3. This fentiment has refpect to the mercy and goodnefs of God, or his readinefs to hear the cry of the oppreffed, and send deliverance to his people. This circumflance is neceflary to be taken in, to make him the proper object of faith and truft; and it must be combined with the other, to give us a complete view of the influence of Providence. Power and wifdom alone, give an imperfect display of the divine character. It would give little fupport under the preffure of affliction, to have a general or theoretical perfuafion, that all things are poffible with God: but if we believe his readiness to interpofe, and see our title clear to implore his help, we have that hope which is justly called, "the anchor of the foul, fure and stedfaft." In this fenfe, falvation belongeth unto God; it is his prerogative; it is his glory. The promise fo often repeated in the fame or fimilar terms, is addreffed both to nations and particular perfons. "He fhall call upon me, and I "will anfwer him. I will be with him in trouble, to deli"ver

ver him, and to honor him. The righteous cry, and "the Lord heareth, and delivereth him out of all his trou"bles. Many are the afflictions of the righteous: but the "Lord delivereth him out of them all."

Having briefly ftated these known and general truths, I proceed to the second and principal thing propofed, which was to lay before you a fuccinct view of what the United States of America owe to Divine Providence, in the courfe of the prefent war. On confidering this part of the fubject, a difficulty prefents itself as to the manner of handling it. I am defirous of doing it fome measure of justice, and at the fame tine of avoiding exceffive prolixity, or a tedious enumeration of particular facts. To unite these two purposes as much as poffible, I will divide what I have to fay into diftin&t branches; and after a few words of illustration on each of them, leave it to every hearer to add fuch further examples as may have fallen within his own abfervation. The branches I would feparately confider, are the following: 1. Signal fucceffes or particular and providential favors to us in the courfe of the war. 2. Preservation from difficulties and evils which feemed to be in VOL. III. I

our fituation unavoidable, and at the fame time next to infurmountable. 3. Confounding the counfels of our ene mies, and making them haften on the change which they defired to prevent.

1. Signal fucceffes or providential favors to us in the courfe of the war. Here I must mention what happened at the beginning of the conteft, and prevented us from being crushed in the very out-fet, although it is now in a manner wholly forgotten. Let us remember our true fituation, after we had made the most public and peremptory declarations of our determination to defend our liberties. There was a willing fpirit, but unarmed hands. Our enemies have all along charged us with a deliberate concerted purpose of breaking with them, and setting up an independent empire. The falfhood of this accufation might be made to appear from many circumstances; as there being no pre-contract among the states themselves, nor any attempt to engage allies or affiftance in Europe, and several others. But though there were no other argument at all, it is fufficiently proved by the total want of arms and ammunition to fupply us even during the first stages of refistance. The nakedness of the country in this respect is well known; and our enemies endeavored to avail themselves of it by taking every measure to prevent their being brought to us. This difficulty was got over by many providential fupplies, without the care or forefight of those who were at the head of affairs, and particularly by many unexpected captures from our enemies themfelves.

How contrary to human appearance and human conjectures have many circumstances turned out? It was univerfally fuppofed at first that we fhould be able to do nothing at all at fea, because of the great naval power of the enemy; yet the fuccefs of our private veffels has been one of the most powerful means of diftreffing them, and fupporting us. I cannot help in particular taking notice, that the eastern states which were the first objects of their vengeance, were actually in their poffeffion, and feemed to be devoted to pillage and deftruction; yet in a fhort time they were delivered, and have in the courfe of the war

acquired a greater acceffion of wealth and power than it is probable they could have done in the fame period of fecurity and peace.

It falls to be taken notice of under this branch of the fubject, that our moft fignal fucceffes have generally /been when we had the weakest hopes or the greatest fears. What could be more difcouraging than our situation at the clofe of the year 1776? when, after general Howe's arrival with so powerful and well appointed an armament, our army enlifted but for a few months, was almost entirely dispersed? Yet then did the furprife of the Heffians at Trenton, and the fubfequent victory at Princeton, raife the drooping fpirits of the country, and give a new turn to our affairs. Thefe advantages redounded greatly to the honor of the commander in chief who planned, and the handful of troops with him, who executed the meafures, as is confeffed by all; yet were they of still greater moment to the caufe of America in general, than they were brilliant as military exploits. This place and neighborhood having been the scene of these actions, cannot but make them and their confequences fresh in the memo. ry of every one who now hears me.

