in what sort of indifferency liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

I have said above, that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz., Motion and Thinking. These, in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For, if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due consideration, will be found rather passions than actions; and consequently so far the effects barely of passive powers in those subjects, which yet on their accounts are thought agents. For in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought receives the impression, where it is put into that action purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent; and such a power is not properly an active power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Sometimes the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power; and this is properly active power. Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action; v.g. a solid substance by motion operates on, or alters the sensible ideas of, another substance; and therefore this modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in that solid substance is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only from some external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself, or in another substance, when at rest. So likewise, in thinking, a power to receive ideas or thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is called a power of thinking: but

this is but a passive power, or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions, which grammar and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into; since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active does not always signify action; v. g. this proposition, ‘I see the moon or a star,' or 'I feel the heat of the sun,' though expressed by a verb active, does not signify any action in me, whereby I operate on those substances; but the reception of the ideas of light, roundness, and heat, wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot in that position of my eyes or body avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the sunbeams, I am properly active; because, of my own choice, by a power within myself, I put myself into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up; which if I would consider as a philosopher, and examine on what causes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones, viz., Extension, Solidity, Mobility, or the Power of being moved; which by our senses we receive from body: Perceptivity, or the power of perception or thinking; Motivity, or the power of moving; which by reflection we receive from our minds. I use these two new words, to avoid the danger of being mistaken

in the use of those which are equivocal. To which if we add Existence, Duration, Number, which belong both to the one and to the other, we have, perhaps, all the original ideas, on which the rest depend.

CHAPTER XXII.

OF MIXED MODES.

Mixed modes, what. We are now, in the next place, to consider those we call Mixed Modes: such are the complex ideas we mark by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie, &c., which consist of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds. These Mixed Modes, being such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristic marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of Substances.

But if we at

Made by the mind. That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one idea, experience shows us. tentively consider these ideas I call Mixed Modes [which] we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations: for, it being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex

ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence, I think, it is that these ideas are called notions; as if they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas it sufficed [1.] that the mind put the parts of them together, and [2.] that they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined as they are put together in the Understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of hypocrisy might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not; or else have framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident that, in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must have been in the minds before they existed anywhere else; and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.

Sometimes got by the explication of their names.-Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words standing for such combinations, a usual way of getting these complex ideas is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of a company of simple ideas combined, they may, by words standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that complex com

bination of simple ideas were never offered* to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of sacrilege or murder, without ever seeing either of them committed.

The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.— Every Mixed Mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire whence it has its unity; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea, since that combination does not always exist together in nature? To which I answer, It is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of Mixed Modes; seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to make one complex one, but such collections as there [are] names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea as the killing a man's father; yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species of action from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

The cause of making mixed modes.—What occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct and, as it were, settled modes, and neglect others which,