always moved by Evil, to fly it; because a total Freedom from Pain always makes a neceffary Part of our Happiness: But every Good, nay, every greater Good, does not conftantly move Defire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any neceffary Part of our Happiness. For all that we defire, is only to be happy. But though this general Defire of Happiness operates conftantly and invariably, yet the Satisfaction of any particular Defire can be fufpended from determining the Will to any fubfervient Action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent Good, which we then defire, makes a Part of our real Happiness, or be confiftent or inconfiftent with it. The Result of our Judgment upon that Examination, is what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be free, if his Will were determined by any Thing but his own Defire guided by his own Judgment. I know that Liberty by fome is placed in an Indifferency of the Man, antecedent to the Determination of his Will. I wifh they, who lay fo much Stress on fuch an antecedent Indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this fuppofed Indifferency be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, as well as to the Decree of the Will. For it is pretty hard to ftate it between them; i. e. immediately after the Judgment of the Understanding, and before the Determination of the Will, because the Determination of the Will immediately follows the Judgment of the Underftanding: And to place Liberty in an Indifferency antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, feems to me to place Liberty in a State of Darknefs, wherein we can neither fee nor fay any Thing of it; at least it places it in a Subject incapable of it, no Agent being allowed capable of Liberty, but in confequence of Thought and Judgment. I am not nice about Phrafes, and therefore confent to fay, with thofe that love to speak fo, that Liberty is placed in Indifferency; but 'tis an Indifferency which remains after the Judgment of the Understanding; yea, even after the Determination of the Will: And that is an Indifferency not of the Man, (for after he has once judged which is beft, viz. to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an Indifferency of the operative Powers of the Man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating, after as before the Decree of the Will, are in a State, which, if one pleafes, may be called Indifferency; and as far as this Indifferency reaches, a Man is free, and no farther: v.g. I have the Ability to move my Hand, or to let it reft; that operative Power is indifferent to move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that refpect perfectly free. My Will determines that

operative

operative Power to Reft, I am yet free, because the Indifferency of that my operative Power to act, or not to act, ftill remains; the Power of moving my Hand is not at all impaired by the Determination of my Will, which at present orders Reft; the Indifferency of that Power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before, as will appear, if the Will puts it to the Trial, by ordering the contrary. But if, during the Reft of my Hand, it be feized by a fudden Pally, the Indifferency of that operative Power is gone, and with it my Liberty; I have no longer Freedom in that Refpect, but am under a Neceffity of letting my Hand reft. On the other Side, if my Hand be put into Motion by a Convulfion, the Indifferency of that operative Faculty is taken away by that Motion, and my Liberty in that Cafe is loft: For I am under a Neceffity of having my Hand move. I have added this, to fhew in what fort of Indifferency Liberty seems to me to confift, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§. 72. True Notions concerning the Nature and Extent of Liberty, are of fo great Importance, that I hope I shall be pardoned this Digreffion, which my Attempt to explain it has led me into. The Ideas of Will, Volition, Liberty, and Neceffity, in this Chapter of Power, came naturally in my way. In a former Edition of this Treatife, I gave an Account of my Thoughts concerning them, according to the Light I then had: And now, as a Lover of Truth, and not a Worshipper of my own Doctrines, I own fome Change of my Opinion, which I think I have discovered Ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiaffed Indifferency followed Truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being fo vain as to fancy Infallibility, nor fo difingenuous as to diffemblè my Mistakes for fear of blemishing my Reputation, I have, with the fame fincere Defign for Truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a feverer Enquiry has fuggefted. It is not impoffible, but that fome may think my former Notions right, and fome (as I have already found) these latter, and some neither. I fhall not at all wonder at this Variety in Men's Opinions; impartial Deductions of Reafon in controverted Points being fo very rare, and exact ones in abftract Notions not so very eafy, efpecially if of any Length. And therefore I fhould think myfelf not a little beholden to any one, who would upon thefe, or any other Grounds, fairly clear this Subject of Liberty from any Difficulties that may yet remain.

Before I clofe this Chapter, it may, perhaps, be to our Purpose, and help to give us clearer Conceptions about Power, if we make our Thoughts take a little more exact Survey of Action. I have faid above, that we have Ideas but of two

