Ineer; to give fly hints that he does not thoroughly believe it; and to make the word orthodoxy a term of contempt and reproach. Max. 4. A good preacher muft not only have all the above and fubfequent principles of moderation in him, as the source of every thing that is good, but muft, over and above, have the following special marks and figns of a talent for preaching: 1. His fubjects must be confined to focial duties. 2. He muft recommend them only from rational confiderations, viz. the beauty and comely proportions of virtue, and its advantages in the prefent life, without any regard to a future ftate of more extended felf-intereft. 3. His authorities must be drawn from heathen writers, none, or as few as poffible from scripture. 4. He must be very unacceptable to the common people. Max. 5. A minifter muft endeavour to acquire as great a degree of politeness in his carriage and behaviour, and to catch as much of the air and manner of a fine gentleman, as poffibly he can. Max. 6. It is not only unneceffary for a moderate man to have much learning, but he ought to be filled with a contempt. of all kinds of learning but one, which is to understand Leibnitz's scheme well: the chief parts of which are fo beautifully painted, and fo harmonioufly fung by Lord Shaftesbury, and which has been fo well licked into form and method by the late immortal Mr. H n. In the illuftration of this maxim, our author gives a short catalogue of the most neceffary and useful books for making a truly learned and moderate man. They are Leibnitz's Theodicee and his letters, Shaftsbury's characteristics, Collins's enquiry into human liberty, all Mr. Hn's pieces, Christianity as old as the creation, D-n's best scheme, and H-'s moral effays. He is likewise at the pains to extract the fum and fubftance of these books, and to prefent it to his readers under a name, which, he fays, is not without a meaning, tho' not intelligible to all, viz. THE ATHENIAN CREED. This creed is as follows. I believe in the beauty and comely proportion of Dame Nature, and in Almighty Fate, her only parent and guardian, for it hath been moft gracioufly obliged (blessed be its name) to make us all very good. "I believe that the univerfe is a huge machine, wound up from everlasting by neceffity, and confifting of an infinite number of links and chains, each in a progreffive motion towards the zenith of perfection, and meridian of glory; that I myself am a little glorious piece of clock-work, a wheel within a wheel, or rather a pendulum in this grand machine, fwinging hither U 2 and and thither by the different impulfes of fate and defliny; that my foul (if I have any) is an imperceptible bundle of exceeding minute corpufcles, much fmaller than the finest holland fand; and that certain perfons, in a very eminent flation, are nothing elfe but a huge collection of necessary agents, who can do nothing at all. I believe that there is no ill in the universe, nor any fuch thing as virtue abfolutely confidered; that thofe things vulgarly called fins, are only errors in the judgment, and foils to fet off the beauty of nature, or patches to adorn her face; that the whole race of intelligent beings, even the devils themfelves (if there be any) fhall finally be happy; fo that Judas Ifcariot is by this time a glorified faint, and it is good for him that he hath been born. In fine, I believe in the divinity of L. S-, the faintship of Marcus Antoninus, the perfpicuity and fublimity of A—~—e; and the perpetual duration of Mr. H-n's works, notwithftanding their present tendency to oblivion. Amen.' Max. 7. A moderate man muft endeavour, as much as he handfomely can, to put off any appearance of devotion, and avoid all unneceffary exercises of religious worship, whether public or private. Max. 8. In church fettlements, which are the principal caufes that come before minifters for judgment, the only thing to be regarded is, who the patron and the great and noble heretors are for; the inclinations of the common people are to be utterly defpifed. Max. 9. While a fettlement is carrying on, the candidate against whom there is a ftrong oppofition from the people, must be looked upon, and every where declared to be, a perfon of great worth, and remarkable abilities: provided always that if ever the fame perfon, after he is fettled, be at pains, and fucceed, in gaining the people's affection, he fhall then fall as much below the ordinary ftandard in his character, as before he was raised above it. Max. 10. Whenever we have got a fettlement decided over the belly of perhaps the whole people in the parifh, by a majority in the general aflembly, the victory fhould be improved, by appointing fome of the orthodox oppofers of the fettlement to execute it, especially thofe of them that pretend to have a fcruple of confcience at having an active hand in any fuch fettlement. Max. 11. The character which moderate men give their advertaries, of the orthodox party, muft always be that of knaves or fools; and, as occation ferves, the fame person (if it will pafs) may be reprefented as a knøve at one time, and as a fool at another. Max. 12. As to the world in general, a moderate man is to have great charity for atheifts and deifts in principle, and for perfons that are loofe and vicious in their practice; but not at all for thofe who have a high profeffion of religion, and a great pretenfion to ftrictnefs in their walk and converfation. Max. 13. All moderate men are joined together in the Atricteft bend of union, and do never fail to fupport and defend one another to the utmoft, be the caufe they are engaged in what it will. Such is the fyftem our author lays down for the education and accomplishment of a moderate clergyman: it will enable our readers to form a tolerable judgment of his own principles, as well as of the principles of thofe whom he endeavours to characterize. We must not quit this pamphlet without taking notice of the real moderation of the price it is fold at, (a proof the author is no enemy to the practice of this virtue) for it contains about double the quantity that might be expected, according to the current proportion.