the existence of fuch dæmons. He fays, however, Matt. x. 28, Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the foul; but rather fear him, who is able to destroy both foul and body in bell.

But when we confider that, according to the uniform tenor of the fcriptures, and efpecially our Saviour's own difcourfes and parables, there is no punishment in hell till after the refurrection, it will be evident that his meaning could only be, that men have power over us only in this life, but God in the life to come; meaning by the foul, the life, and in this place, the future and better life of man in oppofition to the prefent. Allo when the apostle Paul, 1 Theff. v. 23, fays, I pray God your whole fpirit, and foul, and body, be preferved blameless until the coming of our Lord Jefus Chrift, he only uses thefe terms as denoting, in the philofophy of his time (which had spread even among the Jews) all that conftituted a complete man, without hinting at the poffibility of any feparation of the feveral parts.

Had the facred writers really believed the existence of the foul, as a principle in the human conftitution, naturally diftinct from, and independent of the body, it cannot but be fuppofed that they would have made fome ufe of it in their arguments for a future life. But it is remarkable that we find no fuch argument in all the New Teftament.

St. Paul, though he writes largely upon the fubject, and to Grecks, by whom the doctrines

of

of Plato were refpected, lays the whole stress of his argument upon the promife of God by Jefus Chrift, confirmed to us by his refurrecti on from the dead. According to him, who muft certainly be allowed to have understood chriflianity, and who would not flightly undervalue any proper fupport of its doctrines; if Christ be not raijed, our faith is vain, and they who are afleep in Chrift, that is, they who have died in the profeffion of chriftianity, are peribed. But how could they have been said to have perished, or how could he conclude, as he does, that upon the fuppofition of there being no refurrection of the dead, we may fafely neglect all the duties of morality, adopting the Epicurean maxim, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die, if the foul furvive the body, enjoying all its thinking faculties, and confequently be the proper fubject of moral retribution? Indeed what occafion could there be for a refurrection, or general judgment, upon that hypothesis?

A paffage in the book of Revelation may alfo be interpreted in a manner equally favourable to this doctrine. We read, Rev. xx. 4, I faw under the altar the fouls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jefus, and for the word of God, &c. and they lived and reigned with Chrift a thousand years. But the reft of the dead lived not again till the thousand years were ended. It is plain, therefore, that he faw them not as unembodied fouls, but as living men, after a real refurrection, and K 2

therefore

therefore he did not fee the reft of the dead fouls at all; for being dead, they had no fouls or lives.

I fhall conclude this fection with fome obfervations of Mr. Hallet; "Hence we fee

why the fcriptures never fpeak of the im"mortality of the foul, as many divines have "done. Tillotfon takes notice of the fact, "and wonders at it. The reason that he af figns for the filence of the fcriptures on "this head is, that the doctrine of the na"tural immortality of the foul is taught fo "plainly by the light of nature, that every "man's reafon can eafily difcover it, and fo "a revelation needs not mention it, but might take it for granted. Whereas it now appears that the true reason why the fcrip66 tures do not teach it, is because it is not "true". Difcourfes, Vol. I, p. 277.

All

With refpect to the importance of the opinion, he fays, "It is of no confequence in the world "to any purpofe of religion, whether the foul "of man be material or immaterial. "that religion is concerned to do, is to prove "that that which now thinks in us fhall "continue to think, and to be capable of

happiness or mifery for ever. This religion proves from the exprefs promises and threatenings of the gofpel. But religion "is not concerned to determine of what na"ture this thinking immortal substance is. "For my part, I judge it to be immaterial; "but if a man fhould think that the foul is

66 m ere

66

66

mere matter, endowed with the power of thought, he would not overturn any article "in religion, that is of the least consequence to promote the ends of religion. For while "a man thinks that his foul is matter, he neceffarily thinks that God, who made matter capable of thinking, and endowed the "matter of his foul in particular with the power of thought, is capable, by the fame almighty power, of preferving the matter "of his foul capable of thinking for ever. "And when he fhall have proved that it is "the will of God that that thing which now "thinks in him fhall continue to think for

66

66

66

ever, he has proved the immortality of the "foul, even upon his fuppofition of its being material, in the only way in which we who apprehend it to be immaterial are capable "of proving its actual immortality. For this ૮૬ can only be proved by fhewing, that it is "the will of God that it fhall be immortal.” Hallet's Difcourfes, p. 214.

To what is advanced in this fection, I beg my reader to add what is obferved in the third volume of my Inftitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, concerning the doctrine of an intermediate ftate; every argument against this doctrine tending to prove that there is no feparate foul in man, but that his percipient and thinking powers are nothing more than the neceffary refult of the life of the body.

SECTION XI.

Of the DIVINE ESSENCE according to the Scriptures.

HA

AD the Deity been an immaterial fubftance, in the modern ftrict metaphyfical fenfe of the word (for in the common fenfe of it, as fignifying a being that has properties and powers, not only infinitely fuperior to, but most effentially different from, every thing that we call matter, it has been feen that I do not object to it) and had this idea of God been of real confequence, either to his own honour, or to the virtue and happiness of mankind, it might have been expected that it would have been ftrongly and frequently inculcated in the fcriptures, as we find the doctrine of the unity of his nature, of his almighty power, his perfect knowledge, and his unbounded goodness to be. But if we look into the fcriptures, we find a very ftriking difference in this cafe.

The fcriptures abound with the strongest asfertions, and the moft folemn declarations concerning the unity of God, and concerning his power, wisdom and goodness; but though we find in them that his attributes are difplayed every where, and that nothing can confine their operations, we meet with nothing at all determinate with respect to the divine effence. Nay,