INTERROGATIVE THOUGHT AND THE MEANS OF

ITS EXPRESSION.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.

WORDS OR IDEA-SYMBOLS.

Words express ideas versus things.

When, as often happens, an idea is the mental counterpart of a thing, it is true that the sign of the idea is also, indirectly, the sign of the thing. But it is more accurate and, in close examination of language, quite essential, to recognize in words the immediate signs of what is mental only.

A word may express one idea.

As to what constitutes a single idea, opinion may vary. But presumably the idea suggested by "blue" or "blueness" will be accepted as single. Its presentation by a single word may be described as Integral symbolization.

A word may express more than one idea.

For instance "ate" expresses not only the idea of eating, but also a time idea, and quite as effectively as the phrase "in past time." Such symbolization may be known as Multiple.

A word may express less than one idea.

That is, in particular, it may co-operate with another word in expressing one idea. Thus in French the symbols "ne" and "pas" accomplish together no more than the English "not." The symbolization of each may be distinguished as Fractional.

SENTENCES OR THOUGHT-SYMBOLS.

Sentences express thoughts versus ideas.

The single word being normally the expression of a single idea, that combination of words which is called a sentence will normally express a plurality of ideas. Not every such plurality is however available for sentential expression. Without discussion it may be merely postulated for the present, that no aggregation of words is a sentence, unless it expresses a thought; and that no aggregation of ideas is a thought, unless it contains two ideas and a relation of some sort between them. (See pp. 362 and 367.) For instance, given "Orange exceeds lemon", if any word be omitted, the remainder is not a sentence; and what that remainder expresses is not a thought.

Sentences express thoughts versus extra-mental facts.

When I say, for instance, that the sun has passed behind a cloud, I doubly violate the presumable physical truth. The "passage" is not that of the sun; and what I suggest by the word "behind" has no existence, except in the mind of an observer specially situated. But my expression successfully indicates what I have thought; and that is all that language intends. It is true that I strive to harmonize my thoughts with external facts. It may then be admitted that these facts are what the sentence indirectly aims to present. But it is more accurate and, in close examination of language, quite essential to recognize in sentences the immediate symbols, on a larger scale than words, of mental phenomena only.*

Sentences express thoughts versus other mental facts.

Among the actual phenomena of mind, must doubtless be included desires and emotions. These, and also the sensations of the body, are undeniably the frequent burden of speech. But they are such only indirectly. I am likely enough, for instance,

*That these mental phenomena themselves are facts is obvious. They are however subjective facts, being readily differentiated from the objective facts of the extra-mental universe. Also even the thought of one instant may become objective or external to the thought of the next, as when one makes a thought of his own the theme of further mental operation.

to tell you of my fear. A sentence by which I do so will not, however, express a fear itself, but rather my idea of fear.

To illustrate, compare the sentences "Brown fears your dog", "I do not fear him", "I should dislike to fear him", "I shall fear him". In all of these the idea of fear may be distinguished from the emotion of fear, as clearly as the idea of the dog can be distinguished from the dog himself. It is plainly also the idea of fear, and not the emotion itself, that is expressed by what I say. When now I say, "I fear your dog", I see no reason to suppose that the meaning of the symbol "fear" has changed. The fact that, in the present illustration, I am actually afraid (while speaking) is no more a proof that I express the fear itself, than the fact that my teeth are at the same time aching, is a proof that the words "I fear your dog" express the tooth-ache.*

Sentences express thoughts formed in a particular way.

To illustrate, seeing the contractor, Mr. Brown, and also an Italian workman, and being curious to learn in what way, if any, they are in relation, I discover that their relation is that of employer to employee. My discovery I announce by the sentence "Brown employs an Italian."

In the thought which I thus express, the ideas named by "Brown" and "Italian" are preliminary data. What I express by "employs" is a resultant, to which I naturally accord a dominant importance. Given "Brown" and the "Italian," I develop "employs." They being my condition, this is my conclusion. "Employs" depicts the most important figure of my mental picture.

I may, however, derive my mental stimulus from a primary juxtaposition of "Brown" and "employs." Thinking first of these two, I may institute a search of a different order. Perhaps from memory, perhaps from other sources, I find that the proper element to put with the given two is "Italian." This element, unpleasantly missing at the outset, sought with effort, found with satisfaction, is naturally of dominant importance. Brown and the relation of employer to employee are preliminary data.

