and to which he should keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse. Where he does not or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought "determined ideas" a way of speaking less liable to mistake than "clear and distinct:" and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.

OF

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

An inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.

-Since it is the Understanding that sets man above the

rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage

and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a

subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to in-

quire into. The Understanding, like the eye, whilst it

makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no no-

tice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a

distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be

the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; what-

ever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves,

sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our own

minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own

Understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but

bring us great advantage in directing our thoughts in

the search of other things.

B

Design. This therefore being my purpose, to inquire
into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of human Know-
ledge, together with the grounds and degrees of Belief,
Opinion, and Assent, I shall not at present meddle with
the physical consideration of the Mind, or trouble my-
self to examine wherein its Essence consists; or by what
motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we
come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas
in our Understandings; and whether those ideas do, in
their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter
or [not.] These are speculations which, however curious
and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way
in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my
present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of
a man as they are employed about the objects which
they have to do with; and I shall imagine I have not
wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have
on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I
can give any account of the ways whereby our Under-
standings come to obtain those notions of things we have,
and can set down any measures of the certainty of our
Knowledge, or the grounds of those Persuasions which
are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and
wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or
other with such assurance and confidence, that he that
shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe
their opposition, and at the same time consider the fond-
ness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the re-
solution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained,
may perhaps have reason to suspect that either there
is no such thing as Truth at all, or that mankind

hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge
of it.

Method.-It is therefore worth while to search out the
bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by
what measures, in things whereof we have no certain
Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and mo-
derate our Persuasions. In order whereunto I shall
pursue this following method :-

First, I shall inquire into the Original of those Ideas,
or Notions, which a man observes, and is conscious to
himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the
Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what Knowledge
the Understanding hath by those ideas, and the Cer-
tainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature
and grounds of Faith or Opinion; whereby I mean, that
Assent which we give to any proposition as true, of
whose truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: and
here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and
degrees of Assent.

Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.—If, by
this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding, I can
discover the powers thereof, I suppose it may be of use
to prevail with the busy Mind of man to be more cau-
tious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehen-
sion. We should not then, perhaps, be so forward, out
of an affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise
questions, and perplex ourselves and others with dis-
putes, about things to which our Understandings are
not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds