friend that I have in the world fhould beg of me with the greatest opportunity; or any man that hath the greatest authority over me, fhould lay his fevereft commands upon me to believe a thing, for which I fee no reafon, I could not do it; because nothing can command affent, but evidence. So that he that would perfuade men to believe either the principles of natural religion, or any divine revelation, muft convince them of the truth of them, for it is unreasonable to defire a man to believe any thing, unless I give him good reafon why he fhould.

And this being the proper courfe which is to be taken, there are two forts of perfons to whom I fhall apply myfelf in this exhortation: thofe who do not believe thefe things; and those who are perfuaded of them: to: the former, in order to the begetting of faith in them to the latter, in order to the ftrengthening and confirm ing of their faith.

Thofe who do not believe, are of two forts; either fuch as do pofitively disbelieve these things, and make. it their business to arm themselves against them with: all the arguments they can; who are fo far from believ-1 ing a God, or any divine revelation, that they endeavour to perfuade themselves of the contrary, that there is no fuch thing; or elfe they are fuch as are indifferent: about thefe matters. They have received the principles: of religion by their education, and they have nothing to fay against them, nor for them; they never confidered them, nor the proper confequences of them; they neither believe nor disbelieve them upon any reafonable account.

Now all thefe are to be dealt withal in the fame. way for whatever will convince the disbeliever, will: much more perfuade the indifferent, and confirm the weak. For faith is to be strengthened by the fame arguments whereby it is wrought. Therefore I fhall apply myself to convince unbelievers; and every one: may apply thofe arguments which I ufe to this pur. pofe, for the strengthening of their own faith.

But before I come to thofe arguments I intend to offer for the conviction of thofe that do not believe, I think it convenient to endeavour, if poffible, to remove a

violent, and, I think, unreasonable prejudice which men have received against all those who endeavour to make religion reasonable. As if Bellarmine had been in the right, when he faid, That faith was rather to be defined by ignorance than by knowledge. The plain English of which is, that it is for want of understanding that men believe the gofpel; and if the world were but a little more knowing and wife, no body would be a Chriftian. I know not how it comes to pafs, whether through the artifice of the Popish party, who hate the light, left it fhould reprove them, and make them manifeft; or through the ignorance of too many well-meaning Proteftants; I fay, I know not how it comes to pafs, but fo it is, that every one that offers to give a reasonable account of his faith, and to establish religion upon rational principles, is prefently branded for a Socinian; of which we have a fad inftance in that incomparable perfon Mr. Chillingworth, the glory of this age and nation, who for no other cause that I know of, but his worthy and fuccefsful attempts to make Christian religion reasonable, and to discover those firm and solid foundations upon which our faith is built, hath been requited with this black and odious character. But if this be Socinianifm, for a ran to enquire into the grounds and reafons of Chriftian religion, and to endeavour to give a fatisfactory account why he believes it, I know no way but that all confiderate, inquifitive men, that are above fancy and enthufiafm, must be either Socinians or Atheists.

for

I cannot imagine how men can do greater differvice to religion, than by taking it off from the rational and folid bafis upon which it ftands, and bearing the world in hand, that men ought to believe without reason; this is to turn faith into credulity, and to level Christian religion with the vileft and moft groundless enthusiasms that ever were in the world. Indeed if we had only to deal with Henry Nicholas, and Jacob Behman, who fight against us in the dark, not with reafons and arguments, but with infignificant words, and obfcure phrases; we might make a fhift to bear up against them with this principle, and we might charge them to believe us, as they do us to believe them, without giving them any reafon for it: but if we were to deal with Celfus, VOL. IX.

or

or Julian, or Porphyry, or fome of our modern Atheists, we should foon find how vain it would be to go about to cajole them with phrafes, and to gain them over to Christianity, by telling them that they mult deny their reason, and lay afide their understandings, and believe they know not why. If the great pillars of Chriftianity, the ancient Fathers, had taken this course in their apologies for Chriftian religion, it had never triumphed over Judaifm and Paganism as it did; and whoever hath read over those defences and vindications of Chriftian religion against Jews and Heathens, which were written in the first ages of the church, efpecially the books of Origen against Celfus, and Eufebius his book de Demonft. and Præparat. Evangel. fhall find that they did very folicitoufly endeavour to fatisfy the world, by all rational ways, both of the truth and reasonableness of Chriftian religion. And if that was a good way then, it is fo now; and never more neceffary than in this age, which I fear hath as many Atheists and infidels, that go under the name of Chriftians, as ever were in any age fince Christian religion was first planted in the world.