The great victory over general Burgoyne and his ar my, (weakened at Bennington, and taken prifoners at Saratoga,) which opened the eyes of Europe in general, and in fome degree even of Britain, happened at a time when many were difcouraged. It happened when after the loffes of Brandy-Wine and Germantown, the British were in poffeffion of Philadelphia, and the Congress of the United States were obliged to fly to a diftant part of the country. It happened not long after our difgraceful flight from Ticonderoga, and the fcandalous lofs of that post, which was every where faid and thought to be the key of the continent, and the poffeffion of it effential to our fecurity. We must not omit to obferve that this victory over a nume /rous army of British regulars, was obtained by an army composed in a great measure of militia fuddenly collect ed, and freemen of the country who turned out as yo lunteers.

In the fame manner our late aftonishing fuccefs in the fouth began when our affairs in that part of the continent wore a most discouraging afpect. The year 1781, which began with mutiny in the northern army, and weakness in the fouthern, produced more inftances of gallantry and military prowess than all the former, and was closed with a victory more glorious to us, and more humiliating to the enemy, than any thing that had before happened during the course of the war.

It was furely a great favor of Providence to raise up for us fo great and illuftrious an ally in Europe. This Prince has affifted us, as you all know, in a very powerful and effectual manner, and has granted that affistance upon a footing,fo generous as well as juft, that our enemies will not yet believe, but there must be fome fecret and partial ftipulations in favor of himfelf and his fubjects, although no fuch thing exifts.

Let me add to all these the providing for us a perfon who was fo eminently qualified for the arduous task of commander in chief of the armies of the United States. I must make some apology here. None who know me, I think will charge me with a difpofition to adulation or grofs flattery of living characters. I am of opinion and have often expreffed it, that the time for fixing a man's character is after death has fet his feal upon it, and favor, fear and friendship are at an end. For this reafon I do not mean to give a general or full character of the perfon here in view. But in fpeaking of the kindness of Providence to the United States, it would be a culpable neglect not to mention that feveral of his characteriftic qualities feem fo perfectly fuited to our wants, that we muft confider his appointment to the fervice, and the continued health with which he has been bleffed, as a favor from the God of heaven. Confider his coolnefs and prudence, his fortitude and perfeverance, his happy talent of engaging the affection of all ranks, fo that he is equally acceptable to the citizen, and to the foldier -to the ftate in which he was born, and to every other on the continent. To be a brave man, or fkilful commander, is common to him with many others; but this

country stood in need of a comprehenfive and penetrating mind, which understood the effect of particular meafures in bringing the general cause to an iffue. When we contraft bis character and conduct with thofe of the various leaders that have been oppofed to him, when we confider their attempts to blaft each others reputation, and the fhort duration of their command, we muft say that Providence has fitted him for the charge, and called him to the fervice.

This head can hardly be better clofed than with the extraordinary interpofition of divine Providence for the discovery of the black treachery of Arnold, who intended to put one of the most important fortreffes, and the general himself, into the enemies hands. This defign was ripe for execution, and the time of execution was at hand. As there was no fufpicion of the traitor, no meafures were, or could be taken for preventing it. The meeting of the fpy with two friends of America, which was entirely cafual, the unaccountable embarrassment of that artful perfon, when with a little addrefs, he might eafily have extricated himself; and indeed, the whole circumftances of that affair, clearly point out the finger of God.

I might have added many more inftances of the favor of providence in particular events, but what have been mentioned, I think are fully fufficient for the purpose, for which they are adduced, and will lead the hearers to the recollection of others of a fimilar kind.

The fecond part of my obfervations, muft be on the difficulties and dangers, which feemed to be in our fitua tion, unavoidable, and, at the fame time, next to infur mountable. The firft of this kind, which I fhall mention, is diffenfion, or the oppofition of one colony to another. On this our enemies reckoned very much, from the beginning. Even before the war broke out, reafoners feemed to build their hopes, of the colonies not breaking off from the mother country for ages, upon the impoffibility of their uniting their ftrength, and forming one compact body, either for offence or refiftance. To fay the truth, the danger was great and real. It was on this account,