either the strict 1ogical conclusion must be particular, and then the same objection aristosas before—or it must be directly assumed that the given individual instances adequately represent the whole Class to which they are admit-ted to belong: and, so far as strict logic is concerned, this is an argument a particulari ad universale.' How, then, is this difficulty to be met? Must the conclusion derived from Induction be always useless or insecure? By no means. 1st. Our instinctive conviction (which is more immediately powerful than any formal pooof) of the permanence of a Law of Nature may be so great, that, having fully ascertained, suppose, one piece of gold to be malleable, we unhesitatingly and securely infer that—' all gold is malleable.' 2ndly. Our reliance on the skill of particular individuals, suppose chemists for instance, may be so well-founded, that we doubt not the universality of the grounds on which they base their classifications. 3rdly. An imperfect Induction may be so fenced by collateral Arguments as to be rendered perfectly impregnable. All these three, more or less, sustain the Induction of LOCKE, in both its departments. But to the last of them alone is it necessary here to direct attention. Independently of the vast help which the 'Argument a fortiori' must afford in such a case, he employs, with much effect, the 'Argument from Analogy.' This Argument may, perhaps, be concisely called that in which from likeness we infer likelihood. This the presumed likeness of things unknown to others that are known-is our sole reason for supposing that the sun will rise to C morrow, or that our bodies will in five intenence be 'living'd much we rely in all our concerns on the lity' resulting from Analogy needs no proof: sufface it to say, in the words of Bishop Butler-"to Us probability is the very guide of life." This Argument LOCKE employs variously: but we may give his especial application of it in the words of Dr. Lardner: "He draws an analogical argument from tracing back the state of the mind from the adult to the child, from the child to the infant, and so back to the moment of its birth, which is the first moment in which we can observe it. Through all these stages we find the stock of ideas diminishing rapidly, and find scarcely any in the newborn infant; whereas, had we proceeded in the other direction, we should have found the variety of ideas increasing in proportion to the variety of sensible objects - which presented themselves, and to the attention with which they are contemplated. Arguing, therefore, by analogy, we may infer, that were we able to carry our observation back from infancy to the moment of creation, we should find no ideas then actually existing, though probably they would immediately begin to exist.” Under this head we may class, 3rdly, his 'Argument from Etymology,' which properly rests on likeness. This is thus described by Lardner: “He deduces an argument from etymology in support of this doctrine. He observes, that most of the words in use, even those expressing ideas of reflection, are derived from names expressive of sensible ideas. Such are, imagine, apprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, &c., spirit, angel, &c. And he conjectures, that if we were able to trace all names back to their first origin, we should find them all ultimately implying sensible ideas." He employs, 4thly, the Argumentum ad hominem' —that is, the confutation of an adversary on his own ground, i. e. by the consequences of his own principles if admitted. This Argument, on which the practice of cross-examination is chiefly based, is certainly of no intrinsic value; for an adversary may prove any number of opponents to be wrong or unable to convict him, without his being able to show that he himself is right or innocent. In LOCKE's hands, however, it is a powerful instrument. But as he chiefly employs it in parts of the Cartesian controversy which enter little into this volume, we need not dwell upon it. 5thly. The Argumentum ad ignorantiam'-i. e. the requiring an opponent to admit your principle or assign a better though often an unmeaning and contemptible fallacy, is, in LOCKE's use of it, an honest and powerful ally to truth. 'If," he says in effect to the Cartesian, "there really are innate ideas,' as your system asserts, why not name some of them? I have, by a copious Induction, named multitudes of classes that are not innate in fact, every one that experience can suggest to me; is it, then, unreasonable to ask you to name some—even one-that is?" There is, perhaps, no instance on record in which this Argument has been so remarkably applied. On the whole, it is hard to conceive any Induction better guarded than that of JOHN LOCKE. And the reader, it is hoped, is now fairly in a position to enter on the inquiry-how far he shall individually conclude that the sum of all these Arguments sustains that which alone is the charter of all right reasoning-the 'Argumentum ad Judicium.' |