SERMON XIII.

Galat. i. 10.

DO I NOW PERSUADE MEN OR GOD? OR DO I SEEK TO PLEASE MEN? FOR IF I YET PLEASED MEN, I SHOULD NOT BE THE SERVANT OF CHRIST.

ST. Paul, we see, here puts two questions with respect to his own apostolic character, which may, at first sight, seem to take somewhat from the likeness of a moral pourtrait which he has elsewhere drawn of himself, and in which a principal feature was a solicitude to adapt his behaviour so much to the world, as to endeavour by it to be all things to all men; to the Jews, a Jew; and to the Greeks, a Greek. Yet this is easily reconciled to the text, if we recollect, from the true and general idea we have of his life and conversation, that he ever made his complacency to mankind subservient to his duty to God, that he regarded such complacency only so far as it added to his power of observing that duty, and pleased men, not seeking his own profit, but that, as an apostle and servant of Christ, he might forward the

conversion of sinners, and, by the very justifiable arts of general urbanity and particular civility, "save some."

This being granted, we may hence infer that the very rule which St. Paul laid down for his own conduct in his peculiar situation, may, and ought to be the general rule which all men should follow, even on the most common occasions; and that an attention to the laws (as they may be called in civilized states) of society, should be regarded, when such laws are not in opposition to the laws of God and of Christ; but that whenever they are in the least so, the former should be slighted and the other religiously observed. Obvious, however, as this truth is, and notwithstanding that divine aid which Revelation has graciously dispensed to natural reason, many Philosophers have placed their obligations to morality on foundations foreign from that of the duty of pleasing God; and either finding their convenience in allowing greater latitude to their behaviour, or aiming at the character of superior talents and reputation, either drawn away by a love of singularity, or misled by a vain veneration for antiquity, they have invented or adopted different systems, and have endeavoured, with incredible industry, to reconcile them to men's minds, and to propagate them as universal truths.

That this should be the case in the Pagan world, is not indeed much to be wondered at: The false and im

perfect conceptions they had of the nature of the Deity, necessarily misled them in this point. It is true, they believed that the divinities they worshipped had power to punish and to reward them. They endeavoured therefore to appease them by sacrifices, and to propitiate them by vows; but to please them by a life conformable to their will, and, by so doing, to arrive at moral perfection, neither did nor could possibly enter into their imaginations. Indeed, if it had, they would have found it difficult to frame any uniform system of conduct upon it that could have pleased such a variety of deities, since we know there was scarce a single vice which was not patronized, scarce a single virtue which was not reprobated by one or other of that fancy-formed mob of beings.

Since, therefore, they could not ascertain that a life of purity and virtue was acceptable to their gods, their religion could never inspire them with virtue or purity. Accordingly we find it consisted chiefly in the due observance of certain rites and ceremonies, a belief in the Divine Existence, and the necessity of submitting to its decrees. Their Philosophers finding in this no just basis for morality, were under a necessity of recurring to other principles, and of founding the obligation to moral duties on Virtue, either for its own intrinsic excellence and beauty, or because it best contributed to the ease and pleasure of life, or else because it was the surest means of supporting what it constituted the dignity of human nature;

those who wished to place it on a still more permanent foundation, perhaps added the only immortality of which they had any adequate idea, that of fame and reputation with future ages.

I say not this to derogate from the merit of these philosophic worthies; many of them deserve the admiration, some even the love of all posterity; nevertheless the want of the religious principle has left a weakness in their reasonings, and visibly eclipsed that glory which a love of truth and a habit of virtue had spread over their illustrious characters.

Equally various, and equally imperfect have been many of the systems of modern moralists, insomuch that it would be almost an endless task to point out the false and flimsy arguments of all those pretended champions of freedom, and vindicators of the rights of reason, who, expelling Religion from their plan of Ethics, endeavour to support man in the severest conflicts, by declaiming to him upon the dignity of his nature; to shield him against the allurements of pleasure, even by interposing Pleasure herself; or who, giving him Prudence for a guide, pretend to secure him by her direction alone, from all the open as well as secret attacks of Error and of Vice.

Yet there is one of these principles of action which may, with propriety here, be examined; a principle that,

under the most specious appearance, has insinuated itself into a more general reception than any other, particularly with the active and polite part of the world, with the men of business and the men of pleasure: a principle, which, it must be confessed, when under the rule and influence of Religion, is capable of doing the greatest service to the cause of Virtue; but which, when setting up itself in opposition to her, becomes the most uncertain, the most fallacious of all other guides.

I speak of HONOUR, the insufficiency of whose influence upon morality, will appear from considering how liable it is to be perverted by SELF-INTEREST; by our irascible PASSIONS; by the spirit of PARTY; and by the spirit of FASHION.

1. The law of Reputation, if I may so call it, or those rules of behaviour to which we must conform, if we would keep on good terms with the world, maintain the character of an honest man, or claim the privileges of a gentleman, is what may justly be termed the sanction of Honour; and in this respect, it is allowed, it pretends to imitate the religion it would supplant, in that it teaches us to fulfil certain engagements, to ratify certain contracts, and to perform certain acts of equity, which written constitutions, and the course of civil justice, neither do oblige us to, nor can take within their cognizance: but it varies very materially from it, in that its