1 66 lowers. "Is it possible to believe," asks Kant, that Leibniz,. by his pre-determined harmony between soul and body, intended' an adaptation of two beings, entirely independent as regards their nature? For a harmony between soul and body we must substitute a harmony between sense and understanding as we remember that phenomena are mere presentations. The Critique gave as the ground of this harmony so far as it makes the knowledge of universal laws of nature possible a priori, that without it no experience would be possible. But why we should have such faculties, and why they should co-operate as if all nature were purposely arranged for our comprehension, "this we could not explain nor can any one else. Leibniz called the ground of this a predetermined harmony. He did not thus explain the co-operation (or agreement) nor did he wish to explain it. He only indicated. that by this we were to think a certain purposiveness in the ordering activity of the supreme cause, and this purposiveness as already put into the creation (pre-determined)." If Kant could have seen the letter to Remond already quoted (Works III, 623), he would have regarded this as a proof of the correctness of his interpretation. The doctrine of formal purposiveness is indeed the best development of the thought of Leibniz, though it was not until Kant had reached it in his own way that he recognized its relationship to that of the thinker who suggested rather than proved or systematized. 6. The Critique of Teleological Judgment contains both a modification and an extension of the views expressed in the reply to Forster in 1787, followed by a general recapitulation of the various aspects of teleology, physical, moral, and teleological. Is there in addition to the formal, subjective purposiveness of nature an objective purposiveness also? We saw that the former must be assumed with regard to the relations of understanding to reason tomake a unity of science possible, and with regard to the harmony of imagination and understanding to make the æsthetic judgments. possible, but we had to admit that neither unity of science nor æsthetic feeling is necessary for experience, hence our deduction would only establish their subjective validity. Now in the case of organic beings, as already shown, we are obliged to conceive 'H. VI. 65 ff. them, if we conceive them at all, after the analogy of reason which acts according to ends. Here then are objects which demand the application of a new "analogy" in addition to the three "analogies of experience." Why not then give this analogy a place with the rest? Because, answers Kant, the cases are directly opposite. The mind must apply its analogies of experience to bring object into experience, and we can see a priori why objects necessarily stand in just the relations asserted. On the other hand, if we are to apply our analogy of a causality according to ends, we begin by showing that there is no a priori necessity evident that the objects or relations in question exist. We regard them as contingent, hence our analogy is only a regulative not a constructive principle. Moreover, while we must recognize that organized beings furnish what we may properly call "ends of nature," in the sense that we cannot understand their possibility in any other way, we must yet admit that we cannot understand it in this way either. For (and this distinction was not pointed out in the reply to Forster) nature is not a machine. It is thus to say far too little of her to apply to her the analogy of Art, and though we come nearer if we apply the analogy of Life, yet this involves either giving a contradictory attribute to matter or assuming a Hylozoism, and we must acknowledge that strictly speaking, the organization of nature has nothing analogous with any kind of causality that we know. This concept of a thing as end of nature can then be no constitutive concept, though it may serve as regulative to guide our investigation after a remote analogy of our causality according to ends, for we must remember on the other hand that if we used only mechanism we could not employ the maxim that nothing in 'H. V. 371-373, § 61. Contrast with the above the strong statement in a projected reply to Forster, fouund in Lose Blätter, C. 5. p. 137. “Der Grundsatz der Zweckmässigkeit im Bau organischer vornehmlich lebender Geschöpfe ist so mit der Vernunft zusammenhangend als der Grundsatz der wirkenden Ursachen in Ansehung aller Veränderungen in der Welt. Irgend einen Theil eines Geschöpfs der der Gattung beständig anhängt für zwecklos annehmen ist eben so viel als eine Begebenheit in der Welt ohne Ursache entstanden anzunehmen. Denn wir können uns die Möglichkeit solcher Wesen in Welchen ein Theil um aller und alle Theile um eines willen da sind garnicht anders als durch eine Idee gedenken die ihrer Entstehung zu Grunde lag." 2 H. V. 386 f; U. 293 f. 1 Jor M an organism is in vain. On this point then the result is essentially that of the first Critique, though as with the formal purposiveness the emphasis is there on the negative side, here on the positive, showing that the conception of inner purposiveness guides the reason into an entirely different order of things than that of a mere mechanism of nature, which will here no longer suffice. Just as the introduction applied criticism to the systematizing operation of science to discover its pre-suppositions, so here the teleological judgment is examined which every physiologist pronounces in his working hypothesis that every part of plant or animal has a function, and the assumption involved is seen to be that of the inner purposiveness of organized beings. For Kant's procedure it would be quite immaterial whether this purposiveness is viewed with the eyes of a Paley or of a Darwin. This working hypothesis, however, in any case, demands a criticism to show on what transcendental principle it is based. Admitting the Darwinian hypothesis fully there will still be found the four conflicting theories of Epicureanism, Spinozism, Hylozoism, and Theism, and Kant would still assert that all attempts to treat the technique of nature dogmatically must fail because the concept end of nature is inexplicable. Kant's position must not be misunderstood as if he took the ground that we could explain an organism by the conception of purpose. This he expressly denies when he says, "The causality of nature has nothing analogous with any causality that we know.1 More emphatically perhaps than elsewhere is this expressed in a passage printed by Reicke, which belongs to Kant's last years and may be regarded as expressing his maturest views. In this he declares that to intrude the reason's concept of purposiveness into the real inner relation of Matter and its manifoldness, is an Amphiboly. While, however, Darwinism cannot make criticism. 