tion (say that of owner to property) in the static phase, while "to get” and "to acquire" express the same relation in the dynamic phase. More over a single word may express, on one occasion, one, and, on another, the other phase-as in "A exceeds B," which may be taken as meaning either "A is greater than B" or "A is becoming greater than B."

It is the dynamic relation which is commonly expressed by the verb of action, when attended by its object. Thus in 'A killed B❞ the relation of slayer to victim is considered in the formative phase-a phase which in "A was killing B" is dwelt upon or, so to speak, stretched out in temporal length. Action then may be interpreted as formative relation, thus facilitating the recognition of the general principle, that every thought of the linguistic type consists of at least two terms and their relation.

THOUGHT-ELEMENTS VERSUS THOUGHT-ATTENDANTS.

By thought-attendants, elsewhere described as instructional (See p. 431, etc.), I mean a variety of suggestions commonly offered by sentences, but forming no part of centrally intended thought. Given, for instance, "Orange exceeds lemon", I find in the verb a person and number value. But this I regard as merely helping the association of the relation with the right first term, in case the sentence, by exhibiting several possible first terms, creates an opportunity for error. I also find that "orange" and "lemon" may have case-endings which would locate the idea of each as either first or last term of thought expressed. But this idea of position in thought-structure, like the idea of association noted just before, is not a part of the thought to be constructed, but merely a guide to the proper construction of that thought. Such ideas compare with actual thought-members much as the plans and specifications of a building compare with the materials of which it is made. Accordingly in the present investigation I neglect them.

Primary or essential thought-elements.

By these I mean the terms thus far revealed (See p. 367) by thought analysis. For instance, in the thought expressed by "Orange exceeds lemon", I discover, thus far, only the idea expressed by "orange", that expressed by "lemon" and a relation of bulk-superiority expressible by "excess." As none of these can be omitted without my thought's surrender of its claim to be a thought, they may be ranked as the essential elements of the given thought.

Of other elements that may be added to that thought, I should maintain that, however useful they may be, they still do not succeed in making thought more truly thought, than it was without them. These accordingly I rank as unessential under the title

Associate thought-elements.

Such elements may be found not only in "Large oranges exceed small lemons", but also in the expression "Orange exceeded lemon". In this, besides the naming of a particular bulk-relation, "exceeded" plainly symbolizes an idea otherwise expressible by "in the past." I find moreover that, antagonistically to the passive voice, "exceeded" names the relation of superior to inferior and not the relation of inferior to superior. "Orange" too, and "lemon", may exhibit ideas of number and of sex-the latter degraded, it may be, into gender. But such ideas of time, voice, gender and number occur in all expressions that I shall examine. Being then by no means peculiar to particular expressional types, they do not aid the differentiation of these types from one another. So I discard them from all thought to be discussed, and do so with especial satisfaction, since every added detail aggravates the difficulty of investigation.

Associate of thought versus associate of idea.

By suggesting in this title that an adjunct may bear upon a total thought, I break completely with traditions commonly accepted. I have been taught to believe that, once the skeleton of a thought to be formed is established in the mind-a skeleton consisting, at the most, of three parts only-any addition thereto must be an addition to a single one of those parts. I am however forced, with doubtless many others (e. g. Paul and Sweet), to believe that some ideas are added to the whole of the skeleton at once.

The nature of these ideas, and the argument in favor of their annexation to the total thought, I take up later. Meantime, to change my figure, let it be enough to note that my attention has been, up to date, confined to trowsers, coat and cap-the garment, each, of part only of my body. I must now extend my mental vision to my cloak, with which I may invest my body all at

once.

THOUGHT-ASSOCIATES.

(Thought-reality.)

Examining the thought expressed by "Orange exceeds lemon,” I find that it is real. But, in saying this, I must use the utmost care, to avoid misunderstanding. I mean, and only mean, that the thought is actually formed in my mind. It goes also without saying that each element of the thought, each idea thereof, is also in my mind. In other words I merely hold with others, that even intellectual phenomena are facts. As reality thus defined is characteristic of all our thoughts and all thoughtelements, it may be neglected in their comparative study.*

Thought-truth.

By truth I mean accordance, so far as may be, with reality external to the momentary action of the mind-a being-matched by external reality.**

*It is true that reality might be conceived by the mind along with one thought or a part thereof, and not with another thought or any of its parts. But I do not find that such is the fact. For instance, when I say that "Orange exceeds lemon," I do not tell myself that thinking of an orange is with me a real occurrence. I draw no contrast between my real thinking of the orange, and an unreal thinking of an apple-or anything else of which I simply am not thinking.

**It is possible of course to associate such truth with an individual thought-member-that is, to make it the adjunct of an idea. For instance, given again the expression "Orange exceeds lemon," I feel that my idea of the greater fruit is fairly accordant with an existing external object, as is also my idea of the less. How far the idea of excess is matched by aught that outlies thought, is debatable. But as much as this, at least, is obvious: that the idea of excess does vary with variations in external data. It may then be asumed that this idea is as true as it can be to that which is external. Each idea, that is each member of my thought, possesses then its maximum degree of truth attainable by mind.

