attention, and without much previously acquired knowledge of the subject. It is sometimes no easy task for the experienced divine to follow the author's train of thought, not because it is confused and perplexed, but because it is exceedingly deep and profound. To unfold a chain of abstract reasoning to theiligence of common readers is one of the most difficult of arts, and has been successfully attained by very few. If in this Dr. Lloyd is not always so happy as might be wished, yet his argumentation is sound, and may at all times be comprehended by a well informed and attentive reader; and he deserves unqualified praise for the accuracy of his views of the revealed doctrines, profound thought, and for the cogent reasoning with which he illustrates them.

The subjects treated in these Discourses are the nature and offices of faith-the want of faith-spiritual influencesthe value of the holy Scriptures as means of grace-the rules' of interpretation to be applied to the holy Scriptures-the doctrine of predestination-the doctrine of atonement-of Christ's mediation-on prayer as means of grace-on works as means of grace on good works as means of grace. All these subjects are treated in the most satisfactory and convincing manner. The Scriptural view of them is powerfully stated, and defended against the principal sectarian errors by a line of argument at once profound and unassailable. There are few works which can be so unreservedly recommended to the divine, for the soundness of their principles as these Discourses, and very few which display characters of such deep thinking. But to enable our readers to form a judgment of the author's mode of handling his subject, we shall give an analysis of, together with some extracts from, one of his discourses. That which we have selected is the seventh, which' treats of the doctrine of predestination.

The text chosen by the Author is Rom. viii. 29. Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to' the image of his Son," and taking this appropriate passage as the basis of his discourse, he proceeds to discuss the question' concerning the part allotted to man himself, in carrying on the work of his own salvation.

On the subject of election and predestination the Antinomian doctrine is, that the decrees of God are not fettered by any condition whatever, and are effected without any connection with human ageney... That of the moderate Calvinists, is, that human efforts have a place in the work of salvation;} that works of righteousness, performed in the spirit of Christian faith, are the manifestation of its renovating power in the effects produced by it; and are themselves comprehended in

the scheme, wherein every thing relative to the salvation of the elect, had been previously and unalterably determined. Of these opinions the latter, by affording a place to works of righteousness in the scheme of salvation, is so far favourable to the cause of Christian morality. But both of them are, in their operation, injurious to practical Chrtstianity. If Christianity be a scheme in which man is allowed no part at all, or else that of a passive instrument, the origin of his actions is exterior to himself; and consequently the foundations of moral obligation are far from being safe. When men are under the influence of a persuasion that they are the elect and the objects of God's special grace, their hopes become presumptuous, their conduct unguarded, their zeal is too nearly allied to fanaticism, and their humility to despair.

As the passage chosen for the text has been regarded as one of those in which the doctrine of unconditional election is most expressly and unequivocally asserted, it seems proper to consider how far it is applicable to this purpose., Now it must be observed, that a large portion of the Epistle from which the text is selected, relates to the divine administration in the rejection of the Jews, and the calling of the Gentiles. Are we not, then, warranted by the principles of the soundest criticism to apply the passage to the national promulgation of the Gospel dispensation. If so, it is an exposition of the proceedings of the Deity for the attainment of this gracious purpose; wherein it is declared, that, agreeably to his foreknowledge, he had made all those arrangements that could be necessary to produce, in the individuals. of the nations so to be called, a conformity to the image of his Son; that in the prosecution of this plan of salvation, he called them to the knowledge of the Gospel, by ordering it to be preached among them, which call, if obeyed, should be followed, on his part, with justification here, and glory hereafter.

But not to insist on this view of the passage, which however harmonizes with the rest of the Epistle, and with the general tenour of the Scriptures; let it be considered as an account of God's dealings with his creatures individually. But even by this concession the Calvinistic cause will not be benefited, as is strongly argued by the author.

"Even in this way of considering the passage, I think we shall discover in it nothing which will not accord with the views of natural theology, which teaches, that though the counsels of God are consequent on His foreknowledge in order of conception; they are commensurate to that knowledge, not only in respect of time, but of extent that this knowledge being from eternity, His de

terminations must be so likewise: that as it extends to all the con'sequences of his first creation, His determinations must be equally extended, embracing all the means of grace, and all the particulars of that discipline by which each individual should be conducted to his final destination and allotment, in the scale of being.

"This co-existence of the knowledge and determinations of the Almighty, is marked in the words of the apostle: for whom he foreknew, he did also predestinate. Yet in the order in which these things are offered to our conceptions, the decree of predestination does not occupy the place of a primary or unconditional act, directing all things, even the exercise of the Divine Wisdom, to its own accomplishment. So far from being the foundation on which the entire scheme is erected, this predetermination of God, in favour of certain of His creatures, is grounded on his foreknowledge of its objects. He predestinated whom he foreknew.