1Cf. Riehl op. cit. Bd. II.; Theil II. 331 ff. 2 Die Organisation des Subjects selber zum Behuf der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung sebst ist der Grund einer Amphibolie Das was blos sinnlich constituirend ist (der Form nach) für intellectuel und umgekehrt zu den ken und den Vernunftbegriff der Zweckmässigkeit im realen (activen) inneren Verhältnis der Materie und des Manigfaltigen desslben in einem ausseren Sinnen Object welche Form ein immaterielles Princip ist, wie einen deus ex machina einzuschieben. Wir nehmen nämlich an uns selbst Organen war durch welche 2 superfluous, it does give an entirely new point of view, and its outlook is precisely in the direction toward which Kant looked.* For its progress is toward a mechanical explanation for certain phenomena. But if this mechanical explanation be ultimately reached for all phenomena, so that we could from a given number of assumed primary forces trace the formation of the world, the teleological problem will but assume a profounder significance. For, as was asserted in the History of the Heavens, we cannot avoid asking why mechanical forces under necessary laws should concur to a result that we cannot help regarding as harmony and unity. The human intellect will never be able to think the different parts as combined in a unity unless under the condition that the idea of a unity was at the same time the cause of the whole. For an intuitive understanding, necessity and harmony might be one and the same, but such an understanding would know things in themselves. For us who know only phenomena through the senses a scientific explanation must remain a connection of phenomena according to mechanical laws, but side by side with this will remain the demand of reason for the application of her own principle of unity, the teleological. The two do not necessarily conflict at all. Indeed, if we assume a final cause this is not in the least an explanation. It is rather only a challenge to find the mechanical causes through which the end is attained, and we may think of the mechanical causes as in subordination to the final. 3 7. The treatment of the argument of physico-theology in the last Critique, adds a further criticism to those of the Sole Proof and the first Critique. For not only is this argument dependent on a transcendental for its conclusiveness, it is now discovered to be dependent on moral teleology. Led by the suggestion offered wir die bewegende Kräfte der Materie zweckmässig (nach unserm Kräftenverein) vereinigen ohne die Möglichkeit dieses organischen Systems einzusehen: haben hiebey Zwecke die eine immaterielle Ursache voraussetzen weil sie Verstand hat (denn nur ein Verstand kann das Mannig faltige der Materie zum Bewustseyn eines Systems der Kräfte vereinigen). Nach der Analogie unserer eigenen Organisation und [bricht ab]. Lose Blätter. D. 25, p. 265. 1Cf. esp: $80-$82. 1 by the internal purposiveness of organic beings, the mind goes on to think an external purposiveness and thus to connect all the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms in one chain of ends, concluding with man as the highest and only self-conscious link, and our study of nature might even lead us to see that it was man's culture and not his happiness for which nature seemed to be adapted. But reason will not stop here; it persists in asking "What is it all for?" and for this question which asks for the ultimate unconditioned end, the final purpose, of the whole creation, it is evident that nothing in the world of the conditioned can furnish an answer. Yet, unless this question is asked and answered it is evident that we can have no physico-theology, for though the formal and objective purposiveness may force the reflective Judgment to assume an intelligent Cause, yet such a Cause is far from being sufficient for our concept of God. We must have reason to believe that this Cause is not only skillful but wise, and this can come only from our answer to the question, What is the final purpose of the whole? Where then can this question find its answer? Only by leaving the realm of nature for that of morality; for it is only in man as under moral laws, man as a noumenon, man as acting that we find an end good in itself, and not simply good for something. Only if the final purpose of creation is a moral one can we postulate a moral author of creation.2 But it is not only to complete its argument that physico-theology or rather physical teleology, as we must henceforward call it since its limitation has been clearly shown, is dependent on moral teleology. It is from the same source that it derives, to a large extent, the powerful impression that it has always made upon the human mind. For it is not physical ends which point to an inscrutable Understanding in the cause of the world, nor is it man, viewed simply as a physical or intellectual being, that stimulates the reason to its conception of a final purpose and a supersensuous all-wise Being. Personal worth, which a man must give himself, is the sole condition under which he can be regarded as an end. Moral teleology is thus at the basis of all that is conclusive and impressive. Physical teleology performs only the service of leading the way. 3 1 Cf. Kant's remarks on the Lisbon earthquake, written 1756: H. I. 444. 2 U. §§ 84-87. H. V. 491 ff: U. 471 f, |