What is it but an Aggregate of those several simple Ideas, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a conftant regular Motion, at a certain Distance from us, and perhaps fome other? as he who thinks and difcourfes of the Sun, has been more or less accurate, in obferving those fenfible Qualities, Ideas, or Properties, which are in that Thing which he calls the Sun. Power a great Part of our complex Ideas of Subftances. §. 7. For he has the perfectest Idea of any of the particular Sorts of Subftances, who has gathered and put together moft of thofe fimple Ideas which do exift in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and paffive Capacities; which tho' not fimple Ideas, yet in this respect, for Brevity's fake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the Power of drawing Iron, is one of the Ideas of the complex one of that Substance we call paffed by fuch a Fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower Rank of Writers. But I fee your Lordship would have me exact, and without any Faults; and I wish I could be fo, the better to deferve your Lordship's Approbation. My Saying, That when we talk of Subftance, we talk like Chil dren; who being asked a Question about fomething which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory Anfwer, That it is fomething;' your Lordship feems mightily to lay to Heart in thefe Words that follow; If this be the Truth of the Cafe, we must fill talk like Chil dren, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Subftance, we can have no Principle of Certainty to go upon in this Debate. If your Lordship has any better and diftin&ter Idea of Subftance than mine is, which I have given an Account of, your Lordship is not at all concerned in what I have there faid. But thofe whose Idea of Subftance, whether a rational or not rational Idea, is like mine, fomething, they know not what, muft in that, with me, talk like Children, when they speak of fomething, they know not what. For a Philofopher that fays, That which fupports Accidents, is fomething, he knows not what; and a Countryman that fays, The Foundation of the great Church at Harlem, is fupported by fomething, he knows not what; and a Child that ftands in the Dark upon his Mother's Muff, and fays he ftands upon fomething, he knows not what, in this respect talk all three alike. But if the Country-man knows, that the Foundation of the Church of Harlem is fupported by a Rock, as the Houses about Bristol are; or by Gravel, as the Houses about London are; or by wooden Piles, as the Houses in Amfterdam are; call a Loadstone, and a Power to be fo drawn, is a Part of the complex one we call Iron; which Powers pafs for inherent Qualities in thofe Subjects. Because every Subftance being as apt, by the Powers we obferve in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us thofe fimple Ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by thofe new fenfible Qualities introduced into other Subjects, difcover to us thofe Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Senfes, as regularly as its fenfible Qualities do it immediately: v. g. We immediately by our Senfes perceive in Fire its Heat and it is plain, that then having a clear and diftin&t Idea of the Thing that fupports the Church, he does not talk of this Matter as a Child; nor will he of the Support of Accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinct Idea of it, than that it is barely Something. But as long as we think like Children, in Cafes where our Ideas are no clearer nor diftincter than theirs, I agree with your Lordship, that I know not how it can be remedied, but that we must talk like them. Mr. Locke's 3d Letter, Farther, the Bishop afks, Whether there be no Difference between the bare Being of a Thing, and its Subfiftence by itfelf? To which our Author answers, Yes. But what will that do to prove, that upon my Principles, we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is any fuch Thing as Substance? You feem by this Question to conclude, That the Idea of a Thing that fubfifts by itself, is a clear and diftinct Idea of Subftance: But I beg Leave to afk, Is the Idea of the Manner of Subfiftence of a Thing, the Idea of the Thing itfelf? If it be not, we may have a clear and diftin&t Idea of the Manner, and yet have none but a very obfcure and confufed one of the Thing. For Example; I tell your Lordship, that I know a Thing that cannot fubfift without a Support, and I know another Thing that does fubfift without a Support, and fay no more of them: Can you, by having the clear and diftinct Ideas of having á Support, and not having a Support, fay, that you have a clear and diftinct Idea of the Thing that I know which has, and of the Thing that I know which has not a Support? If your Lordship can, I befeech you to give me the clear and diftinct Ideas of thefe, which I ony call by the general Name, Things, that have or have not Supports: For fuch there are, and fuch I fhall give your Lord.fhip clear and diftinct Ideas of, when you fhall pleafe to call upon me for them; tho' I think your Lordfhip will fcarce find them by the general and confused Idea of Things, nor in the clearer and Colour; which are, if rightly confidered, nothing but Powers in it to produce thofe Ideas in us: We alfo by our Senfes perceive the Colour and Brittleness of Charcoal, whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has to change the Colour and Confiftency of Wood. By the former, Fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately difcovers to us these several Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a Part of the Qualities of Fire, and fo make them a Part of the complex Ideas of it. For all thofe Powers that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the Alteration of fome fenfible Qualities in thofe Subjects on which they operate, and fo making them exhibit to us new fenfible Ideas; therefore it is that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the fimple Ideas, which make the complex ones of the Sorts of Substances; clearer and more diftin&t Idea of having or not having a Support. To fhew a blind Man, that he has no clear and diftin&t Idea of Scarlet, I tell him, that his Notion of it, that it is a Thing or Being, does not prove he has any clear or diftin&t Idea of it; but barely that he takes it to be fomething, he knows not what. He replies, That he knows more than that, v. g. he knows that it fubfifts, or inheres