IN JUSTICE to the memory of Dr. Witherspoon, it ought to be stated that he did not intend these lectures for the press, and that he once compelled a printer who, without his knowledge, had undertaken to publish them, to desist from the design, by threatning a prosecution as the consequence of persisting in it. The Doctor's lectures on morals, notwithstanding they assume the form of regular discourses, were in fact, viewed by himself as little more than a syllabus or compend, on which be might enlarge before a class at the times of recitation; and not intending that they should go further, or be otherwise considered, he took freely and without acknowledgment from writers of character such ideas, and perhaps expressions, as he found suited to bis purpose. But though these causes would not permit the Dr. himself to give to the public these sketches of moral philosophy, it is believed that they ought not to operate so powerfully on those into whose hands his papers have fallen since his death. Many of his pupils whose eminence in literature and distinction in society give weight to their opinions, have thought that these lectures, with all their imperfections, contain one of the best and most perspicuous exhibitions of the radical principles of the science on which they treat that has ever been made, and they have very importunately demanded their publication in this edition of his works: Nor is it conceived that a compliance with this demand, after the explanation here given can do any injury to the Dr's. reputation. And to the writer of this note it does not seem a sufficient reason that a very valuable work should be consigned to oblivion, because it is in some measure incomplete, or because it is partly a selection from authors to whom a distinct reference cannot now be made.

LECTURES

ΟΝ

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

ORAL Philofophy is that branch of Science which treats of the principles and laws of Duty or Mo rals. It is called Philosophy, because it is an inquiry into the nature and grounds of moral obligation by reafon, as diftinct from revelation.

Hence arifes a queftion, is it lawful, and is it fafe or useful to separate moral philofophy from religion? It will be faid, it is either the fame or different from revealed truth; if the fame, unneceffary-if different, false and dangerous.

An author of New-England, fays, moral philofophy is just reducing infidelity to a fyftem. But however fpecious the objections, they will be found at bottom not folid.If the Scripture is true, the difcoveries of reafon cannot be contrary to it; and therefore, it has nothing to fear from that quarter. And as we are certain it can do no evil, fo there is a probability that it may do much good. There may be an illustration and confirmation of the inspired writings, from reafon and obfervation, which will greatly add to their beauty and force.

The noble and eminent improvements in natural philofophy, which have been made fince the end of the laft century, have been far from hurting the interest of religion; on the contrary, they have greatly promoted it. Why fhould it not be the fame with moral philofophy,

which is indeed nothing elfe but the knowledge of human nature? It is true, that infidels do commonly proceed upon pretended principles of reafon. But as it is impofible to hinder them from reasoning on this subject, the best way is to meet them upon their own ground, and to fhow from reafon itself, the fallacy of their principles. I do not know any thing that ferves more for the fupport of religion than to fee from the different and oppofite fyf. tems of philofophers, that there is nothing certain in their schemes, but what is coincident with the word of God.

Some there are, and perhaps more in the prefent than any former age, who deny the law of nature, and fay, that all fuch fentiments as have been usually ascribed to the law of nature, are from revelation and tradition.

We must diftinguifh here between the light of nature and the law of nature: by the firft is to be understood what we can or do difcover by our own powers, without revelation or tradition: by the fecond, that which, when discovered, can be made appear to be agreeable to reafon and nature.

There have been fome very fhrewd and able writers of late, viz. Dr. Willfon, of New Caftle, and Mr. Riccalton of Scotland, who have written against the light of nature, fhewing that the first principles of knowledge are taken from information. That nothing can be fuppofed more rude and ignorant, than man without inftruction. That when men have been brought up fo, they have scarcely been fuperior to brutes. It is very difficult to be precife upon this fubject, and to diftinguish the difcoveries of reafon from the exercife of it. Yet I think, admitting all, or the greatest part, of what fuch contend for, we may, notwithstanding, confider how far any thing is confonant to reason, or may be proven by reafon; though perhaps reason, if left to itfelf, would never have difcovered it.

Dr. Clark was one of the greateft champions for the law of nature; but it is only fince his time that the fhrewd oppolers of it have appeared. The Hutchinfonians (so called from Hutchinfon of England) infift that not only

all moral, but alfo all natural knowledge comes from revelation, the true fyftem of the world, true chronology, all human arts, &c. In this, as is ufual with most other claffes of men, they carry their noftrum to extravagance. I am of opinion, that the whole Scripture is perfectly agreeable to found philofophy; yet certainly it was never intended to teach us every thing. The political law of the Jews contains many noble principles of equity, and excellent examples to future lawgivers; yet it was fo local and peculiar, that certainly it was never intended to be immutable and univerfal.

It would be more juft and ufeful to fay that all fimple and original difcoveries have been the production of Providence, and not the invention of man. On the whole, it seems reasonable to make moral philofophy, in the fense above explained, a fubject of ftudy. And indeed let men think what they will of it, they ought to acquaint themfelves with it. They muft know what it is, if they mean' even to show that it is falfe.

The Division of the Subject.

Moral philofophy is divided into two great branches, Ethics and Politics, to this fome add Jurifprudence, though this may be confidered as a part of politics.

Ethics relate to perfonal duties, Politics to the conftition, government, and rights of focieties, and jurisprudence, to the adminiftration of juftice in conftituted flates. It feems a point agreed upon, that the principles of duty and obligation must be drawn from the nature of That is to fay, if we can difcover how his Maker formed' him, or for what he intended him, that certainly is what he ought to be.

The knowledge of human nature, however, is either perplexed and difficult of itself, or hath been made fo, by the manner in which writers in all ages have treated it. Perhaps this circumftance itfelf, is a ftrong presumption of the truth of the Scripture doctrine of the depravity and corruption of our nature. Suppofing this depravity, VOL. III. 3. A

it must be one great caufe of difficulty and confufion in giving an account of human nature as the work of God. This I take to be indeed the cafe with the greatest part of our moral and theological knowledge.

Those who deny this depravity, will be apt to plead for every thing, or for many things as dictates of nature, which are in reality propenfities of nature in its prefent ftate, but at the fame time the fruit and evidence of its departure from its original purity. It is by the remaining power of natural confcience that we muft endeavor to detect and oppose these errors.

(1) We may confider man very generally in his fpecies as diftin&t from and fuperior to the other creatures, and what it is, in which the difference truly confifts. (2) As an individual, what are the parts which conftitute his nature.

1. Philofophers have generally attempted to affign the precife diftinction between men and the other animals ; but when endeavoring to bring it to one peculiar incommunicable characteristic, they have generally contradicted one another and fometimes difputed with violence, and rendered the thing more uncertain.

The difficulty of fixing upon a precife criterion, only ferves to fhow that in man we have an example of what we fee alfo every where elfe, viz. a beautiful and infenfible gradation from one thing to another, so that the higheft of the inferior is, as it were, connected and blended with the lowest of the fuperior clafs. Birds and beasts are connected by fome fpecies, fo that you will find it hard to fay whether they belong to the one or the other-So indeed it is in the whole vegetable as well as animal kingdom. (1) Some fay men are diftinguished from brutes by reason, and certainly this, either in kind or degree, is the most honorable of our diftinétions. (2) Others fay that many brutes give ftrong figns of reafon, as dogs, horfes and elephants. But that man is diftinguifhed by memory and forefight but I apprehend that thefe are upon the fame footing with reafon, if there are fome glimmerings of reafon in the brute creation, there are alfo manifeft proofs of memory and fome of forefight. (3) Some have thought it proper to diftinguifh man from the inferior creatures by