Sorts of Action, viz. Motion and Thinking. Thefe, in truth, tho' called and counted Actions, yet, if nearly confidered, will not be found to be always perfectly fo. For, if I mistake not, there are Inftances of both Kinds, which upon due Confideration will be found rather Paffions than Actions, and confequently fo far the Effects barely of paffive Powers in thofe Subjects, which yet on their Account are thought Agents. For in these Inftances; the Subftance that hath Motion, or Thought, receives the Im preffion, whereby it is put into that Action, purely from without, and fo acts merely by the Capacity it has to receive fuch an Impreffion from fome external Agent; and fuch a Power is not properly an Active Power, but a mere paffive Capacity in the Subject. Sometimes the Subftance, or Agent, puts itself into Action by its own Power, and this is properly Active Power: Whatfoever Modification a Subftance has, whereby it produces any Effect, that is called Action; v. g. a solid Substance by Motion operates on, or alters the sensible Ideas of another Subftance, and therefore this Modification of Motion we call Action. But yet this Motion in that folid Subftance is, when rightly confidered, but a Paffion, if it received it only from fome external Agent. So that the Active Power of Motion is in no Subftance which cannot begin Motion in itfelf, or in another Subftance, when at Reft. So likewife in Thinking, a Power to receive Ideas, or Thoughts, from the Operation of any external Substance, is called a Power of Thinking But this is but a Paffive Power, or Capacity. But to be able to bring into View Ideas out of Sight, at one's own Choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an Active Power. This Reflection may be of fome ufe to preferve us from Miftakes about Powers and Actions, which Grammar, and the common Frame of Languages, may be apt to lead us into: Since what is fignified by Verbs that Grammarians call Active, does not always fignify Action; v. g. this Propofition, I fee the Moon, or a Star, or I feel the Heat of the Sun, though expreffed by a Verb Active, does not fignify any Action in me, whereby I operate on thofe Subftances; but the Reception of the Ideas of Light, Roundnefs, and Heat, wherein I am not active, but barely paffive, and cannot in that Pofition of my Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes another way, or remove my Body out of the Sun-beams, I am properly active; becaufe of my own Choice, by a Power within myfelf, I put myself into that Motion. Such an Action is the Product of Active Power.

$.73. And thus I have, in a fhort Draught, given a View of our original Ideas, from whence all the reft are derived, and of which

which they are made up; which if I would confider as a PhiJofopher, and examine on what Caufes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to thefe very few primary and original ones, viz.

Extenfion,
Solidity,

Mobility, or the Power of being moved;

which by our Senfes we receive from Body:

Perceptivity, or the Power of Perception or Thinking;
Motivity, or the Power of Moving;

which by Reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave Leave to make use of these two new Words, to avoid the Danger of being mistaken in the Ufe of those which are equivocal. To which if we add

Existence,
Duration,

Number;

which belong both to the one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the Original Ideas, on which the reft depend. For by thefe, I imagine, might be explained the Nature of Colours, Sounds, Taftes, Smells, and all other Ideas we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the feverally modified Extenfions, and Motions of thofe minute Bodies, which produce thofe feveral Senfations in us. But my prefent Purpofe being only to enquire into the Knowledge the Mind has of Things, by thofe Ideas and Appearances, which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that Knowledge, rather than into their Caufes, or Manner of Production, I fhall not, contrary to the Defign of this Effay, fet myself to enquiré philofophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies, and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the Power to produce in us the Ideas of their fenfible Qualities: I fhall not enter any farther into that Difquifition; it fufficing to my Purpose to obferve, That Gold or Saffron has a Power to produce in us the Idea of Yellow, and Snow or Milk the Idea of White; which we can only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures, or Motion of the Particles which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular Senfation: Though when we go beyond the bare Ideas in our Minds, and would enquire into their Caufes, we cannot conceive any Thing elfe to be in any fenfible Object, whereby it produces different Ideas

in

in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and Motion of its infenfible Parts.

Mixed Modes what.

S. I.

Of Mixed Modes.

H

Aving treated of fimple Modes in the foregoing Chapters, and given feveral Inftances of fome of the most confiderable of them, to fhew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next Place to confider those we call mixed Modes: Such are the complex Ideas we mark by the Names Obligation, Drunkennefs, a Lye, &c. which confifting of feveral Combinations of fimple Ideas of different Kinds, I have called mixed Modes, to diftinguish them from the more fimple Modes, which confift only of fimple Ideas of the fame Kind. These mixed Modes being alfo fuch Combinations of fimple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have a steady Exiftence, but scattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby diftinguished from the complex Ideas of Subftances. Made by the §. 2. That the Mind, in respect of its fimple

Mind.

Ideas, is wholly paffive, and receives them all from the Exiftence and Operations of Things, fuch as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one Idea, Experience fhews us. But if we attentively confider the Ideas I call mixed Modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their Original quite different. The Mind often exercises an active Power in making thefe feveral Combinations: For it being once furnished with fimple Ideas, it can put them together in feveral Compositions, and fo make Variety of complex Ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these Ideas are called Nations; as if they had their Original and conftant Exiftence more in the Thoughts of Men, than in the Reality of Things; and to form fuch Ideas, it fufficed, that the Mind puts the Parts of them together, and that they were confiftent in the Understanding, without confidering whether they had any real Being: Though I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from Obfervation, and the Existence of several fimple Ideas fo combined, as they are put together in the Un

2,

derstanding.