were to expect such a thing we might look for it from those who have not merely touched at this subject by the bye, and in dark hints, but have discoursed of moral ends, on set purpose, such as Cicero and Seneca. Cicero frequently tells, that he designed to enrich his native country with a translation of all that was valua ble in the Greek philosophers, he had perused them for this end, and thus accomplished, he sets himself to write of moral ends, which he does in five books. Here we may expect somewhat to the purpose: But if we do we are disappointed. The first book sets off Epicure's opinion about happiness with a great deal of rhetoric. The second overthrows it. The third represents the Stoic's opinion. And the fourth confutes it. The fifth represents and asserts the Peripatetic's opinion, which had been as easily overthrown as any of them. And this is all you are to expect here, without one word of God, the enjoyment of him, or any thing of that kind, which favours of a life after this. Seneca writes again, a book de Vita Beata, consisting of thirty-two chapters. Here we find somewhat possibly. And indeed if one should hear him state the question, as he does in his second chapter, he would expect some great matters from him. Quæramus quid optime factum sit, non quid usitatissimum: Et quid nos in possessione felicitatis æternæ constituat, non quid vulgo, veritatis pessimo interpreti, probatum sit. Vulgus autem tam chlamydatos, quam coronam voco.* What may we not now expect? But after this, I assure you, you are to look for no more words about eternity, nor any thing more, but a jejune discourse in pretty sentences, about the Stoic's opinion, representing that a man would be happy, if his passions were extinct, and he was perfectly pleased with the condition he is in, be it what it will. Now after this, who can dream that nature's light is sufficient to satisfy here? Is every man able to discover that which philosophers, the greatest of them, after the greatest application, failed so signally about, that scarcely any of them came near it, and none of them reached it?

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5. Nor will it appear strange, that the Heathen philosophers of old should be so much at a loss about future happiness, to any one who considers how difficult, if not impossible, it must be for any, who rejects revelation, and betakes himself to the mere light of nature, to arrive at the wished for, and necessary assurance of eternal felicity after this life, even at this present time, after all the great improvements, which the rational proofs of a future state have obtained, since Christianity prevailed in the world. If nature's

* "Let us inquire what is best to be done, and not what is most common "and what puts us in possession of eternal felicity, and not what is approved "by the vulgar-the worst judges of truth. By the vulgar I mean the rich " and great men, as well as the mob."

light, now under its highest improvements, proves unable to afford full assurance, and still leaves us to fluctuate in uncertainty about future happiness; no wonder that they should be in the dark, who Eestrangers to these improvements.

hat the arguments for a future state, since Christianity obtainedhave received a vast improvement from Christian divines and philosophers, cannot modestly be denied. The performances of Blato and Cicero, on this point, which were the best among the ancients, are, when compared with our late Christian writers, but Gke the trifes of a boy at school, or the rude essays of a novice, in comparison to the most elaborate and complete performances of the greatest masters; if they bear even the same proportion. He who knows not this, knows nothing in these matters. Yea, to that degree have they improven those arguments, that it is utterly imngssible for any man, who gives all their reasons for the continuance of the soul after death, with their answers to the trifling pretences of the opposers of this conclusion, a fair hearing and due consideration, to acquiesce rationally in the contrary assertion of Atheists and mortal Deists; or not to favour, at least this opinion, ashat is highly probable, if not absolutely certain.

But after all, if we are left to seek assurance of this from the unassisted light of nature, that certainly God has provided for, and will actually bestow upon man, and more especially man who is now a sinner, future and eternal felicity, we will find ourselves. plunged into inextricable difficulties, out of which the light of naHe will find it very difficult, if not impossible to extricate us. It is one thing to be persuaded of the future separate subsistence of our souls after death, and another to know in what condition they shall and yet more to be assured, that after death our souls shall possessed of eternal happiness. It is precisely about this last Point that we are now to speak. The arguments drawn from nature'slight will scarce fix us in the steady persuasion of future and eternal felicity. There is a great odds betwixt our knowledge of future punishments, and the grounds whereby we are led to it, and

persuasion of future and eternal rewards. Upon inquiry the like reasons will not be found for both. Our notices about eternal rewards, when the promises of it contained in the scriptures are set aside, will be found liable to many objections, hardly to be solved by the mere light of nature, which do not so much affect the proofs advanced for future punishments. Besides, since the entrance of sin, its universal prevalence in the world, and the consequences following upon it, have so long benighted man, as to any knowledge that he otherwise might have had about eternal happiness, that now it will be found a matter of the utmost difficulty, if not a plain impossibility, for him to reach assurance of eternal felicity by the mere light of nature, however improven.

The pleas drawn from the holiness and justice of God, say much for the certain punishment, after this life, of many notorious offenders, who have wholly escaped punishment here; especially as they are strengthened by other collateral considerations clear and enforcing them.

But whether the pleas for future and eternal rewards, from fe justice and goodness of God on the one hand; and the sufferings of persons really guilty of sin, but in comparison of others Virtuous, on the other; will with equal firmness conclude, that Go is obliged to, or certainly will, reward their imperfect virtue, and compensate their sufferings, may, and perhaps not without reason, be questioned.