Such excellence of detail does not, however, mainly interest me. As I taste my soup, I care not greatly for the nature of its individual elements. What I desire is that the soup itself be good; and if in this desire I am disappointed, I shall not be comforted by any eulogizing of the soup materials. Toward thought my behavior is quite analagous. For instance, the idea expressed by "Booth" is matched by a counter

To illustrate, suppose that I have made a mental transit between the ideas expressed by A and B, and that I have further experienced a mind-sensation expressible by the word "excess." These three elements of consciousness together form a unit; and to this unit each element is indispensable. Regarded thus only, all elements rank as equal in importance. That they may, from other points of view, appear unequal in importance, has been conceded. (See the preceding note.) In the interest of simplicity, I elect to consider only the obviously possible case of parity.

Suppose me further to feel that the mental status just described is matched in the outer world by two objects and their bulk-relation. In other words I regard my whole thought as true. If now I wish to add to my thought this idea of truth, forming thereby a thought of greater complexity, I may say that "A truly exceeds B."

Now most grammarians will tell me, I suppose, that "truly” is an adverb that is, that the idea of truth is treated as an

part in physical reality, or, in other words, is true; so also are the ideas expressed by "killed" and "Garfield." It is even true that Booth killed; and a killing of Garfield actually happened. But from all these truths of detail I derive but scanty satisfaction; indeed I heed them little in the presence of the total "Booth killed Garfield." Truth, in short, as an idea-adjunct, is commonly neglected, to the point at least of failing to be a part of what I mean to say.

A peculiar modification of truth is, however, very commonly associated with the individual thought-member or idea. To illustrate, if you ask me what is the relation between A and B, I answer, emphasizing the relation, “A exceeds B;" and to this idea of excess I specially attach an idea, roughly speaking, of truth. I mean, however, this time something more than that the idea of excess is matched, outside of my thought, by what is real. What this something is, I can seek to better advantage in a more objective illustration. Let it then be conceded that fire and gunpowder, being assembled, produce, by means entirely unknown to me, an explosion. Reasoning along the well-known psychological highway, I conceive a faculty of explosion-causing, or say the quality of explosiveness. Strictly speaking, I ought to predicate this explosiveness of the combination fire and gunpowder. But in actual practice I use the expression "Powder is explosive." This explosiveness is not, however, on a par with other qualities of powder, for instance its blackness. It is black unaidedly. It is explosive only with the aid of fire. It is not productive of explosion peculiar to itself. It is co-productive, with fire, of an explosion peculiar to powder and fire

attribute of the excess. Again, if I leave the idea of truth without a special expression, I suppose it would be held that, so far as truth is still a part of my meaning, it still attaches itself to the idea of excess. That is, in "A exceeds B" (Conf. "A does not exceed B") any truth regarded as part of what I mean, is an incorporated limiter of "exceeds❞—a part of the total meaning of "exceeds" and limiter of another part of that meaning, namely the idea of excess alone.

But, as I have argued above (See the preceding note) any truth proper, which is associable with a single idea, will be that single idea's being-matched by a single element of external reality; with truth of this sort, however, I do not think my sentence deals. On the other hand, the truth of my total thought, with which my sentence does deal, cannot, if I have rightly argued, appear as the attribute of a particular thought-member, except in the modified form of rightness, or co-productiveness (with other members) of true thought. Such modified truth, how

combined. So also when I say that "A exceeds B" or, more laboriously, "The excess of A over B is true," I really mean that the excess is coproductive, with A and B, of a truth peculiar to the combination "A exceeds B."

Now in the thought before me A and B are postulates, accepted without approval, without a mental vote-the charter members of an idea society. "Exceeds" on the other hand is offered as a later candidate. Truth being the aim of the society, it is important that the prospective new member co-operate effectively with the charter members, in truthproduction. The intrinsic merit of the candidate is of less importance than his suitableness to members already enrolled. Accordingly, in the sentence "A exceeds B," I should say that what I associate with excess is not precisely the idea of truth, but rather an idea of suitableness to A and B in true-thought production—or, in a word, rightness.

By similar reasoning I should argue that, if in the same expression A be emphasized (or B), an idea of rightness is associated with A (or B). It appears accordingly that any member of that idea trio which constitutes an essential thought, may be regarded as an accession to the others, and further also as suitable to those others, in true thought production-in other words as right-in other words as, very roughly speaking, true. I have accordingly carried one step further the thought-forms presented on pages 361-362.

All of these thought-forms I propose from now on to neglect in favor of another, not that they are uncommon or inferior, but merely because they promise no addition to what may be gained from the examination of that other, which has the advantage of being simpler.