But my defign at prefent is not to perfuade men particularly to the belief of Chriftianity, (that I intend hereafter, by God's affiftance, to speak to) but to perfuade men to the belief of religion in general. So that all that I fhall do at present, fhall be, as briefly as I can, to offer fome arguments and confiderations to perfuade men to the belief of the principles of natural religion, and of the revelation which God hath made of his mind and will in the fcripturės.

I. To perfuade men to believe the principles of natural religion, such as the being of a God; the immortality of the foul; and future rewards after this life; I fhall offer these two confiderations.

First, That it is most reasonable fo to do. Secondly, That it is infinitely moft prudent. First, As to the being of God. Do but confider these two things which are undeniable; that there is a world, however it came; and that mankind do generally confent in a confident persuasion that there is a God, whatever be the cause of it. Now thefe two things being certain, and not liable to any question, let us enquire

whe

whether a reasonable account can be given of these without a God.

1. Suppofing there be no God, how came this vaft and orderly frame of the world? There are but two ways that can be imagined. Either it was from eternity always of itself; or it began fome time to be. That it fhould be always of itfelf; though it may be imagined of the heavens, and the earth, which, as to the main, are permanent, and continue the fame; yet in things that fucceed one after another, it is altogether unimaginable. As in the generation of men, there can be no doubt, whether every one of them was from another, or fome of themfelves. Some of them must be of themselves; for whatever number of causes be imagined in orderly fucceffion, fome of them must have no caufe, but be of themfelves. Now that which is of itfelf, and the caufe of all others, is the firft. So that there must be a first man; and the age of man being finite, this firft man must have a beginning. So that an infinite fucceffion of men fhould have been, is impoffible; and confequently that men were always. But I need not infift much upon this, becaufe few or none of our modern Atheists pitch upon this way. Befides that Ariftotle, who is reputed the great afferter of the eternity of the world, doth acknowledge an infinite progrefs and fucceffion of causes to be one of the greateft abfurdities.

Suppofe then the world began fome time to be; it muft either be made by counfel and defign; that is, produced by fome being that knew what it did, that did contrive and frame it as it is; which it is easy to conceive a being that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful, might do; but this is to own a God: or elfe the matter of it being fuppofed to have been always, and in continual motion and tumult, it at last happened to fall into this order, and the parts of matter, after various agitations, were at length entangled and knit together in this order, in which we fee the world to be. But can any man think this reasonable to imagine, that in the infinite variety which is in the world, all things fhould happen by chance, as well and as orderly as the greatest wisdom could have contrived them?

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them? Whoever can believe this, muft do it with his will, and not with his understanding.

But feeing it must be granted that fomething is of itfelf; how eafy is it to grant fuch a being to be of itfelf, as hath other perfections proportionable to neceffary existence, that is infinitely good, and wife, and powerful? And there will be no difficulty in conceiving how fuch a being as this could make the world.

2. This likewife is undeniable, that mankind do generally confent in a confident persuasion that there is a God, whatever was the cause of this. Now the reafon of fo univerfal a confent in all places and ages of the world, must be one and constant: but no one and conftant reafon of this can be given, unless it be from the frame and nature of man's mind and understanding, which hath the notion of a deity ftampt upon it, or, which is all one, hath fuch an understanding, as will in its own free use and exercise find out a God. And what more reasonable than to think, that if we be God's workmanship, he should fet this mark of himself upon us, that we might know to whom we belong? And I dare fay, that this account must be much more reafonable and fatisfactory to any indifferent man, than . to refolve this univerfal confent into tradition, or statepolicy, both which are liable to inexplicable difficulties, as I have elfe where fhewn at large.

II. As to the immortality of the foul. Suppofing a God, who is an infinite Spirit, it is eafy to imagine the poffibility of a finite fpirit: and fuppofing the goodness of God, no man can doubt, but that when he made all things, he would make some best: and the fame goodnefs which moved him to make things, would be a rea fon to continue those things for the longest duration they are capable of.

III. As to future rewards. Supposing the holiness and justice of God, that he loves righteousness, and hates iniquity; and that he is the Magiftrate and Governour of the world, and concerned to countenance goodness and difcourage fin; and confidering the promiscuous difpenfation of his providence in this world, and how all things

* See Vol. 1. Serm. 1, where the arguments here briefly named are handled at large.