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Teleology in the Sole Proof. Moral and non-moral depend-
argument in 1762. 7 Summary for this period.
1. Idea for a Universal History. 2. Development of formal
purposiveness in the projected Critique of Taste up to 1788.
3. Teleology in the article On the Use of Teleological Princi-
ples in Nature. 4. The general point of view of the Critique
of Judgment. 5. Changed interpretation of Leibniz's pre-
established harmony. 6. Objective teleology in organized
beings. 7. Physical and moral teleology in their relations to
each other and to theology. 8. Conclusion.
In addition to the obligations indicated in the notes I wish to express my special indebtedness to the works of Riehl, Caird, Stadler and B. Erdmann, and to the personal help of Professors Garman, Ladd, and Riehl, with whom I have studied Kant.
JAMES H. TUFTS.
Freiburg i. B. June 7, 1892.
TELEOLOGY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY
1. Modern science and philosophy in breaking with scholasticism, found themselves in doubt as to what they should do with the doctrine of final causes. This hesitation was quite independent of the theological consequences, or of the general scientific position of the investigator. Descartes, for whom the guaranty for the trustworthiness of his science lies in the confidence that God will not deceive, is for rejecting utterly the consideration of final causes. Our mind is incapable of understanding all the ends that God may have in creation and hence we must wholly reject the search for final causes. Still less is it possible to say that God has made all for our sake, though such a pious thought might excite greater gratitude on our part. Nor can we assume to understand some of God's ends without presuming to grasp all, “omnes enim in imperscrutabile ejus sapientiæ abysso sunt eodem modo reconditi."From the uses of parts of plants and animals we may recognize and praise God, the workman, but cannot divine his end,
2. Gassendi, on the other hand, the reviver of Epicureanism, whose theology has very slight relation to his science, by no means shares the opinion of Descartes. He affirms that though we may not understand all God's ends, there are some which force
Cum enim jam sciam naturam meam esse valde infirmam et limitatam, Dei autem naturam esse immensam, incomprehensibilem, infinitam, ex hoc satis etiam scio innumerabilia illum posse quorum causas ignorem; atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus quod a fine peti solet, in rebus phyicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto posse investigare fines Dei.
Med. IV. See also Princip. I. 28 and III. 2.
themselves upon our attention; notably, the functions or uses of parts of the body, e. g. the mouth for nutriment and respiration, and especially the umbilical vessels, the valves of the heart and the tendons of the fingers. Nor is it for theological purposes alone that final causes are worthy of study. They are frequently an aid in discovering the efficient causes in which alone physics is interested according to Descartes, while if we abandon final causes entirely, there then is no conclusive reason for assuming God as the efficient cause. Why may not the world always have been as it is, or at least have assumed its present form by chance as the result of the elements of which it consists? 3
3. In England, in spite of Bacon's well-known sarcasm, comparing final causes with a vestal virgin, who is consecrated to God and bears nothing, the most eminent scientific investigators, Boyle and Newton, declared for a cautious use of final causes, while Locke, though making only a slight allusion to the subject, evidently uses the physico-theological argument as one link in his proof for the existence of God."
As Boyle's teleology is almost identical with that of Newton, which was so prominently before Kant, it is worth special notice, although his discussion may not have been directly in Kant's hands. After agreeing with Gassendi’s position, that man may
discover some, though not all, the ends of God, and claiming that an important difference exists in this respect between celestial bodies and organized beings, he takes up the question as to whether the action for ends may be ascribed to unintelligent and even inanimate bodies. These, he says, cannot act for their own ends, but may from ends of the creator, and this be thinks may be conceived as accomplished through the original endowment of matter by the creator, with such properties and laws of motion as would produce the designed effects, each part acting as regularly for the attain
Quae sane et caetera quoque, reipsa non minus miranda manifestant nobis, velimus, nolimus, quem finem in ipsis ita conformandis, naturae Author habuerit. Op. omnia, Lug. 1758. Tomus III. 361 b.
2 At ex investigatione finium, non ipsa modo causa finalis existere intelligitur; sed is ipse quoque est gradus ad agnoscendum efficientem, quae in efficiendo talem sibi ipsi proposuerit finem. Ibid, 360 b, 361 a.
3 Ibid. 360 b.