6

least extension of matter,' nor of 'infinity,' we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter;' but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number,' our Reason meets with none, of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus we, having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of Motion or Thought,—how the mind produces either of them in us,—and much [more] imperfect yet of the operation of GOD, run into great difficulties about 'free created agents,' which Reason cannot well extricate itself out of.

For want of intermediate ideas.—Thirdly, Our Reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any two other ideas: and in this some men's faculties far outgo others'. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarcely forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human.

Because of wrong principles.—Fourthly, The mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions, without knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to implore the help of Reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations brings a man into, that, if he will pursue it,

it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexities.

Because of doubtful terms.—Fifthly, As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our Reason, so, upon the same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs often, in discourses and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's Reason, and bring them to a nonplus: but these two latter are our fault, and not the fault of Reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere observable.

Intuition, demonstration, judgment.-[The Relations of Knowledge and Judgment may be thus summed up:] Intuitive Knowledge is-The perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together:

Rational Knowledge [or, Demonstration] is-The perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas by the intervention of one or more other ideas:

Judgment is The thinking, or taking, two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but has observed to be frequent and usual.

Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.— Though the deducing one Proposition from another— or making inferences in words-be a great part of Reason, and that which it is usually employed about,-yet the principal act of Ratiocination is-The finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another by the intervention of a third: as a man by a yard finds

two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxtaposition. Words have their consequences as the signs of such ideas: and things agree or disagree as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas.

Four sorts of arguments.—Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of Arguments that men in their reasonings with others ordinarily make use of to prevail on their Assent; or, at least, so to awe them as to silence their opposition.

The First is to allege the opinions of men whose parts, learning, eminenc[e], power, or some other cause, have gained a name and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. This I think may be called-Argumentum ad verecundiam.

Secondly-Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit their judgments and receive the opinion in debate, is-to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to assign a better. And this I call-Argumentum ad ignorantiam.

A Third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad hominem.

The Fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call--Argumentum ad judicium.

This [last] alone, of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances us in our way of Knowledge. For (1) It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because

I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. (2) It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. (3) Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error.

Propositions above, contrary, and according to, reason.— By what has been before said of Reason, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to, Reason. (1) Propositions according to Reason' are such whose. truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. (2) Propositions above Reason' are such whose truth or probability we cannot by Reason derive from those principles (3) Propositions 'contrary to reason' are such as are inconsistent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of one GOD is according to Reason; the existence of more than one GOD-contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the dead above Reason. Farther: as 'above reason' may be taken in a double sense, viz.: either as signifying 'above probability,'

6

or 'above certainty'—so in that large sense also contrary to Reason' is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

Reason and faith not opposite.—There is [5.*] another use of the word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith; which though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking-yet common use has so authorized, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however Faith be opposed to Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind; which, if it be regulated as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties [which] he has given him to keep him out of mistake and error.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.

Necessary to know their boundaries.-It has been shown (1) That we are of necessity ignorant, and want Knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. (2) That we are ignorant, and want Rational Knowledge, where we want proofs. (3) That we want General Knowledge

* See page 425.-ED.