in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet confcious of. For if any one may, then, by the fame Reason, all Propofitions that are true, and the Mind is capable of ever affenting to, may be faid to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since, if any one can be faid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it, and fo the Mind is of all Truths it ever fhall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: For a Man may live long, and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. (So that if the Capacity of knowing, be the natural Impreffion contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be every one of them Innate and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper Way of fpeaking; which, whilft it pretends to affert the contrary, fays nothing different from thofe, who deny Innate Principles. For no-body, I think, ever denied that the Mind was capable of knowing feveral Truths. The Capacity, they fay, is Innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what End fuch Contest for certain Innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Understanding without being perceived, I can fee no Difference there can be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing, in refpect of their Original; they muft all be Innate, or all Adventitious; in vain fhall a Man go about to diftinguish them. He therefore that talks of Innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diftinct Sort of Truths) mean fuch Truths to be in the Understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if thefe Words (to be in the Understanding) have any Propriety, they fignify to be understood: So that, to be in the Understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and never to be perceived; is all one, as to fay, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Understanding. If there fore these two Propofitions, Whatfoever is, is, and it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be, are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them; Infants, and all that have Souls, muft neceffarily have them in their Understandings, know the Truth of them, and affent to it.

§. 6. To avoid this, 'tis ufually anfwered, That all Men know and affent to them, when they come to the Ufe of Reafon, and this is enough to prove them Innate. I anfwer,

§. 7. Doubtful Expreffions, that have fearce any Signification, go for clear Reasons, to thofe,

That Men

know them
when they

come to the

je of Reason, aufwered.

who

who being prepoffeffed, take not the Pains to examine even
what they themselves fay. For to apply this Anfwer with any
tolerable Senfe to our present Purpose, it must fignify one of
these two Things; either, That as foon as Men come to the
Ufe of Reason, these fuppofed native Infcriptions come to be
known, and obferved by them: Or elfe, That the Use and
Exercife of Men's Reafon affifts them in the Discovery of these
Principles, and certainly makes them known to them...
If Reafon dif- §. 8. If they mean, that by the Ufe of Reafon
covered them, Men may difcover thefe Principles; and that
that would not this is fufficient to prove them Innate their
prove them In- Way of arguing will stand thus, (viz.) That
whatever Truths Reafon can certainly discover
to us, and make us firmly affent to, thofe are all naturally im-
printed on the Mind; fince that univerfal Affent, which is made
the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the
Ufe of Reason, we are capable to come to a certain Knowledge
of, and affent to them; and by this Means there will be no
Difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and
Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allowed
Innate; they being all Discoveries made by the Ufe of Reason,
and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to
know, if he apply his Thoughts rightly that Way:

nate.

Tis falfe that. 9. But how can thefe Men think the Use
Reafon difco- of Reafon neceffary to discover Principles that

vers them.

are fuppofed Innate, when Reason (if we may believe them) is nothing elfe but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propofitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought Innate, which we have need of Reason to discover, unless, as I have faid, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be Innate. We may as well think the Ufe of Reafon neceflary to make our Eyes difcover vifible Objects, as that there fhould be need of Reason, or the Exercise thereof, to make the Understanding fee what is Originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the Understanding, before it be perceived by it. So that to make Reafon difcover thofe Truths thus imprinted, is to fay, that the Ufe of Reafon discovers to a Man, what he knew before: and if Men have those Innate, impreffed Truths originally, and before the Ufe of Reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the Ufe of Reafon; 'tis in effect to say, that Men know, and know them not, at the fame Time.

§. 1o. Twill here perhaps be faid, that Mathematical Demonftrations, and other Truths, that are not Innate, are not

affented

affented to, as foon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these Maxims, and other Innate Truths. I fhall have occafion to speak of Affent upon the firft propofing, more particularly by and by. I fhall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these Maxims and Mathematical Demonftrations are in this different; that the one have need of Reason, ufing of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Affent; but the other, as foon as understood, are, without any the leaft Reafoning, embraced and affented to. But I withal beg leave to obferve, that it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge, which requires the Ufe of Reafon for the Discovery of these general Truths: fince it must be confeffed, that in their Difcovery there is no Ufe made of Reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be, is a Deduction of our Reafon. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature they seem fo fond of, whilft they make the Knowledge of thofe Principles to depend on the Labour of our Thoughts. For all Reafoning is Search, and cafting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Senfe be supposed, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reafon, fhould need the Ufe of Reason to discover it?

