O F Human Understanding. §. I. BOOK I. CHA P. I. S INCE it is the Understanding An Enquiry into the Understanding, ufeful. pleasant and for its Nobleness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the Eye, whilft it makes us fee and perceive all other Things, takes no Notice of itself; and it requires Art and Pains to fet it at a Diftance, and make it its own Object.). But, whatever be the Difficulties that lie in the Way of this Enquiry; whatever it be that keeps us fo much in the Dark to ourfelves; (fure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds, all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the Search of other Things. §. 2. This, therefore, being my Purpose, to Defigni enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of Human Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Affent, I fhall not at prefent meddle with the Phyfical Confideration of the Mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein its Effence confifts, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of ourBodies, we come to have any Senfation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether thofe Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter or no: Thefe are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Design I am now upon. (It fhall fuffice to my prefent Purpose, to confider the difcerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employed VOL. I. A about about the Objects, which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine I have not wholly mif-employed myself in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occafion, if, in this historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can fet down any Meafures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of thofe Perfuafions, which are to be found amongst Men, fo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet afferted fomewhere or other with fuch Affurance and Confidence, that he that fhall take a View of the Opinions of Mankind, obferve their Oppofition, and at the fame Time confider the Fondness and Devotion wherewith they are embraced, the Refolution and Eagernefs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have Reason to fufpect, that either there is no fuch Thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no fufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.) Method. §. 3. It is therefore worth while to fearch out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in Things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Affent, and moderate our Perfuafions. In order whereunto, I fhall purfue this following Method. First, I fhall enquire into the Original of those Ideas, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the Ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them. Secondly, I fhall endeavour to fhew what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it. Thirdly, I fhall make fome Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Faith, or Opinion; whereby I mean that Affent, which we give to any Propofition as true, of whofe Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we fhall have Occafion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of Affent. Useful to know the Extent of our Comprebenfion. us §. 4. If, by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can difcover the Powers thereof; how far they reach; to what Things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail I fuppofe it may be of ufe, to prevail with the bufy Mind of Man to be more cautious in meddling with Things exceeding its Comprehenfion; to top when it is at the utmoft Extent of its Tether; and to fit down in a quiet Ignorance of thofe Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the Reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be fo forward, out of an Our Capacity State and fuited to our Concerns. an Affectation of an univerfal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex ourselves and others with Difputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not fuited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or diftinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any Notions at all. (If we can find out how far the Understanding can extend its View, how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty, and in what Cases it can only judge and guefs; we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this State S. 5. For tho' the Comprehenfion of our Underftandings comes exceeding fhort of the vaft Extent of Things; yet we fhall have Caufe enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has beftowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the Inhabitants of this our Manfion. Men have Reafon to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he hath given them (as St. Peter fays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ ευσέβειαν, Whatfoever is necefary for the Conveniencies of Life, and Information of Virtue and has put within the Reach of their Discovery the comfortable Provifion for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How fhort foever their Knowledge may come of an universal or perfect Comprehenfion of whatsoever is, it yet fecures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the Sight of their own Duties. Men may find Matter fufficient to bufy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Conftitution, and throw away the Bleffings their Hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp every thing. We fhall not have much Reafon to complain of the Narrownefs of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of Ufe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish Peevifhnefs, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, because there are fome Things that are fet out of the Reach of it. It will be no Excufe to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Bufinefs by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-fhine. The Candle, that is fet up in us, fhines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Difcoveries we can make with this, ought to fatisfy us: And we fhall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion that they are fuited to our Faculties, and upon thofe Grounds they are capable of being A 2 propofed = propofed to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require Demonftration, and demand Certainty, where Probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every Thing, because we cannot certainly know all Things; we shall do much-what as wifely as he, who would not use his Legs, but fit ftill and perifh, because he had no Wings to fly, Knowledge of §. 6. When we know our own Strength, we fhall the better know what to undertake with Hopes of Succefs: And when we have well furveyed the Powers of our own Minds, and made fome Estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to fit ftill, and not fet our Thoughts on Work at all, in defpair of knowing any Thing; or, on the other Side, queftion every Thing, and difclaim all Knowledge, because fome Things are not to be underftood. 'Tis of great Ufe to the Sailor to know the Length of his Line, tho' he cannot with it fathom all the Depths of the Ocean. 'Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the Bottom, at fuch Places as are neceflary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoals that may ruin him. COur Bufinefs here is not to know all Things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out thofe Meafures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that fome other Things efcape our Knowledge. Occafion of this Effay. S. 7, This was that which gave the first Rife to this Efay concerning the Understanding For I thought that the firft Step towards fatisfying feveral Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and fee to what Things they were adapted. 'Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong End, and in vain fought for Satisfaction in a quiet and fure Poffeffion of Truths that most concerned us, whilft we let loose our Thoughts into the vaft Ocean of Being,, as if all that boundless Extent were the natural and undoubted Poffeffion of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decifions, or that efcaped its Comprehenfion. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thofe Depths, where they can find no fure Footing; 'tis no wonder, that they raife Queftions and multiply Difputes, which never coming to any clear Refolution, are pro per |