ginnings and, as it were, materials of Knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without at least some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he Thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the Understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them.

CHAPTER II.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS.

Uncompounded appearances.-The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the Ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are Simple, and some Complex.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch

often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas,- -as a man sees at once motion and colour, the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax,-yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses; the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose: and nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; [each of which,] being in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

The mind can neither make nor destroy them.-When the Understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety; and so can make at pleasure new Complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new Simple Idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the Understanding destroy those that are there: the dominion of man in this little world of his own Understanding being much the same as it is in the great world of visible things, wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being.

I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt; and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true, distinct notions of sounds.

This is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which He has given to man; yet I think it is not possible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Visible and Tangible Qualities: and had mankind been made with but four senses, the qualities then which are the object of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be; which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, [it] will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think that in other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little know ledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or Understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the com

mon opinion of man's having but Five Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more. But either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

CHAPTER III.

OF IDEAS OF ONE SENSE.

Division of simple ideas.-The better to conceive the ideas we receive from Sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First, then, there are some which come into our minds by one sense only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themselves into the mind by more senses than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only. Fourthly, There are some that are suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection.

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.

Ideas of one sense. There are some ideas which have admittance only through One Sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, come in only by the eyes; all kind of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears; the several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the

nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's presenceroom (as I may so call it), are, any of them, so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by, no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch are Heat, Cold, and Solidity; all the rest-consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle-are obvious enough.

Few simple ideas have names.-I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt, are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless varieties of relishes which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds. I shall therefore, in the account of Simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our Complex ideas; amongst which I think I may well account Solidity.

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