S. 11. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little Attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find that this ready Affent of the Mind to fome Truths, depends not, either on native Infcription, or the Ufe of Recfon; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite diftinct from both of them, as we 'fhall fee hereafter. Reason therefore having nothing to do in procuring our Affent to these Maxims, if by saying, That Men know and affent to them, when they come to the Ufe of Reafon, be meant that the Ufe of Reafon affifts us in the Knowledge of thefe Maxims, it is utterly falfe; and were it true, would prove them not to be Innate.

The coming to the Use of Reafon, not

§. 12. If by knowing and affenting to them, when we come to the Use of Reason, be meant, that this is the Time when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as foon as Children come to the Ufe of Reason, they come alfo to know and affent to thefe Maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, It is falfe: Becaufe it is evident thefe Maxims are not in the Mind fo early as the Ufe of Reason: and therefore the com

VOL. I.

B

the Time we come to know thefe Max

ims.

ing

ing to the Ufe of Reason is falfly affigned, as the Time of their Difcovery. How many Inftances of the Ufe of Reafon may we observe in Children, a long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be? And a great Part of illiterate People, and Savages, pafs many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propofitions. I grant Men come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought Innate, 'till they come to the Ufe of Reafon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is fo, becaufe 'till after they come to the Ufe of Reason, thofe general abstract Ideas are not framed in the Mind, about which thofe general Maxims are, which are miftaken for Innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduced and brought into the Mind by the fame Way, and difcovered by the fame Steps, as feveral other Propofitions, which no-body was ever fo extravagant as to suppose Innate. This I hope to make plain in the Sequel of this Difcourfe. I allow therefore a Neceffity that Men should come to the Ufe of Reason before they get the Knowledge of thofe general Truths; but deny, that Men's coming to the Use of Reason is the Time of their Discovery.

By this they are not diftinguished from other knowable Truths.

S. 13. In the mean time, it is obfervable, that this Saying, That Men know and affent to these Maxims, when they come to the Ufe of Reafon, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the Ufe of Reafon, but may poffibly be affented to fome time after, during a Man's Life: but when, is uncertain: And fo may all other knowable Truths, as well as thefe; which therefore have no Advantage nor Distinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the Ufe of Reafon; nor are thereby proved to be Innate, but quite the contrary.

If coming to the
Ufe of Reafon

were the Time of their Difcovery, it would not prove them

S. 14. But, Secondly, were it true, that the precife Time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the Ufe of Reafon, neither would that prove them Innate. This Way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Suppofition of itfelf is falfe. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its firft Conftitution, because it comes first to be observed and affented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a diftinct Province, begins

Innate.

begins to exert itself? And therefore, the coming to the Ufe of Speech, if it were fuppofed the Time that these Maxims are firft affented to, (which it may be with as much Truth, as the Time when Men come to the Use of Reason) would be as good a Proof that they were Innate, as to fay, they are Innate, becaufe Men affent to them, when they come to the Use of Reafon. I agree then with thefe Men of Innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercife of Reafon: But I deny that the coming to the Ufe of Reason, is the precife Time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precife Time, I deny that it will prove them Innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Propofition, That Men affent to them when they come to the Ufe of Reafon, is no more but this, That the making of general abftract Ideas, and the understanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children commonly get not thofe general Ideas, nor learn the Names that ftand for them, 'till having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Ideas, they are, by their ordinary Difcourfe and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational Conversation. If affenting to these Maxims, when Men come to the Use of Reason, can be true in any other Senfe, I defire it may be fhewn; or at least, how in this, or any other Senfe, it proves them Innate.

The Steps by which the Mind attains Several Truths.

§. 15. The Senfes at firft let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet; and the Mind by degrees growing familiar with fome of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abftracts them, and by degrees learns the Ufe of general Names. In this Manner the Mind comes to be furnished with Ideas and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its difcurfive Faculty: And the Ufe of Reafon becomes daily more vifihle, as thefe Materials, that give it Employment, encrease. But though the having of general Ideas, and the Use of general Words and Reafon, ufually grow together; yet, I fee not, how this any way proves them Innate. The Knowledge of fome Truths, I confefs, is very early in the Mind; but in a Way that shews them not to be Innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it ftill to be about Ideas, not Innate, but acquired: It being about thofe firft which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earlieft to do, which make the most frequent Impreffions on their

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Senfes