with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making a part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to [itself].

But yet possibly it will still be objected, "Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions-had those thoughts—that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them ?” To which I answer-That we must here take notice what the word "I" is applied to; which, in this case, is—the man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, "I" is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousnesses at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemn declaration of their opinions; human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did; thereby [virtually] making them two persons; which is somewhat explained by our way of speak. ing, when we say "Such an one is not himself-or is beside

himself;" in which phrases it is insinuated as if those who now, or at least first, used them, thought that self was changed-[that] the self-same person was no longer in that man.

Difference between identity of man and person.—But yet, it is hard to conceive that the same individual man should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by the same individual man.’ First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance: in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

Or, secondly, the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

Or, thirdly, the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.

Now, take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible to make Personal Identity to consist in anything but Consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

"But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? Why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it?" Just as much the same person as a man that walks and does other things in his sleep is the same person; and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For, though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps

N

-though continued in a fleeting, successive body-remains, it will be the same man. But if [3.] to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape, as long as that vital union and shape remain, in a concrete no otherwise the same [than] by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be the same man. For, whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same existence, continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and casualty, [for] comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite[ly many] others, some whereof I shall mention.

Proportional.-First, Some one simple idea, being capable of parts or degrees, [may] afford an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v. g. whiter, sweeter, equal, more, &c. These Relations, depending on the equality [or] excess of the same simple idea in several subjects, may be called-Proportional; and that these are only conversant about those Simple ideas received from Sensation or Reflection is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

Natural.-Secondly, Another occasion of comparing

things together is-the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which, being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; v. g. father and son, brothers, countrymen, &c.; and these I call-Natural Relations: wherein we may observe, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For, it is very convenient that by distinct names these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind, there being occasion, both in laws and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations; from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men: whereas in [the case of] brutes, men having very little or no cause to mind these relations have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages; which, being suited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various respects [that] might be found among them; nor [to] the different abstract considerations [that] might be framed about them. Where they [have] had no philosophical notions, there they [have] had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine why in some countries they may not have so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more