preponderance, therefore, of the Dutch over the English in this colony, and the disposition on the part of the former to take up arms being more general than it would be among the English, might increase the difficulties which England would have to encounter in case of a general uprising.

It may thus be seen that those who most favored the aggressive policy of Mr. Chamberlain, and especially the Uitlanders, have been governed largely by the idea that it would be dangerous to postpone the war, and that the difficulties might by postponement be protracted for an indefinite length of time. The causus belli, however, of the war is to be found largely in the commercial difficulties which the Uitlanders have to encounter. They are dependent for their existence upon the outside world. Their breadstuffs, their clothing, all implements, and most all of the necessaries of life come from abroad, and these are taxed as they pass through the different colonies on the road to the great city of Johannesburg. Long lists of grievances of a commercial character have been set forth by the Uitlanders as evidence of the oppression they were under. Examples of this may be found in the tax on dynamite used for mining purposes. It costs there seventeen dollars per case, when it could be bought out of the state for less than ten dollars. And a concession on dynamite has been granted to a company which makes millions of dollars a year out of it. Enormous prices by reason of similar concessions are paid for candles. The railroads discriminate and charge as much for hauling freight a distance of forty-seven miles from the border of the Transvaal to Johannesburg as it costs to haul the same freight a thousand miles from the seaport.

Those who undertake to justify England in this war claim that one of her purposes is also humanitarian; that the treking of the Boers was not simply for the purpose of migrating to a land wherein they could enjoy greater political privileges, but for the purpose of maintaining the institution of slavery, and that symptoms of slavery still exist in that country. This, of course, is denied by the Boers who undertake to show that the native service is simply a condition of employment. But it will hardly do to ascribe the English position in this war to the slavery question. There are those, no doubt, to whom this excuse appeals very strongly.

Connected with the charge of slavery is also the charge that English missionaries have been treated very harshly by the Boers. Whatever that treatment may have been, it is certain that the missionaries manifest a strong dislike of a people into whose religion they have been unable thus far to make any inroad. The Boers maintain strongly their faith, and it has been one of the leading causes of their union, and, no doubt, one of the leading causes of the great treks which they have in the past undertaken. Before and at the opening of the war, the ministers certainly did all they could to create popular prejudices throughout England and America by writing in denunciation of the Boers, and wherever a missionary discussed the question, people generally expected to find him against the Boers and in favor of this war. But while the missionary sympathizers may justify the war in part on the grounds of the grievances set up by the missionaries, it is certain that the treatment of missionaries by the Boers has played really no part whatever in this matter. Besides, the grievance is old, for in recent years there has been but little conflict between the Boers and the missionaries.

It is evident that even now, in the midst of war, the leaders among the Liberal party have not withdrawn entirely the strong opposition which they felt at its commencement. Bryce, the author of the "American Commonwealth," a prominent Liberal, has written a work upon "Impressions of South Africa." Bryce is very popular and considered a very impartial author. His book was published in 1898. Now that the war has broken out a revised edition is to be issued, and in it he says, speaking of the causes that led to this

war:

"The Boers made concessions, but the English held these concessions insufficient. In the course of this dicsussion the British ministry used language which led the Transvaal people to believe that they were determined to force the Boer government to comply with their demands; and they followed up their dispatches by sending troops from England to Africa. They justified this action by pointing out (and the event has shown this to be the fact) that the British garrison in South Africa was insufficient to defend the colonies. But the Boers naturally felt that if they remained quiet till the British forces had been raised to a strength which they could not hope to resist, they would lose the only military advantage which they possessed. Accordingly, when they knew

that the reserves were being called out in England, and that an army corps was to be sent to South Africa, they declared war, having been for some time previously convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the British government had resolved to coerce them. They were in sore straight, and they took the course which must have been expected from them, and, indeed, the only course which brave men who are not going to make further concessions could have taken."

tion:

Continuing further, Mr Bryce says regarding the present situa

"To some of us it appears a calamity for England also, since it is likely to alienate, perhaps for generations to come, the bulk of the white population in one of our most important self-governing colonies; it may, indeed, possibly mean for her the ultimate loss of South Africa."