in another Thing: And is there no Difference, fays he, in your Lordship's Words, between the bare Being of a Thing, and its Subfiftence in another? Yes, fay I to him, a great deal, they are very different Ideas. But for all that, you have no clear and diftin&t Idea of Scarlet, not fuch a one as I have, who fee and know it, and have another Kind of Idea of it, befides that of Inherence. Your Lordship has the Idea of Subfifting by itself, and therefore you conclude, you have a clear and diftinet Idea of the Thing that fubfifts by itself; which, methinks, is all one, as if your Country-man fhould fay, he hath an Idea of a Cedar of Lebanon, that it is a Tree of a Nature to need no Prop to lean on for its Support; therefore he hath a clear and distinct Idea of a Cedar of Lebanon: Which clear and diftin&t Idea, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a Tree, with which his indetermined Idea of a Čedar is confounded. Juft fo is the Idea of Subftance; which, however called clear and distinct, is confounded with the general indetermined Idea of fomething. But fuppofe that the Manner of fubfifting by itself gives us a clear and diftinct Idea of Subftance, how does that prove, That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is any fuch Thing as Subftance in the World? Which is the Propofition to be proved. tho tho' thefe Powers, confidered in themselves, are truly complex Ideas: And in this loofer Senfe I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of thefe Potentialities amongst the fimple Ideas which we recollect in our Minds when we think of particular Subftances; for the Powers that are feverally in them are neceffary to be confidered, if we will have true diftinct Notions of the feveral Sorts of Subftances. §. 8. Nor are we to wonder that Powers And why. make a great Part of our complex Ideas of Subftances; fince their fecondary Qualities are thofe, which in moft of them ferve principally to diftinguish Substances one from another, and commonly make a confiderable Part of the complex Idea of the several Sorts of them: For our Senfes failing us in the Discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute Parts of Bodies, on which their real Conftitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their fecondary Qualities, as the characteristical Notes and Marks whereby to frame Ideas of them in our Minds, and diftinguish them one from another; all which fecondary Qualities, as has been thewn, are nothing but bare Powers; for the Colour and Taste of Opium are, as well as its foporifick or anodyne Virtues, mere Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Operations on different Parts of our Bodies. Three Sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Substances. §. 9. The Ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal Subftances are of thefe three Sorts. First, the Ideas of the primary Qualities of Things, which are difcovered by our Senfes, and are in them even when we perceive them not; fuch are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the Parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, the fenfible fecondary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the Powers thofe Subftances have to produce feveral Ideas in us by our Senfes; which Ideas are not in the Things themselves, otherwife than as any Thing is in its Cause. Thirdly, the Aptnefs we confider in any Subftance to give or receive fuch Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Subftance fo altered fhould produce in us different Ideas from what it did before; these are called active and paffive Powers; all which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, termi nate only in fenfible fimple Ideas: For, whatever Alteration a Loadstone has the Power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to operate operate on Iron, did not its fenfible Motion discover it; and 1 doubt not but there are a thousand Changes that Bodies we daily handle have a Power to cause in one another, which we never fufpect, because they never appear in fenfible Effects. Powers make a great Part of our complex Ideas of Subftances. §. 10. Powers therefore juftly make a great Part of our complex Ideas of Subflances. He that will examine his complex Idea of Gold, will find several of its Ideas that make it up, to be only Powers; as the Power of being melted, but of not spending itself in the Fire, of being diffolved in Aqua Regia, are Ideas as neceflary to make up our complex Idea of Gold, as its Colour and Weight; which, if duly confidered, are also nothing but different Powers: For to fpeak truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold, but is a Power in Gold to produce that Idea in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light; and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our Idea of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax; these are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the Motion and Figure of its infenfible Parts, fo on a Man, as to make him have the Idea of Heat; and fo on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the Idea of White. The now fecondary Qualities of Bodies would difappear, if we could dif cover the primary ones of their minute Parts. §. 11. Had we Senfes acute enough to difcern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Conftitution on which their fenfible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different Ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then difappear; and instead of it, we should fee an admirable Texture of Parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microscopes plainly difcover to us; for what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is, by thus augmenting the Acuteness of our Senfes, discovered to be quite a different Thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the Proportion of the Bulk of the minute Parts of a coloured Object to our ufual Sight, produces different Ideas from what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glafs, which is opake, and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair feen this Way, lofes its for mer Colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a Mixture of fome bright sparkling Colours, fuch as appear from the Refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies. Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope, wherein its leffer Parts appear, fhews only fome few Globules of |