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That it is congruous that virtue should be rewarded, may pe haps easily be granted. But, what that reward is, which it may from divine justice or bounty claim, it will not be easy for us to determine, if we have no other guide than the mere light of nar ture. The man who perfectly performs his duty is secured against the fears of punishment, and has reason to rest fully assured of God's acceptance and approbation of what is every way agreeable to his will. He has a perfect inward calm in his own conscienc is disturbed with no challenges, and has the satisfaction and inward complacency, resulting from his having acquitted himself according to his duty: His conscience assures him he has done nothing to provoke God to withdraw favours already given, or to withhold further favours. And though he cannot easily see reason to link God obliged, either to continue what he freely gave, or accumu late further effects of bounty upon him, or to protract his happiness to eternity; yet he has the satisfaction of knowing, that he bath not rendered himself unworthy of any favour. This reward is the

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necessary and unavoidable consequence of perfect obedience. sail But this comes not up to the point. That which the light of nature must assure us of is, That virtuous men, on account of their virtue, may claim and expect, besides this, a further reward, and that of no less consequence than eternal felicity. Now, if I take it not, when the promise of God, which cannot be known. without revelation, is laid aside, the mere light of nature will gushi difficult to fix upon solid grounds, for any assurance as to this. Many thorny difficulties must be got through. Not a few perplexing questions must be solved. If it is said, that the justice of God necessarily obliges him, besides that reward necessarily result, ing from perfect obedience, (of which above,) further to reco pence, even the most exact and perfect performance of our duty antecedently to any promise given to that effect, with future and eternal felicity; it may be inquired, How it shall be made appear that virtue, suppose it to be as perfect as you will, can be said te merit, and to merit so great a reward? May not God, without in

justice, turn to nothing an innocent creature? Sure I am, no mean nor incompetent judges have thought so. Where is the injustice of removing or taking away what he freely gave, and did not promise to continue? Is it modest or safe for us, without the most convincing evidences of the inconsistency of the thing, to limit the power of God, or put a cannot on the Almighty. And does not the very possibility of the annihilation of an innocent creature, in a consistency with justice, though God, for other reasons, should newer think fit to do it, entirely enervate this plea? If God, without injustice, may take away the being of an innocent creature, how is it possible to evince, that in justice, he must reward it with eternal happiness? Again, if we may, for our virtue, claim eternal felicity, as due in justice, may it not be inquired, What exercise of virtue-for how long a time continued is sufficient to give us this title to eternal rewards? If the bounty and goodness of God is insisted on, as the ground of this claim, the plea of justice seems to be deserted. And here again it may be inquired, Whether the goodness of God is necessary in its egress? Whether the bounty of God ought not to be understood to respect those things which are absolutely at the giver's pleasure to grant or withhold? Whether, in such matters, we can be assured that bounty will give us this or that, which, though we want, is not in justice due, nor secured to us by any promise? Further, it may be inquired how far must goodness extend itself as to rewards? Is it not supposable, that it may stop short of eternal felicity, and think a less reward sufficient? Of so great weight have these, and the like difficulties appeared to not a few, and those not of the more stupid sort of mankind, that they have not doubted to assert boldly, that even innocent man, without revelation, and a positive promise, could never be assured of eternal rewards. And how the light of nature can disengage us from these difficulties, were man perfectly innocent, I do not well understand.

But whatever there is of this, the entrance of sin and the con sideration of man's case as involved in guilt, has cast us upon new and yet greater difficulties. From this present condition wherein we find all mankind without exception involved, a whole shoal of difficulties emerge, never, I am afraid, to be removed by unassisted reason.

Now it may be inquired, what obedience is it that can entitle us to eternal felicity? If none save that which is perfect will serve, who shall be the better for this reward? Who can pretend to this perfect or sinless obedience? If imperfect obedience may, how shall we be sure of this? How shall he who deserves punishment,

See the Excellency of Theology, &c. by T. H. R. Boil, page 25, 26, 27, &c. and Consid. about the Recon. of Reason and Rel. by T. E. page 21, 22.

claim, demand and expect reward, a great reward, yea, the greatest reward-eternal happiness? If the goodness of God is pleaded, and it is said, that though we cannot expect in strict justice to have our imperfect obedience rewarded; yet we may hope it from the bounty of God? Besides, what was above moved against this, in a more plausible case, when we were speaking of innocent man, it may be further inquired, whether, though infinite bounty might deal thus graciously with man, if he were perfectly righteous, it may not yet withhold its favours, or at least stop short of eternal felicity, with the best among sinners? Again, what degree of imperfection is it that will prejudge this claim? What may consist with it? Who is good in that sense, which is necessary to qualify him for this expectation? Is there any such person existent? What way shall we be sure of this? Is it to be measured by outward actions only, or are inward principles and aims to come in consideration? Who can know these save God? If it be said, we can know ourselves to be such: I answer, how shall we maintain any confidence of future, nay eternal rewards, while conscience tells that we deserve punishment? What if by the mere light of nature we can never be assured of forgiveness? How shall we then by it, be sure of eternal rewards? If we are not rewarded here, how can we know but that it has been for our sins that good things have been withheld from us? May not this be presumed to be the consequence of our known sins, or more covert evils, which self-love has made us overlook? If we suffer, yet do we suffer more than our sins deserve, or even so much? If we think so, will we be sustained competent judges of the quality of offences, and their demerit, which are done against God, especially when we are the actors? To whom does it belong to judge? If we meet with some part, for ye can never prove it is all, of demerit or deserved punishment of your sins here, will this conclude that ye shall be exempted from suffering what further God may in justice think due to them, and you on their account hereafter? What security have ye that ye shall escape with what is inflicted on you here? And not only so, but instead of meeting with what ye further deserve, obtain rewards which ye dare scarcely say ye deserve? If God spare at present a noted offender, who cannot without violence to reason be supposed a subject meet for pardon or for a reward, and reserve the whole punishments due to his crimes, to the other world; but in the mean while, sees meet to inflict present punishment on thee, though less criminal, perhaps to convince the world, that even lesser offenders shall not escape; if, I say, he deal thus, is there no way for clearing his justice, but by conferring eternal happiness on thee? Why, if he inflict what further punishment is due to thee, in exact proportion to thy less atrocious crimes; and punish the other with evils proportioned to his more atrocious crimes, and make him up by