At the outbreak of the war, Mr. Chamberlain had but little to say, and the press indulged in some comment over his reticence, and wondered how it was possible that he could restrain himself from speech-making in which he frequently indulges, and in which his representations are of the most extreme character. Recently, however, he found it convenient to arrange for a speech at Leicester. He had been extremely goaded by certain portions of the continental press, and the attitude of some French papers was most exasperating to him. Indeed, the papers that indulged in extreme criticism and were attacking the person of the Queen, had descended to a vileness that, although not worthy of notice, was nevertheless extremely aggravating. The circumstances that led to the attack upon the Queen arose from the announcement that she would spend the coming winter in the Italian part of the Riviera, a warm and delightful country for those who delight in the sunshine during the cold wintry months of northern Europe.

The Riviera extends from Genoa along the shore of the Mediterranean as far west as Nice, and, during the winter season, is perhaps as nearly Paradise as can be found in any part of the world. I suppose political conditions led the Queen to make the change and go to Italy instead of to France, especially since the French were very critical toward the English at the outbreak of the war. Some of the most disreputable, as well as the lowest, French journals, began an attack upon the person of the Queen, and made references quite vulgar in their character.

Mr. Chamberlain seems to have lost his temper, and he undertook in his speech to lecture the French, and, in his reference to France, made statements that were threatening in their character. He warned the French that such attacks "may have serious consequences if our neighbors do not mend their ways." He also spoke of the very friendly interest existing between England, Germany and the United States. He made reference to an AngloSaxon, or Tuetonic alliance. In the use of the word "alliance," he had accentuated perhaps too strongly the friendly interest between Germany and England, as a number of the German newspapers at once repudiated the idea that there was an alliance between England and Germany. However, he did represent that these three countries were practically in accord with reference to their foreign policy. Whether that accord of foreign policy will lead to an alliance, is yet to be seen. England had recently been treating Germany to high consideration. She has practically withdrawn her interest in the Samoan Islands on terms most favorable to Germany, and according to Germany's own wishes. The adjustment of the Samoan question between England and Germany, was evidently a stroke of high diplomacy on the part of England in her play for the friendly interest of Germany.

That the Liberals will take every advantage of what they consider the mistakes of the Conservatives in this war, to strengthen their position, may be seen again from the remarks of Lord Rosebery at Edinburgh, wherein he makes reply to Mr. Chamberlain. Lord Rosebery says:

"We have no right to go into the gutters (speaking of the French) to fish up the derelict press of any country and to hold it up to scorn, as a motive of our policy. It is impossible that the Queen could be besmirched by such attacks, which only recoil on the attackers; but, whatever the degraded outburst may mean, it does not represent the best or highest opinion of France. We have been over-ready to flout other nations, and it is no wonder that Great Britain is unpopular abroad. I do trust that this undiplomatic frankness will cease, for these stinging words rankle long afterwards, and it is not for statesmen to speak under the passing irritation of the moment."

The events of the war clearly demonstrate that England has again been guilty of the sin which has characterized her move

ments in almost every war of the last half of this century, namely, an underestimation of the strength of her enemies. At this time, it is not possible to give any very correct idea of what has actually taken place in the movements and contests on the battlefield. The Boers have moved their forces south into Natal, a British province, where most of the fighting, up to the present time, has taken place. There have been battles at Glencoe, Colenso and Estcourt. Seventeen thousand British are now shut up in Ladysmith, Kimberly and Mafeking. The battle of Modder River is perhaps the most sanguinary struggle that has yet taken place, but the paucity of news from the seat of war is such that it is very difficult at this writing to give the results of the struggle.

The British own the cable lines from South Africa, and the news that reaches us has, of course, a strong British coloring. Recent statements from the other side, show a wide discrepancy in the estimates, not only of the men lost, but in the size of the forces. Here is an example. The English say that from four thousand to nine thousand Boers occupied Talena Hill October 20th, under Lucas Meyer. The account of the Boers gives the number as about one thousand. In the attack made by General Symons upon the Boers, the English report says that from six hundred to nine hundred Boers were wounded. The Boer report says twentyseven. The fact that the war office in England permits so little of the news coming from the front to be made known, indicates at any rate that the English are not meeting with that success which the friends of England are looking for.

It has been supposed that the Boers had deteriorated in the use of their arms, and were not the excellent riflemen that they were some years ago. When the battle of Majuba Hill was fought, in 1880, the Boers were victorious in a conflict against six hundred English soldiers, when their own soldiers numbered only one hundred and fifty. In the Jameson raid, however, fewer than thirty men were killed, and this small number is said to have been the result of a general deterioration on the part of the Boers in the use of the rifle. Many have supposed, therefore, that the Boers would be outmatched in markmanship, and, therefore, at a disadvantage when they came to meet the English soldier on the field. All this speculation about the falling off in the standard of mark