The immediate vocal sequel of emotion, like that of sensation, is the purely reflex cry. But cries, although they very likely pointed the way to speech by suggesting the possibility of using sound as a means of stimulating another's mental action, are not admitted to rank as strictly language, which implies intention.

Italian is my resultant. The first two being my condition, Italian is my conclusion, the most important figure of my thought.

But I make no effort to show this by the form of my sentence. I give to "Italian" no such form or position as I gave to "employs" in the sentence which announced the discovery of a relation. I do not say that "Brown Italians the employment," (that is, the relation of employer to employee). I say, as be fore, "Brown employs an Italian." That is, I express, as before, the thought-form which is developed by finding a relation between terms-not the form developed by finding a term to fit a relation and another term.

So also starting with "employs" and "Italian" I may arrive at "Brown." But I shall not say that "The employing Browns the Italian" or that "The Italian is Browned by the employment." I shall say, as before, that "Brown employs an Italian."

It is true that different emphases may indicate the different forms of thought which first of all I form. The discovery of the relation may be announced by "Brown employs an Italian;" that of the Italian, by "Brown employs an Italian”; that of Brown, by "Brown employs an Italian." But when, for instance, I emphasize "Italian", the emphasis is an admission. that my sentence is strictly inaccurate that it fails to express the particular form of thought which I should like to express if language gave me the power. The emphasis tells you that in that particular form "Italian" is my resultant, though not appearing as such in the form of thought which my sentence expresses. It warns you that "Italian" should have the eminence which belongs to "employs" in "Brown employs an Italian".

The sort of thought revealed by the last expression becomes moreover the linguistic norm-employed even when the sort of thought originally formed is very different. Thus, examining in detail the impression produced by a red rose, and wishing to set before you the detailed impression, I say that "The rose is red", which I interpret as meaning that the rose and the redness are in the relation of object to its own quality. That is, the thought expressed is precisely that which I should have formed, had I passed from the successive ideas of object and color to the discovery of a qualitative relation between them.

Without examining further, I offer, merely as a working hypothesis, the assumption that, whatever be the form originally

assumed by a thought, before it is expressed by a sentence it takes the form of a pair of ideas and the relation between them.*

Sentences presuppose analysis and synthesis of thought.

While using for convenience the term analysis, I wish to be understood as omitting from its meaning any idea of separation. Also from the meaning of synthesis I wish to exclude the idea of junction. By the former I mean the recognition, the special perception, of a whole as consisting of members-not its division into separate parts. By the latter I mean the recognition of members as constituting a whole; I do not mean a combining of separate elements.

It is believed and, I doubt not, rightly, that in the beginnings of speech the single symbol stood for a total unanalyzed thought. Indeed survivals of this method exist at the present time. It is the basis of the cable code. It crops out in such expressions as "Pluit”, in which the word performs the function of the sentence. It is recognized in "Yes" and "No," which, by reinstating previously mentioned elements of thought, attain the values of affirmative and negative statements. (See further, p. 441.)

But the difficulty of this method led to its abrogation, as the number of thoughts to be expressed grew larger. For the number of symbols which the mind can remember must be reckoned by thousands only; while the number of different thoughts which the mind may form is quite beyond reckoning. On the other hand, the number of ideas or thought-elements which the mind has thus far developed is comparatively small. Yet by co-think

*Another view of the sentence, preferred by some, I mention only in order to discard it. According to this view I centrally announce what I conceive as an action, by the word "employs." With this employing I at the same time think of Brown as standing in the relation of actor to his own act (one of the relations covered by the phrase, "relation of subject to verb"). At the same time I am supposed to think of the employing and the Italian as standing in the relation of action to its own actee ("the relation of verb to its object"). But I believe that we actually make a short cut. Just as I hardly think all at once of A as the brother of B, and of B as the father of C, but rather of A as the uncle of C; so also I hardly think of "Brown" as related in one way with “employing," and "employing" as related in another way with the "Italian." I rather think of "Brown" as related with the "Italian;" and the relation I conceive as that of employer to employee. That is, I make over relations to suit the direct relationship required.