the division of Egypt into independent monarchies, there are, nevertheless, facts connected with the construction of the chronicle which lead to nearly similar conclusions. He then proceeds to detail his own opinion, which he states to have originated in some circumstances in the chronicle itself, which attracted his attention. It is briefly as follows:

Manethon and Eratosthenes derived their information from registers, which were kept, it seems, in the temples, in several different nomes or provinces of Egypt; some at Memphis, some at Diospolis and elsewhere. Here then is a source of discrepancy in documents compiled by writers deducing their materials from different quarters; for many circumstances might occasion differences in these various registers. Memphis, for example, was taken possession of by the shepherds, and remained some time under their yoke; and Diospolis or Elephantine was occasionally subject to the Ethiopians. It might happen that provincial governors would revolt, and for a time assume independent sway; and would then inscribe their own names on the records of the monarchy, in the place of their superiors. In the names of kings variations might happen, from the imperfection of alphabetic writing, the difference of dialects, the multiplicity of names given to the sovereigns, and the substitution of magnificent titles for proper appellatives: so that, although Memphis and Diospolis were, in general, subject to the monarch of all Egypt; yet the series of kings, as exhibited in the registers of Thebes, might differ materially from that of the Memphite records. Some evidences, moreover, are adduced of the historian having filled up some of the chronological chasms, by compilations from different records, and by some obvious repetitions: and from other considerations, it seems that the early part of Manethon's chronicle, instead of containing one continued series of kings, consists, in reality, of several coeval successions. By this means, Manethon's scheme, and the old chronicle, and the laterculus of Eratosthenes, are reconciled; and the longest succession of their dynasties falls within the lowest period allowed by the latter for the antiquity of the Egyptian monarchy. A computation upon this point of time is then formed, by viewing the connexion between the earlier and later parts of the Egyptian chronology.

"We have already shewn," says our author, "that the beginning of the reign of Sesostris or Ægyptus is to be dated at 1350 B. C. The whole series of Eratosthenes, from Menes to the last king whose name is set down, occupied, as Syncellus says, 1075

years. From this sum we must deduct 68 years, for the length of the two last reigns, and the interval between Menes and Phrouron will be 1007 years. Now if this Phrouron, whose name is interpreted "The Nile," be really the same as the Ægyptus or Sethosis of Manethon, we have only to add 1007 years to the date before mentioned, in order to ascertain the time when Menes began to reign, and the record of the Egyptian monarchy commences. 1350 +1007 amount to 2357. This date falls short of the lowest epoch deduced from the Old Chronicle, by upwards of 50 years; but the difference is less than we might expect. If this computation is correct, Nitocris must have died just 40 years before the Exode, and Thyosi-Mares was the Amenophis who was drowned in the Red Sea. Perhaps some confirmation to our hypothesis will be found in the coincidence of the date of this king's death. If we compute upwards from Nilus, supposing him identical with Sesostris, we find that the end of the reign of Thyosi-Mares falls just six years before the Scriptural date of the Exode; an error so small as this may be considered a remarkable instance of agreement. It must be remarked, that if the coincidences noticed in this section should be regarded as merely accidental, the conclusions obtained in the preceding pages will be in no way affected; and it may still be allowed that we have determined, with a tolerable degree of precision, the antiquity of the Egyptian monarchy, by comparing the Old Chronicle and that of Manethon with the laterculus of Eratosthenes. The analogies traced in the former sections appear to be so strong as to lie beyond the reach of merely accidental coincidence. This cannot be said of those which we have last surveyed; though I confess that I am inclined, on the whole, to regard even the latter as too distinct and too numerous to be the effect of chance." [pp. *118, *119.]

*

After considering the two schemes of Sir John Marsham and our present author, we incline to give the preference to the latter; the details of which are ingenious, and upon the whole satisfactory. It is, indeed, like the former, partly conjectural, as must be every calculation of the kind which relates to so remote and clouded a period. Still there is a basis of at least strong probability upon which the argument is founded; and it is pursued in that spirit of patient research which, while it bespeaks modesty and industry, must ever prove conducive to the interests of truth. From the skies truth has descended in the form of inspiration. Happy they who engage in advocating her cause, and promoting her

*No'wist, adv. [no and wise; this is commonly spoken and written by ignorant barbarians, noways.] Not in any manner or degree.-JOHNSON'S Dictionary.-EDIT.

glory! Theirs it is, to enjoy the felicity of a good conscience; and theirs it shall be, to wear for ever the laurelled honours of a complete and everlasting victory!

An Essay on the Evils of Popular Ignorance. By John Foster. 8vo. pp. 317. London, 1820. Holdsworth.