-In fome productions, indeed, their extraordinary bulk would be no great recommendation to readers of tafte; who may, perhaps, think the fcanty limits of our 'catch-penny pieces, the only good thing they can boast: but the work we are fpeaking of is not of this fort; the farewell it has left with us, like that of a glafs of well-relished wine, only makes us hope that the ingenious author will not ftop his hand, but put about the bottle, that we may foon have the pleafure of tafting him again, N. B. We are informed, that two editions of thefe Characteriflics were fuld in Scotland, before the prefent, which is the third, was advertifed in the London papers; by which, about a month ago, we received our firft intelligence of the publication. R ART. XXXIV. Inflitutes of Natural Law. Being the fulftance of a courfe of lectures on Grotius de jure belli et pacis, read in St. John's college, Cambridge, by T. Rutherforth, D. D. F. R. S. archdeacon of Effex, and chaplain to her royal highnefs the princess dowager of Wales. Volume the firft. 8vo. 5s. Innys, &c. Na work of this nature, wherein fo great a variety of fub Ijects is of this of, with whunters Evita of divi fions under each, our readers will not expect from us a regular U 3 ab abstract. We must content ourselves therefore with laying before them a fhort view of what is contained in it. The learned author's design is to trace out the rules which mankind are obliged to obferve from their nature and conftitution, confidered as individuals. He divides his work into twenty chapters, in the firft of which he treats of law in general. A law, according to his definition of it, is a rule to which men are obliged to make their moral actions conformable. He does not think it neceffary to enter at large into the question concerning the caufe of obligation, about which moralifts differ fo widely, while they are agreed about the law to which we are obliged; difputing about the reafon of duty, whilft they concur in establishing the fame rules of it. Without entering minutely into the difpute, however, he endeavours to fhew briefly, for what reafon we are obliged to the duties of piety towards God, of justice and benevolence in respect of mankind, of chastity and temperance in refpect of ourselves. What he advances on the fubject is as follows: . It is, I fuppofe, an undoubted truth, that all men are de< firous of happinefs; and I fhall farther take it for granted, that when any practice appears to be fo connected with our happiness, that we cannot obtain the one without following the other, we are then as ftrongly obliged to that practice " as we can be. Whatever rules therefore are, by our own nature, and the conftitution of things, made neceffary for us to obferve, in order to be happy, thefe rules are the law of our nature. Now man, as an individual, unconnected ⚫ with the creatures of his own species, not joined with them in a common intereft, having no other provifion or conveniency but what his own labour could produce, having no prudence but his own to contrive for himself, and having no un ftrength but his own to defend him, would be able to obtain fuch a degree of happiness as his nature prompts him to defire, and much more unable to obtain fuch a degree as his ⚫ nature is capable of. It is therefore the law of his nature, that he should live in fociety with others of his own species: by which I do not mean, that he should merely live in company with them, as many brute creatures are observed to herd together; but that he fhould join with them in a common intereft, that he should bind himself to them in such a manner, as to labour with them for a general good. For without fuch a connection of interefts, he cannot make use of a joint or common wisdom, to contrive for his own good, nor of a joint or common ftrength to fecure himself in the poffeflion of it. So that altho' his own particular happiness < 7 • be be the end which the first principles of his nature teach him to purfue; yet reafon, which is likewife a principle of his nature, informs him, that he cannot effectually obtain this end without endeavouring to advance the common good of mankind; but muft either be contented to enjoy his own happiness, as a part of the general happinefs, or not enjoy it at all. When he discovers farther, that there is a God, who ⚫ made and governs the world, to whofe power he owes his being, and to whose goodness he owes all the happiness that ⚫ he either does or can enjoy ; and when he learns befides, either by the ufe of his reafon, or by exprefs declarations ⚫ from the maker and governor of all things, that he is not to ceafe to exift when he paffes out of this prefent life; but that his being will be continued to him in another; the fame • defire of happiness which obliged him to purfue a general good, and to keep his interefts, by this means, united to the common interefts of his fpecies, will oblige him to ob * ferve all these rules in his moral conduct, which he finds to be neceffary, in order to fecure the favour of his maker, and his own welfare in the life after this. He will plainly underftand, that the most effectual way to fecure the latter point, is to fecure the former; that he is most likely to obtain his future happiness, by putting himself under the protection of that almighty being, who is the difpofer of all things. Nor can he have any hope of engaging the protection of God, 'but by endeavouring to please him, or by obeying his will, " as far as he can discover what his will is. But fince, from a view of what is before him, it appears, that God has 'made his nature and conftitution fuch as requires him, if he ⚫ would be happy here, to work for a general good, or for the ' common intereft of his fpecies; the most reasonable conclufion is, that God, who made his nature and conftitution what it is, expects him thus to work; and that, by thus ⚫ endeavouring to do the work which God expects him to do, ⚫ he takes the most effectual method of fecuring whatever happinefs can be hoped for hereafter. But befides the general defire of happiness, he finds within ⚫ himself certain appetites, which lead him to fome particular forts of pleasure, and that a part of his happiness, whilft he is here, confifts in the gratification of thefe appetites. But then he finds likewife, that if he indulges himself to excefs in fuch pleasures, the excefs is attended with pain and dis"eafes; and that if he gives himfelf up to those pleasures, he ⚫ becomes either useless or hurtful to his fpccies. From either • of U 4 |