proofs. But though we should examine every doctrine according to our abilities, and not believe any thing merely because we were taught it before we arrived at the full ufe of our understanding; yet we are not to be lukewarm in religion, or reject without diftinction the opinions of our former years. For when we are commanded to prove all things, we are ordered likewise to hold faft that which is good. A candid examination may often convince us, that we have been well inftructed from our youth. A habit of doubting therefore, carried too far, is equally dangerous with implicit confidence. Truth, then, fhould always excite our zeal according to its importance, whether it agrees or disagrees with our present tenets, and whether we are indebted for it to the information of others, or our own discovery. I proceed, Thirdly, to expose the methods, by which artful or bigoted men endeavour to obfcure truth, and adorn falfhood. One method, by which men recommend falfhood falfhood in preference to truth, is by positive affertions of falfe principles or pretended facts, and contempt or ridicule of what are true. Weak and ignorant perfons are ready to believe, without proof, what they hear afferted by those of fuperior knowledge and understanding, provided it neither injures their temporal intereft, nor contradicts their defires. Hence we often fee in controverfy very doubtful propofitions taken for granted, unfupported facts boldly afferted, credible teftimony flighted or denied, and important truths treated with contempt. The mischief arifing from this practice is very extenfive; as innumerable falfe conclufions may be drawn from erroneous principles and mistaken facts, and men are with difficulty convinced, that they have hitherto been deceived in what they looked upon as axioms and uncontroverted truths. But though men will, in support of their opinions, however false and prejudicial, proceed fometimes to inconceivable lengths; yet in general they are more artful, and leave their readers to draw falfe conclufions from infinuations founded upon premises partly true, or facts that are misrepresented and distorted in their circumstances. The connection between two propofitions is not always perceived. Hence men may impose upon the fimple by fhewing what conclufion they would wish to form, and producing as an argument, what is in fome fenfe true, or not easy to be confuted; though in the sense required by just reasoning it is entirely falfe, or has little or no reference to the fubject in debate. And as many propofitions are neither univerfally true, nor univerfally false; deceivers often impose upon the weak by making them believe that to be univerfally true, which is fo only in fome particular circumftances. In morality, the relation, fituation, and other circumftances of an agent create a confiderable difference in the nature of fome actions, which appear fimilar to an inattentive obferver. In focieties likewise free will and the various difpofitions of mankind mankind cause them, when influenced by the ftricteft connections, to act in a different manner, though impelled by the fame outward motives. We fhall therefore be liable to error and delufion, if we neglect to mark every circumftance, upon which depends the truth or falfhood of any propofition; or if we praise, blame, or excufe the conduct of a fociety in general for the good or bad behaviour of a few individuals. When And even when men afcribe particular qualities to their proper fubjects, they may deceive the unwary by representing them better or worse than they really are. we praise the goodness of an action, or the juftness of an opinion, the good may be exaggerated, or the neceffary limitations overlooked. And in like manner, where there is fome ground for blame, the cenfure may be too severe on the one hand, or the fault too much palliated on the other. Thus, when we hear the fame action related by a friend and an enemy, the degree of good or evil is often so increased or diminished by favour or hatred, that every impartial perfon may easily perceive, that one or both opinions must be very far diftant from the real truth. Another method of deceiving is, by a change of the fubject, to put the resemblance for the reality, and thus obtain praise or procure blame for what deferves the reverse. The motive, means, or manner of an action often contribute much to its goodness, or enhance its guilt. The fame action may be virtuous or vicious, as it agrees with the will of God and the happiness of our neighbour, or is attended with fuch circumftances, as contradict his laws, and violate the duties of civil fociety. By difregarding these diftinctions, the name of liberty has frequently been used for a cloak of maliciousness, a juft feparation from the corruptions of a tyrannical church is branded with the crime of heresy and schism, and hypocrify of various kinds has been recommended and dignified with the name of religion. But |