struse, and less calculated to inform the reader what the real facts were, and how the law of God was infringed.

There is another view of the matter, which goes far to show that there was an evil spirit, or fallen angel engaged in Eve's ruin; and this is, that Eve could not have been hungry at the time, as she had universal and unlimited access to all the fruits of Eden. It is true that the text states, that when she saw the tree was good for food that she did eat. But this was no reason why she tasted it; as her only and highest reason was, she had been told that it would make her wise, and as wise as the gods, or holy angels of heaven, who, no doubt, she often saw and conversed with. Now if there is no good reason to suppose she was hungry at the time, then there is left no good reasoning why she should taste it, except being incited so to do, by an evil spirit, of whom it is said expressly, under the name of serpent, that he beguiled her in that matter; and thus understood all the writers of the New Testament, who have spoken of the fall of Eve. The whole stress of the matter is laid on her estimation of the power the fruit had of making her wise, while the circumstance of its being good for food, was but secondary, or of small account; unless we suppose her a hungry voracious animal, seeking everywhere, as her chief good, that which could sustain her body only.

Origin of Satan, and Cause of Sin, with many Curious Subjects connected therewith.

Yere

Having thus far treated on the subject of the identity of the creature, called in the English translation of Genesis, the serpent, and of the being who used it as an instrument of deception, as preliminary to our main object; we now hasten to ascertain the origin of Satan, and cause of sin, or moral evil, if there be such a being, and if there be real moral evil at all-which many Universalists deny. But were we now to adopt the opinion of Universalists, with several other sects of the same genus, we should save ourselves the labor of writing the present work; as we should at once discover the being of Satan, such as they believe him to be, to have been produced by the will and power of God; inasmuch as these people believe that there is no such being in existence, but a principle only, which they call the evil principle, or devil: and consists of the bad passions of the human soul, and appetites of the body: and that they were placed there by the Creator, at the moment of man's creation, for good and wise purposes. It is impossible to manage this question in any but one of two ways; either there must be a real personal spiritual Satan, or being distinct in existence from man,

or man is as he should be, in the sight of God-pure, innocent, and holy-and not fallen and corrupted, as generally supposed and believed. Because, to us it appears monstrous and absurd, to suppose man was created with latent and inherent tendencies, or principles, which were to produce, and have produced, the immense mass of natural and moral evil, now and always extant, since the fall, and would seem an impeachment of the goodness, wisdom, and power of God. For God cannot be good, if he is the author of moral, and consequently of natural evil. He cannot be wise in instituting a scene of things, so horrible, and contrary to all moral happiness. He cannot be powerful, nor good, or he would have prevented, if he consistently could, so dreadful a state of things as now, and ever has existed in the world.

We need not draw out an argument here, to prove that the earth mourns, through all her tribes over its entire surface, among the ranks of man, that temporal and moral death have the whole race in their grasp. We need not personate the monster-war, whose jaws are reeking with the blood of millions:-we need not mention famine,-diseases of mind and body,-with all the catalogue of sorrows, more in number than human calculation. can make out, which are now the inheritage of man :---we need not bring to view a picture of all the horrid passions of the souls of both cultivated and uncultivated men, as exhibited in pride, in lust, in falsehood, in anger, in selfishness, in prejudice, in bigotry, in the love of dominion, in treachery, impiety, and recklessness of spirit, to prove that moral evil exists; as no man denies it, except such as do not receive the Bible as the man of their council, and guide of life. Yet there are those who profess even Christianity, and at the same time, unwitingly, and others designedly deny the fall of man into a sinful state, by saying that all this evil is but seeming evil, and is necessary for human happiness, upon the whole, by way of contrast; and such are Universalists, with all of that school. To maintain this belief respecting natural evil, were it not, say they, for labor and weariness, we could know no rest:-were it not for hunger and thirst, we should know no pleasure in the use of food and pleasant drinks:-were it not for weariness, we should know no sweet repose:-were it not for silence and want of society, the power of speech, conversation, could have no charms :-. were it not for a contrariety of thoughts, concord and harmony could not be distinguished as a blessing:-were it not for a variety of fancy, the joy of choice could have no being. All of which is true, and not even inconsistent with a Paradisical state of innocence and purity: if not carried to extremes, as could not have been the case, if man had not fallen; as his prudence and equanimity of temperament, would have in such a case prevented this forever. But when the idea respecting contrast

ing temporal good and evil is made to apply to our present condition, now that we are fallen; it is as much as to say, that natural evil is a natural good, and supposes that were it not for pains, distresses, and sickness, we could know nothing of the joys of health; were it not for famine, we could know nothing of the happines of plenty; were it not for war and murder with all their horrors, we could know nothing of a state of peace and safety; were it not for nakedness we could know nothing of the pleasure of comfortable habiliments; such a notion would be but the evidence of theological and fanatical insanity, because all these blessings are easily appreciated, intuitively, without experiencing their opposites, as such is the constituted and natural ability of our race, when left to the free use, action, and power of reasoning. But when this contrast doctrine is carried forward, and made to apply its influence in a moral light, it is still more ridiculous: for if we say, (which is proper to say, if the doctrine of contrasts is true, in order to find out what happiness is,) that we can know nothing of the happiness of truth and veracity till we have lied a few times--nothing of the comforts of sympathy and kindness, till we have been cruelly treated and oppressednothing of the joys of chastity of mind and person, till we have outraged all decency-nothing of the happiness of civilized society, based on christian principles, till we have passed through a state of anti-christian anarchy and confusion-nothing of the bliss of piety toward God, till we have been all that is vile, abominable and revolting, in person and action; as if moral and physical happiness, could not be appreciated, nor enjoyed, only by the experience of passing through the horrid ordeal of opposites. Did the Creator thus constitute our condition, and make evil necessary to our happiness? then evil is not evil, but a good, equal with good itself. And if this was the way in which it was appointed for man to ascertain temporal good, we have a right to the other supposition, as expressed above, in relation to the ascertainment of moral good; which would also make sin or moral evil necessary to our moral happiness; and therefore, in the economy of God, militates as much for our happiness, as moral good can possibly be supposed to do. But this was not the way in which man was constituted; for God made them upright, morally upright, and indeed we scarcely need the Scriptures to tell us this, as it was impossible for him to have made them, or any other beings, otherwise than good and morally upright, of the intellectual cast of existences.

