Some of them thought hereby to keep the moon in her orb, whereas otherwise she would have fallen down upon the earth, and the world would have lost one of its lights; for the credulous people believed that inchanters and witches could bring the moon down; which made Virgil say,

Cantus &è cælo possunt deducere lunam.

And those wizards knowing the times of her eclipses, would then threaten to shew their skill, by pulling her out of her orb. So that when the silly multitude saw that she began to look red, they presently feared they should lose the benefit of her light, and therefore made a great noise that she might not hear the sound of those charms, which would otherwise bring her down; and this is rendered for a reason of this custom by Pliny and Propertius

Cantus & è curru lunam deducere tentant,

Et facerent, si non æra repulsa sonent.

*

Plutarch gives another reason of it; and he says, it is because they would hasten the moon out of the dark shade wherein she was involved, that so she might bring away the souls of those saints that inhabit within her, which cry out by reason they are then deprived of their wonted happiness, and cannot hear the music of the spheres; but are forced to behold the torments and wailings of those damned souls which are represented to them as they are tortured in the region of the air. But whether this, or whatever else was the meaning of this superstition, yet certainly it was a very ridiculous custom, and bewrayed a great ignorance of those ancient times; especially since it was not only received by the vulgar, such as were men of less note and learning, but believed also by the more famous and wiser sort; such as were those great poets, Stesichorus and Pindar: and not only amongst the more sottish heathens, who might account that planet to be one of their gods, but the primitive christians also were in this kind guilty; which made St. Ambrose so tartly to rebuke those of his

*Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 12.

time, when he said, Tum turbatur carminibus globus lunæ,

quando calicibus turbantur & oculi. 66 are troubled with cups, then you "troubled with charms."

"When your heads think the moon to be

And for this reason also did Maximus *, a bishop, write a homily against it, wherein he shewed the absurdity of that foolish superstition. I remember that Ludovicus Vives relates a more ridiculous story of a people that imprisoned an ass for drinking up the moon, whose image appearing in the water, was covered with a cloud as the ass was drinking; for which the poor beast was afterward brought to the bar, to receive a sentence according to his deserts; where the grave senate being set to examine the matter, one of the counsel (perhaps wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deep judgment, thinks it not fit that their town should lose its moon, but that rather the ass should be cut up, and that taken out of him; which sentence being approved by the rest of those politicians, as the subtilest way for the conclusion of the matter, was accordingly performed. But whether this tale were trué or no, I will not question; however, there is absurdity enough in that former custom of the ancients, that may confirm the truth to be proved, and plainly declare the insufficiency of common opinion to add true worth or estimation unto any thing. So that from that which I have said, may be gathered thus much.

1. That a new truth may seem absurd and impossible, not only to the vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men and excellent scholars: and hence it will follow, that every new thing which seems to oppose common principles, is not presently to be rejected, but rather to be pryed into with a diligent enquiry, since there are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserved for future. discovery.

2. That it is not the commonness of an opinion that can privilege it for a truth; the wrong way is sometimes a well beaten path, whereas the right way (especially to hidden truths) may be less trodden and more obscure.

* Turinens. Episc.

True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in itself strange, since every natural effect has an equal dependance upon its cause, and with the like necessity doth follow from it; so that it is our ignorance which makes things appear so: and hence it comes to pass, that many more evident truths seem incredible, to such who know not the causes of things. You may as soon persuade some country peasants that the moon is made of green cheese, (as we say) as that it is bigger than his cart-wheel, since both seem equally to contradict his sight, and he has not reason enough to lead him farther than his senses. Nay, suppose (saith Plutarch) a philosopher should be educated in such a secret place, where he might not see either sea or river, and afterwards should be brought out where one might shew him the great ocean, telling him the quality of that water, that it is brackish, salt, and not portable, and yet there were many vast creatures of all forms living in it, which make use of the water as we do of the air; questionless he would laugh at all this, as being monstrous lies and fables, without any colour of truth. Just so will this truth which I now deliver appear unto others, because we never dreamt of any such matter as a world in the moon; because the state of that place hath as yet been veiled from our knowledge, therefore we can scarcely assent to any such matter. Things are very hardly received, which are altogether strange to our thoughts and our senses. The soul may with less difficulty be brought to believe any absurdity, when as it has formerly been acquainted with some colours and probabilities for it; but when a new, and an unheard of truth shall come before it, though it have good grounds and reasons, yet the understanding is afraid of it as a stranger, and dares not admit it into his belief, without a great deal of reluctancy and trial. And besides, things that are not manifested to the senses, are not assented unto without some labour of mind, some travel and discourse of the understanding; and many lazy souls had rather quietly repose themselves in an easy error, than take pains to

search out the truth. The strangeness then of this opinion which I now deliver, will be a great hindrance to its belief; but this is not to be respected, by reason it cannot be helped. I have stood the longer in the Preface, because that prejudice which the mere title of the book may beget, cannot easily be removed without a great deal of preparation and I could not tell otherwise how to rectify the thoughts of the reader, for an impartial survey of the following discourse.

:

I must needs confess, though I had often thought with myself that it was possible there might be a world in the moon, yet it seemed such an uncouth opinion, that I never durst discover it, for fear of being counted singular and ridiculous; but afterward, having read Plutarch, Galileus, Keplar, with some others, and finding many of mine own thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it was not only possible there might be, but probable that there was another habitable world in that planet. In the prosecuting of this assertion, I shall first endeavour to clear the way from such doubts as may hinder the speed or ease of farther progress. And because the suppositions implied in this opinion, may seem to contradict the principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving those truths that may make way for the rest; which I shall labour to perform in the second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters, and then proceed to confirm such propositions which do more directly belong to the main point in hand.

PROP. II.

That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith.

T is reported of Aristotle, that when he saw the books

I.

of Moses, he commended them for such a majestic stilę as might become a god; but withal, he censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a philosopher; because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were delivered as if they would rather command than persuade belief. And it is observed, that he sets down nothing himself, but he confirms it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an argument of force for any subject in philosophy, which may not be picked out of his writings; and therefore it is likely if there were in reason a necessity of one only world, that he would have found out some such necessary proof as might confirm it; especially since he labours for it so much in two whole chapters. But now all the arguments which he himself urges in this subject, are very weak, and far enough from having in them any convincing power*. Therefore it is likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set down the two chief of his arguments from his own works, and from them you may guess the force of the other.

The first is this : Since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a huddling and confusion must there be, if there were two places for gravity, and two places for lightness? For it is probable that the earth of that other world would fall down to this centre, and so mutually the air and fire here ascend to those regions in the other; which must needs much derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in his works. But ratio hæc est minimè firma,