does such a conséquence necessarily follow from any assertion in any part of his works. He denies indeed the continuance of memory after death, which he observes is the result of pavracía, and, if memory be absent, it may be asked, how can the consciousness of personal identity exist, the loss of which would be fatal to the expectation of future recompense? But with regard to this conclusion I would venture to remark, that, though memory be excluded, it does not necessarily follow that the knowledge which man obtains or preserves by means of memory, while mind and body are united, is to cease when they are separated. Aristotle assigns to the Deity consciousness of happiness, apprehension of ideas, and an interest in the conduct and fortunes of mankind; and yet, by denying him bodily sensation, virtually denies him memory. He has defined memory to be a faint perception of past reality: the perception of this reality may be conveyed in another way, and more vividly, after death'. In the Ethics the dead are said to be affected by the fortune of their living friends, yet not affected so far as to have their condition changed by this sympathy, whether they

The Epicurean in Cicero accuses Aristotle of depriving the Deity of thought, because he deprived him of body. De Natura Deorum lib. i. cap. 13.

r Aristotle's Ethics, book i. chap. 11.

are happy or otherwise. It is clear from this passage that the dead are supposed to be conscious of personal identity, and to be sensible of pleasure and pain, and that they are divided into classes, some being happy and others not so3. But if the happiness of man in this life is not in Aristotle's opinion a capricious gift of the gods, but the reward of virtuous actions, it is not easy to imagine any other circumstances or conditions on which the fortunes of the soul after death could be made to depend. And this consideration would lead us back to the necessity of some sort of future retribution which the metaphysical theory we have just examined apparently tended to annihilate. It is surprising, that while almost every other branch of human knowledge has been investigated by Aristotle, how little consideration he has bestowed upon the question of the soul's immortality. It is impossible to speak positively as to his opinions on the subject; for throughout his voluminous works, metaphysical, physical, and moral, we find no sufficient data from which to deduce

This positive opinion can hardly be overthrown by the assertion in the third book, that death is most terrible because it is an end, and there appears to be neither good nor evil beyond. Aristotle's Ethics, book iii. chap. 6. He might speak thus of death, and the fear of death, in the mind of man without intending thereby to deny a future state.

t Aristotle's Ethics, book i. chap. 9. book x. chap. 8.

any certain conclusion. It is probable, from the practical character of his mind, that he was unwilling to indulge in speculations on a question from the discussion of which he could arrive at no clear and accurate knowledge. It is not often that we meet with a more complete example of what the logicians call the petitio principii than the assertions of Warburton respecting the chapter we have attempted to discuss. Cudworth had declared it to be obscure, but, says the author of the Legation, ""had that excellent person re"flected on the general doctrine of the TO 'EN he "would have found the passage plain and easy." And he sums up his observations in that convenient form of words recommended by the ancient sophists and rhetoricians, to silence opposition by alarming the adversary into an idea that his dissent will be interpreted as a proof of ignorance: "The learned well know that the Intellectus

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Agens of Aristotle was the very same with the "Anima Mundi of Plato and Pythagoras." Now, omitting all further inquiry into the correctness of Warburton's representations respecting Plato's creed, it may be sufficient to observe at present, that if the learned have acquired such satisfactory knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Sta

"Divine Legation, lib. iii. sect. 4. vol. ii.

p. 112.

gyrite on the same subject, it must have been from other sources than his own writings.

X

That Aristotle believed in a Supreme Being, the original Mover of all things, enjoying perfect felicity, and the source of all good, may be abundantly proved; that, besides the Supreme Being, he maintained the existence also of y one intelligent Principle (notwithstanding his notion that all the spheres were animated essences) pervading the universe, may be inferred from some expressions in his metaphysical works, and from a direct assertion in his Politics. In addition to these, he appears to have considered Nature as a third and distinct cause, performing its functions subordinate to and dependent on the two former ;

* Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συν Εχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 7. Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ ̓ αὐτό. Ibid. cap. 8.

Εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ, καὶ τάξις, καὶ γενέσις. Ibid. cap. 1o.

Ο θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις. Ibid. lib. i. c. 2. Πάντα ἔχει τἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς καί ἐστιν αὐτάρκης. Magna Moralia, lib. ii. cap. 15.

ν Σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ ΠΑΣ Ο ΚΟΣΜΟΣ, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. Aristot. Politic. lib. vii. cap. 3. Vide also Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 8. de Coelo, lib. ii. cap. 3. Idem, lib. i. cap. 9.

2 Εκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ ΦΥΣΙΣ. Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 7. Vide also Phys. lib. ii. cap. 1.

but he has by no means clearly or consistently explained the peculiar province of each, nor the relation which they bear to the human soul. Although therefore it may be allowed that he held the doctrine of the Anima Mundi, he does not seem to have taught it in the fulness of Plato's sense, who confounds it with the law of Nature, and gives a diffuse account of its creation, attributes, and operations. This view of his opinions is supported by the authority of a Eusebius and other fathers of the church, who triumphantly mention the discordance of these great teachers on the subject, as contrasted with the harmony of the inspired writers. It is well known also that the two philosophers were opposed to each other respecting the origin of the world itself: Plato believed that matter in disorder was eternal, Aristotle, that matter arranged, or the world, was eternal; a doctrine which he probably borrowed

a In Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 12. where an extract is given from Porphyry containing an account of Plato's Anima Mundi, the following words occur: Ipòs ovdèv TOÚTWY ἡμῖν ̓Αριστοτέλης ὁμολογεῖ, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν ὑπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως διοικεῖσθαι, &c.

b De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. 10. Idem, lib. ii. cap. 1. Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 29. Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 6, &c. It should be observed, in consulting Aristotle de Cœlo, that oupavò, is frequently used by him to signify the world: it has the same sense also in Plato's Timæus.

I