"Neither is the foreknowledge of God, itself, the moving principle, to which our views are ultimately directed if this were the case, as it is certain that all were foreknown, so all would have been included in the plan contrived for security and ultimate happiness. The foreknowledge here spoken of, respects the suitableness of the objects of God's saving grace: in confirmation whereof, it may be added, that foreknowledge, in the language of Scripture, implies something more than is denoted in the ordinary signification of the term; and that God is said to foreknow those whom He regards with approbation and complacency. Before I formed thee, I knew thee, (Jer. i. 5.) are the words of God to the prophet. 'God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew.' (Rom. xi. 2.) I will profess I never knew you.' (Matt. vii. 23.) A people which I knew not shall serve me.' (2 Sam. xxii. 44.) And that the term is used in the same sense by the apostle in the passage under consideration, is evident from the remark; of which the account of God's proceedings, as given in the text, is the expansion: We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, who are the called according to his purpose.' These are they who from a principle of love towards God, obey the heavenly invitation, and thereby take to themselves all the benefits he hath provided for them. These are they whom He hath ever regarded with complacency, and whom He is therefore said to foreknow.

"Indeed this peculiarity in the Scriptural signification of the word foreknowledge, has been remarked by several of the Calvinistic school; (Archbishop Leighton, Com. i. Pet. i. 2.) but so far from yielding any support to their favourite doctrine, it gives additional confirmation to that which is here insisted on: inasmuch as is done by the Deity, according the account of the apostle, would be done, not merely in consequence of His knowledge of the objects of his mercy, but also in consideration of the approbation with

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which he has regarded them, as the suitable objects for the effu sions of His goodness.

"This act of predestination, then, is not an unconditional decree founded exclusively on the will of God; on the contrary, there is an acknowledged fitness, not created by this decree; and the being in whom it is discerned is the object, to whose security and advancement God's protecting providence is directed by the arrangements, implied in the act of predestination.

"Further: the representation of the apostle, so far from favouring the opinion in support of which it is commonly adduced, would seem to furnish the readiest means of its refutation: for it does not merely offer to our apprehensions a certain suitableness in the objects of God's mercy, independent of the act of predestination; but it strikes yet more deeply at the foundation of the Calvinistic scheme for in the order observed in that representation, the decrees of the Divine Wisdom and the exertions of the Divine Power, are studiously kept behind the conduct of the creature, as it exists in the Divine prescience, for the purpose, as it would seem, of saving the power of self-determination in man.

"This is the more remarkable, when it is considered, that the object of the apostle was to inspire confidence in the extent and immutability of the Divine counsels: and that the admission of a condition external to God himself, must have operated as a limitation on the force of that representation. This admission, however, is not withheld, and it seems difficult to imagine stronger evidence of his persuasion, that man has received from the hand of his Maker a power of self determination: and that this principle is not superseded in any arrangement of his all-disposing Providence.

"On the whole, therefore, the proceedings of the Deity being consequent on his foreknowledge, cannot here be referred to arbitrary decrees: but, on the contrary, they must be regarded as belonging to an equitable administration, grounded on that perfect foreknowledge of its subjects, which has been universally ascribed to the Supreme Being."

Hence it is plain that the decrees of the Almighty are consistent with the exertions of a principle of self-determination in his creatures. But it is said, that preknowledge implies, as its indispensable condition, that the things foreseen shall certainly come to pass: and that certainty with respect to man's future actions, leaves no room for the exertion of any such power as that for which we contend. But this is a fallacious mode of reasoning. Instead of beginning with some received truth, with what is clear and evident, it commences with what is dark and dubious. The foreknowledge of God is not a subject of which we have that complete comprehension requisite in first principles. It is not correct, therefore, to argue from the divine prescience to the denial of human

liberty, because we cannot fully comprehend the divine attributes. Our apprehensions of God must fall infinitely short of his intimate nature and essence. Our notions of the attributes of the Supreme Being are formed by comparison with those principles of human nature to which they may be supposed to have some analogy. This imperfection in our knowledge of the nature of God renders such a mode of argument as that just cited extremely dubious. It cannot certainly be allowed to shake our plainest convictions, or unsettle the foundations of moral obligation. But the consciousness that we are the authors of our own actions does not yield to any other moral evidence in strength or certainty. No argument, therefore, built upon the nature of the attributes of the Deity, can be admitted to overthrow our persuasion that there is a principle of self-determination in man, and that, consequently, the divine decrees must be consistent with it *.

Hence, in opposing the foreknowledge of God to the power of self-determination in man, reason has wandered far from its proper sphere. Nor are we to expect much assistance in the Word of God for carrying on such investigations. Great and glorious are the manifestations which God has there made of himself, of his righteous government, and of his goodness in his provisions for our final happiness. The discoveries which he has made of himself relate to those moral perfections, to which we are invited to aspire, and the main end of them is our spiritual improvement. The Sacred Word is therefore lamentably perverted when it is applied to the determination of questions either in natural or metaphysical science.

"If the truth of these observations is admitted, we shall not presume to suppose, when the apostle ascribes foreknowledge to God, that it was his intention to define the nature of that power of apprehension, as it exists in the great First Cause; how far this attribute is consistent with the contingency of events, or whether time, that modification of every existence of which we have a distinct perception, can properly relate either to the being or the perceptions of the Deity. No, my friends, the design of the apostle was to beget a lively hope in the followers of the Lord Jesus, founded in the sufficiency of his Providence in whose hands we are. This is evident from the declaration, in support of which his account of God's proceedings is introduced. And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God.'

"When, in order to assure us of this, he would communicate his

*In this paragraph we have given a bare outline of Dr. Lloyd's reasoning, which is remarkably acute, close, and powerful, and we recommend it to the earnest attention of our readers.