effential to the notion of a God, if there be not a God already, it is impoffible now that there should be one; because fuch a being as is fuppofed to be effentially eternal, and without beginning, cannot now begin to be. And yet he muft grant it poffible, that there fhould be fuch a being; because it is poffible there fhould be such a being as hath all pof

fible perfection: and fuch a being as this is that which we call God, and is that very thing which the Atheist denies, and others affirm to be. For he that denies a God muft deny fuch a being as all the world describe God to be; and this is the general notion which all men have of God, that he is a being as perfect as is poffible; that is, endued with all fuch perfections as do not imply a contradiction; which none of those perfections which we attribute to God do, as I have already proved.

Secondly, Speculative Atheism, as it is unreasonable, fo is it a moft imprudent and uncomfortable opinion; and that upon these two accounts: ft, Because it is against the present interest and happiness of mankind; 2dly, Because it is infinitely hazardous and unfafe in the iffue.

1. It is against the present intereft and happiness of mankind. If Atheism were the general opinion of the world, it would be infinitely prejudicial to the peace and happiness of human fociety, and would open a wide door to all manner of confufion and disorder. But this I fhall not now infift upon, because I defign a particular discourse of that by itself.

I fhall at prefent content myself to fhew how uncomfortable an opinion this would be to particular perfons. For nothing can be more evident than that man is not fufficient of himself to his own happinefs. He is liable to many evils and miferies which he can neither prevent nor redress. He is full of wants, which he cannot fupply; and compaffed about with infirmities, which het cannot remove; and obnoxious to dangers, which he can never fufficiently provide againft. Confider man without the protection and conduct of a fuperior being, and he is fecure of nothing that he enjoys in this world, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for. He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to defire what he is never likely to obtain. Man walketh in a vain fhew, and difquieteth himself in vain. courts happiness in a thousand fhapes, and the fafter he pursues it, the fafter it flies from him. His hopes and expectations are bigger than his enjoyments, and his fears and jealoufies more troublefome than the evils themselves which he is so much afraid of. He is liable

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