WE participated most sincerely in the pleasure which must have been experienced by every reader of Mr. Foster's former Essays, on hearing of the appearance of another publication by that very eminent writer. The subject to which it relates is in the highest degree important; and the feeling excited by it, though usually one of a melancholy nature, is yet such as, with all its gloominess, a benevolent and pious mind would hardly wish to suppress. There certainly is not in this volume that peculiar attraction which belonged to the preceding Essays, the attraction of novelty, and one might almost say, entire originality of subject. The present subject strikes not immediately upon the mind with the vividness of a first impression, as of something unknown and unthought of before; but it is one, on the contrary, of which all have heard, which all have in some measure considered. Still the views here presented of it are such generally as would occur to few, and in some instances, perhaps, to none besides the author. To an attentive observer of the human character this work will afford ample assistance in some of the most useful inquiries he can possibly pursue; whilst to the Christian philanthropist it will give scope for enlarging the sphere of his benevolent purposes, and shew him, perhaps even more clearly than he has ever before seen it, the necessity of those efforts he is assiduously making to diffuse the benefits of information among the ignorant and the poor. It possesses also particular interest and momentousness at the present period, both from the state of society, with its variety of events, and burdens, and sources of disquietude; and from the noble exertions of so many individuals, and even of the senate of our country, to extend the blessings of education to every class of the people. Nor must we omit to mention, that it claims to be regarded with serious and careful attention, from the discovery which it every where affords of the intimate connexion and mutual dependence subsisting between an enlightened understanding and genuine Christianity.

This treatise is perhaps faulty from its length, and is certainly less agreeable in the perusal than it might have been, from the undivided continuation of its reasonings through its whole extent, without the relief which would arise from the distribution of its very diversified and valuable matter into different portions, distinguished, as was the case in the writer's former production, by some specific note of separation. The circumstances stated by Mr. Foster in his advertisement will indeed sufficiently account for this omission; yet we cannot forbear wishing that it had rather been supplied. The author there informs us, that the work itself grew, in a considerable degree, out of the topics of a discourse delivered at a public meeting assembled in promotion of the object and means of the Bristol Auxiliary British and Foreign School Society; and that, as was natural on such an occasion, it was introduced by a passage from the Bible, serving, indeed, rather as a motto than as the formal basis of the discourse. This motto was appropriately chosen from Hosea, iv. 6. "My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge;" and the discourse was some time afterwards committed to writing, with a view to its publication; but the materials being found too bulky to be compressed within the limits of an ordinary sermon, the far more judicious method was consequently adopted, of presenting it to the public in the shape which it now bears.

The essay itself commences by a striking reference to the wonder and self-reproach arising from the thought, that we can hear and speak of the destruction of the people with so little emotion. After dwelling briefly upon the evil consequences of such insensibility, our observation is directed to the laborious effort requisite to our arriving at any distinct conception of the magnitude of those advantages we have ourselves derived from the impartation of knowledge. And this is finely illustrated by the analogy between a well instructed mind and a fertile country, and the difficulty with which the admiring spectator is supposed to trace the history of the latter backwards in imagination through all the successive stages of its improvement, from its present luxuriance and beauty, to its earliest state of barrenness and desolation. Adverting next to the character of the ancient prophets, and the nature of their office, as consisting so greatly in warnings and denunciations of evil, the author is led to refer particularly to the prevalent ignorance which, from the whole tenor of their writings, is seen to have existed among the people, even amidst all the advantages of such instruction. A re

markably original and impressive explanation is then offered of that lamentable fact, which is made to arise from no other cause than that their instructions proceeded immediately from God, from whose teaching the alienation and depravity of the human mind turned instinctively aside, revolting with disgust and hatred from so near a communication with its Maker.

A little farther onwards we meet with some most valuable remarks on the necessity of uniting one useful truth with others to which it is in any way related, in order that each may produce its proper effect; and tending to shew, that otherwise the truth which is really known will be to so great a degree incapable of duly exciting its individual influence, and may become so far perverted from its just direction, as to have an operation in no respect different from that of absolute error. All the preceding illustrations are naturally taken from the situation and character of the Jews, as being the people immediately referred to by the prophet from whom the motto was derived; and this portion of the essay is concluded by a very energetic application of the words of our Saviour," If thou hadst known, even thou, in this thy day," &c.

The author now proceeds to display the dreadful nature and consequences of ignorance in the case of the heathen; and offers to our view a picture, peculiarly lively and accurate, of the origin and the gross infatuation of some parts of the ancient systems of mythology. He goes on to shew, that men, whose mental condition was so debased as to admit with ease the belief of all these absurdities, and whose active principles could allow them to indulge, without remorse, the necessarily attendant vices, must have been unhappy. The conclusive reasonings advanced in support of this position are worthy of particular regard. It is a most important point, to prove that a state of ignorance and guilt is really a state of suffering; for nothing is easier than to say of nations not yet visited with the light of Christianity, or even of irreligious and thoughtless individuals among ourselves, "They are happy as they are, why disturb them? why talk to them about privations which they do not feel, and sorrows of which they are said to be the subjects, and yet have never known? Can they possibly be miserable, and yet themselves remain unconscious of their misery?" Now this is indeed, we are disposed to think, a reflection very often excited in the minds of sceptical and inconsiderate persons, while listening to such statements as the following: " Thou sayest,