It does not appear from the Scriptures, nor from any reasoning we are acquainted with, that man moved himself to sin and ruin; and much less does it appear, if it were possible, that God so modified the powers of their minds, as that a preponderency of the passions and powers of the mind existed toward moral evil, (as Ballou supposes) and finally tumbled him into the gulph

where the atonement found him, as such a feat would have been the child and offspring of divine purity, an idea almost too monstrous for existence. Wherefore, we conclude, that if there was no foreign tempter, ne devil, no Satan, or real being called the serpent in all parts of the Scripture, where the fall of man is alluded to, whose cunning and subtilty bore eminently upon that catastrophe, and introduction of moral evil into the world; then man is not fallen, is not corrupted, has not departed from his original condition, and is now as good, and as holy in nature, and as upright, and has still as much the image and impress of God on his mind and soul, as it respects moral rectitude, as he had the moment God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and gave him an eternal spirit, or living soul: all is now right, however bad it may seem to be, as man could not will to move himself to evil, being pure in his very nature, like his glorious Creator. On this ground, the promise of a Redeemer is but a fiction, as it could not have been of God, as there was nothing to redeem; no apostacy had taken place, and therefore no expiatory sacrifice, nor any other kind of atonement was required, on man's account; being as he should be, or as he was created by the Most High at first.

These sects, therefore, who disbelieve the existence of such a being as Satan, and that he was the moving cause of man's fall into sin, if there is any sin, are, so far as we are able to discern, uncalled for in the Christian world, as there is, on that position, no sin to be reproved, none to be repented of, or to suffer for, or to be pardoned; a Redeemer is not needed, deism is true: on which account, we cannot but look upon those sects, and especially the Universalists, as insincere and mercenary in their Christian professions, and their exertions to disciple and raise up churches through the world, for the promotion of their dogmas, as mere priesteraft, duping the public with stories about sin, and that men have need of God's mercy-which they do not, nor cannot, as Universalists themselves believe, for the reasons above written.

But whether there is a devil or not, we shall in the course of this work further determine, if the Scriptures are allowed to be a guide in such an inquiry, while for the present, and for reasons already given, we shall hold there is, and proceed to inquire from whence he came, or the cause of his existence-as all things must have a cause, God alone excepted, who is uncaused, and cannot therefore be spoken of as among the number of entities, called things, as he is a being above and distinct from all things, or creatures, whatever, whether material or immaterial.

In our attempt, as above proposed, to account for the being of Satan and cause of sin, it becomes necessary to put on the swift wings of imagination, and travel back through countless ages, up to a time when the Divine Being put forth his first creative act.

And although we believe the Almighty is from everlasting, and that he exists of necessity, yet we are compelled to believe that a first act of creative power, did take place, at some period in past eternity; so to speak. To deny a first act of creative power, which produced that which did not before exist, is to make all the items of creation as eternal as God is himself; and if so, were consequently never created at all. Now if any portions of matter or spiritual being exist, without having been created, God excepted, then all may so exist; and if so, then a creator is not called for, and does not therefore exist, on that hypothesis; as two eternal beings, matter and spirit, cannot have existed from everlasting. God, of necessity, if he exists at all, existed before all things, and by him all things were made, whether spirit or matter. On this subject, however, some have said, that as the Divine Being is an Eternal Being, that he is therefore, an eternal worker; by which argument, it is shown, that God's works are as eternal as himself, which is impossible. But it does not follow, that because he always had the power to work, that he has always done so; as the exercise of that power is always optional with him, or he could not be a free spirit or being, as he declares himself to be, but would be unceasingly subject to his attribute of power, doing perpetually all he can by way of creation, and all he can by way of destruction.

On the subject whether matter is eternal or not, see the reasoning of Dr. Adam Clarke, in his Commentary on Heb. xi. 6, which is termed a mode of reasoning a-priori, or proofs that it is impossible for God not to have existed as he is; a mode of reasoning which does not attempt to prove his being, from any of his works, or from that which appears in nature, but altogether from reasonings a-priori as follows: "First.-If there be no one being in the universe, but such as might possibly not have been, it follows, that there might possibly have been no existence at all: and if that could be so, it would be also possible that the present existence might have arisen from, or out of, total non-existence, which is absurd and impossible. Therefore, it is not possible, that there might have been no existence at all: consequently an impossibility of not existing, must be found somewhere; there must have been a being whose non-existence is impossible. Second. The whole nature of an unoriginated being, or aggregate of his attributes, must be unoriginated, and necessarily what they are. A being cannot produce its own attributes; for this would suppose it acted before it existed. There is nothing in the nature of this being that is contingent, or that could have been otherwise than it is; for whatever is contingent must have a cause, to determine its mode of existence. Third. The attributes of an unoriginated being must be possessed by it unlimitedly; for, to possess an attribute imperfectly, or only in a certain degree, must suppose some cause