as GOD has set some things in broad daylight, as he has given us some certain Knowledge (though limited to a very few things in comparison)-probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state-so, in the greatest part of our concerns, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership in [which] he has been pleased to place us here; wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption-we might, by every day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liab[ility] to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection; it being highly rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the case, that as men employ those talents [which] GOD has given them here, they shall accordingly receive. their rewards at the close of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end to their labours.

Judgment supplies the want of knowledge.—The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain Knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is-Judgment: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree, or (which is the same), any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this Judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness and unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be

had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know; but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by, the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were, by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is called Judgment; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called Assent or Dissent: which being the most usual way wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall, under these terms, treat of it as least liable in our language to equivocation.

Judgment is the presuming things to be so without perceiving it. Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about Truth and Falsehood.

First, Knowledge-whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of, the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.

Secondly, Judgment, which is The putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is-Right Judgment.

CHAPTER XV.

OF PROBABILITY.

Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs. As Demonstration is-The showing [of] the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another, so Probability is nothing but―The appearance of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so; but [which] is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: In the demonstration of it, a man perceives the certain immutable connexion there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones; and so, by an Intuitive Knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain Knowledge that it is so. But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones,' assents to it, i. e. receives it for true. In

which case the foundation of his assent is the Probability of the thing; the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it: the man on whose testimony he receives it not being wont to affirm anything contrary to or beside his knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones,'—that which makes him take these ideas to agree without knowing them to do so- -is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases; or his supposed veracity in this.

It is to supply the want of knowledge.-Our Knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not [being] happy enough to find certain Truth in everything which we have occasion to consider, most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act upon, are such [that] we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their truth; yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them, but assent to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as resolutely, as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But, there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even to the confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust; I shall come now (having, as I think, found out the bounds of human Knowledge and certainty), in the next place, to consider the several degrees and grounds of Probability, and [of] Assent or Faith.

Being that which makes us presume things to be true before we know them to be so.-Probability is-Likeliness* to be true; the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition for which there [are] arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called Belief, Assent, or Opinion, which is-The admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between Probability and certainty-Faith and knowledge-that in all the parts of Knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea-each step has its visible and certain connexion: in Belief not So. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe;-something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.

The grounds of probability are two: conformity with our own experience, [and] the testimony of others' experience.— The grounds of Probability are, in short, these two following:

First, The conformity of anything with our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience.

Secondly, The Testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others [are] to be considered (1) the number, (2) the inte

The reading'likeness' is sometimes adopted: but 'likeness' is properly a ground of probability, and not probability itself.-ED.