pose that there is in man a power of beginning motion, and acting with entire freedom; and let us suppose, further, that the actions of such a man cannot possibly be foreknown-will there not yet be, in the nature of things, notwithstanding the supposition, the same certainty of event, in every one of the man's actions, as if they were ever so fatal and necessary? For instance: Suppose a man, by an internal principle of motion, and an absolute freedom of mind, to do some particular action to-day; and suppose it was not possible that this action should have been foreseen yesterday-was there not, nevertheless, the same certainty of event as if it had been foreseen, and absolutely necessary? That is, would it not have been as certain a truth yesterday, and from all eternity, that this action was, in event, to be performed to-day, notwithstanding the supposed freedom, as it is now a certain and infallible truth that it is performed? Mere certainty of event, therefore, does not imply necessity; and surely it implies no contradiction to suppose that every future event, which in the nature of things is now certain, may now be certainly known by that intelligence which is Omniscient. The manner how God can foreknow future events, without a chain of necessary causes, is indeed impossible for us to explain; yet it is possible for us to conceive some general idea of it, as has already been intimated. For, as a man who has no influence over another man's actions, can yet often perceive beforehand what that man will do; and a wiser and more experienced man, with still greater probability, will foresee what another, with whose disposition he is intimately acquainted, will in some circumstances do: and an angel, with still less degrees of error, may have a further prospect into men's future actions-so, it is highly reasonable to conceive that God, without influencing men's wills by his power, or subjecting them to a chain of necessary causes, cannot but have a knowledge of future free events, as much more certain than men or angels can possibly have, as the perfection of his nature is greater than that of theirs. The distinct manner how he foresees these things, we cannot, indeed, explain; neither can we explain the manner of numberless other things, of the reality of which, however, no man entertains a doubt. So long, therefore, as we perceive no contradiction in it, we must admit that God always knows the free actions of men, and all other beings endued with liberty; otherwise, he would know many things now of which he was once ignorant, and, consequently, his Omniscience would receive addition from events, which is inconsistent with the idea of infinity. In a Being incapable of change, knowledge has nothing to do with before, or after. To every purpose of knowledge and power, all things are to him equally present. He knows perfectly everything that is; and what to us is future, he knows in the very same way as he knows what to us is present. This knowledge of God has, however, no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for the plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown, without being rendered necessary by that knowledge. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause of actions, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power; for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessary, as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made voluntary by its being made foreknown; neither is a free action made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be voluntary. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause—that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the cause in the least, to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, then the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will, which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon the foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will, nor the act, is controlled by the knowledge, and the action, though foreseen, is still free and voluntary. Hence, we conclude that man is a free and voluntary agent, and, therefore, accountable for all his actions; and, at the same time, that all the free actions of all intelligent beings, are foreknown by the Governor of the world. Such knowledge, indeed, is too wonderful for us, but is the knowledge of him who understandeth the thoughts of man afar off. 2. There is no impossibility, at least, that men, whose characters and actions are thus foreknown, may be introduced into the world in such times and places, as that their acts and behavior may not only coincide with the general plan of things, but may also answer many private cases. The celestial bodies are so placed that their jarring attractions make out a splendid system. Why, then, may there not be, in the divine mind, something like a projection of the future history of mankind, as well as of the motion of the heavenly bodies? And why should it not be thought possible for men, as well as for them, by some secret law, or rather by the management of an unseen power, to be brought into their places in such a manner as that, by the free use of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppositions of their interests and inclinations, the natural influences of their different degrees of talents, power, and wealth, they may conspire to make out the great scheme of human affairs? There is no absurdity in this supposition: it is not beyond the power of an almighty and perfect Being; and it is worthy of him. Let us take, from the Jewish history, an example of what may be supposed to occur daily. It was the intention of Divine Providence to place David, the son of Jesse, upon the throne of the Hebrews. The country was invaded by a foreign foe; the hostile armies meet, and lie encamped upon opposite mountains. A man comes forth from the army of the invaders, as was extremely common in those times, and defies the Hebrew host to send forth a champion, to meet him in single combat. Terrified by the gigantic bulk and mighty force of Goliah, no man would risk the unequal conflict. David was too young to carry arms, but had been sent to the camp with provisions for his brothers, and heard the challenge. In defence of his flock, he had killed some beasts of prey, in the wilderness; and he was an excellent marksman with a sling. He thought it might be as easy to kill a man as a wild beast; at all events, he knew that a stone, well directed, would be no less fatal to a giant than to a dwarf. He, therefore, resolved to try his skill; and he tried it with success. Here, no man's free will was intercepted, and no miracle was accomplished; yet, by this train of circumstances, thus brought together, a foundation was laid for the future fortunes of the son of Jesse, for the greatness of his country, and for accomplishing the purposes of Providence. Take, as another instance, the history of Haman. That wicked man had long meditated the destruction of Mordecai, the Jew, and, rather than not satiate his vengeance upon him, would involve the whole Jewish nation in utter destruction. He at last obtained a decree, sentencing the whole people to the sword; and the day was fixed for its execution. In this crisis of their fate, how was the chosen nation to be delivered? Was God visibly and miraculously to interpose, in favor of his own people? This he could have done; but he chose rather to act according to the train of secondary causes. He who giveth sleep to his beloved, withheld it from Ahasuerus, the monarch of Persia. In order to pass the night, he called for the records of his reign; there he found it written, that Mordecai had detected a conspiracy, formed against the life of the king, and that he had never been rewarded for it. By this single circumstance, a sudden reversion took place. Mordecai was advanced to honor and rewards; the villany of Haman was detected; the decree, fatal to the Jews, was revoked; and the whole nation was saved from instant destruction. In like manner, in the history of Joseph, and other histories of the Old Testament, we see the most familiar events made instru- . mental in the hand of God, to effect the purposes of his providence. There is, then, a particular Providence, which governs the affairs of the world. The power and wisdom of the Almighty is constantly exercised, in conducting the concerns of men. All things are full of God. In the regions of the air, in the bowels of the earth, and in the chambers of the sea, his power is felt. Every event in life is under his direction and control. Nothing is fortuitous, or accidental. He gives laws to the tempest, where to spend its force; directs the meteor, flying in the air, where to fall, and where to consume. Are the elemental and subterraneous fires bound up? He can let them loose. Are they broken loose? He The can collect them, as in the hollow of his hand. And all this he performs without unhinging the general system, and without any visible tokens to us, that he is in any way concerned, though he is in fact the effective agent. In like manner, we may comprehend, in some measure, how God may direct, not only the motions of the inanimate and passive part of creation, but also the determinations of free agents, to answer the purposes of his Providence. hearts of men are in the hands of the Lord, as much as the rivers of water. This does not, in the least, destroy the freedom of human actions. Every one knows that the acts of free agents are determined by circumstances; and these circumstances are always in the hand of God. The dispositions and resolutions of men are apt to vary, according to the different turn of mind, or flow of spirits, or their different situations in life, as to health or sickness, strength or weakness, joy or sorrow; and, by the direction of these, God may raise up enemies, or create friends, stir up war, or make peace. This sentiment was maintained by Seneca. "I say not," says he, "that the lightning comes directly from the hand of Jove, but things are properly disposed for the execution of his will; for he acts not immediately, but by the intervention of means." 3. It is not impossible, that many things may be accomplished by secret influence upon the human mind, either by the Deity himself, or by the intervention of agents possessed of powers superior to those that belong to us. For instance, should the case require that a peculiar man be delivered from some threatening ruin, or from some misfortune which would certainly befall him, if he should go the way at such a time as he intended: upon this occasion some new reasons may be presented to the mind, why he should not go at all, or not then, or not by that road; or he may forget to go, or he may be delayed till the conveyance is gone. Or, if he is to be delivered from some dangerous enemy, either some new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the enemy will be, or the enemy may be diverted, after the same manner, from coming where he shall be; or his resentment may be gratified, or some proper methods of defence may be suggested to the person in danger. After the same manner, advantages and successes may be conferred on the deserving; as, on the other hand, men, by the way of punishment for their crimes, may incur mischief and calamities. Such things as these may be; for, since the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do also depend upon their judgments, (as these again do upon the present appearances of things in their minds,) if a new prospect can by any means be produced, the lights by which things are seen altered, new forces and directions impressed upon the spirits, passions exalted or abated, the power of judging enlivened or debilitated, or the attention taken off, without any suspension or alteration of the laws of nature-then, without that, new volitions, designs, measures, or cessation of thinking, may also be produced; and thus many things prevented that otherwise would be, and many brought about that would not. That there may possibly be such inspirations of new thoughts and counsels, may perhaps appear further evident from this, that we frequently find thoughts arising in our minds, into which we are led by no discourse, nothing we read, no clue of reasoning; but they surprise and come upon us from we know not what quarter. If they proceed from the mobility of spirits, straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were they of the nature of dreams, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant, as they are? Is it not much more reasonable to imagine that they come by the order and direction of an all-seeing and all-gracious God, who continually watches over us, and disposes of everything in and about us, for the good of ourselves and others? And this notion is agreeable to the opinions of the best and wisest men, in all ages. That such was the general opinion of the Greeks, in the days of Homer, is plain from the poet's constantly introducing his deities into the narrative of his poems, and telling us that Minerva, or some other god, altered the minds of his heroes. "By this," says Plutarch, "the poet did not mean to make God destroy the will of man, but only move him to will; nor does he miraculously produce the appetites themselves in men, but only causes such imaginations as are capable of exciting them." If, then, the human mind be susceptible of such insinuations and impressions, as it seems to be, which frequently effect them, by ways and means unknown to us, and give them an inclination towards this or that object; how many things may be accomplished by these means, without fixing or refixing the laws of nature, any more than they are unfixed when one man alters the opinion of another, by throwing in his way a book proper for that purpose. All these effects may be produced either by the immediate interposition of God himself, or by that of beings invisible, and in nature superior to us, who act as the ministers of his Providence. We can hardly doubt that there are such beings, as it is in the highest degree improbable that such imperfect creatures as men, are at the top of the scale of created intelligence. And since we ourselves, by the use of our limited powers, do often alter the course of things within our sphere, from what they would be if left to the ordinary laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those laws, why may not superior beings do the same, as instruments of Divine Providence? This idea of the intervention of superior natures is beautifully illustrated by Thompson in the following passage: "These are the haunts of meditation; these The scenes were ancient bards th' inspiring breath, Conversed with angels and immortal forms, On gracious errands sent; to save the fall |