the Prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing or persuasion of their own minds, without any other proof, a sufficient evidence that it was from GOD, though the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having such proofs.

In what I have said I am far from denying that GOD can, or does sometimes, enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs' accompanying it. But in such cases, too, we have Reason and Scripture-unerring rules-to know whether it be from GOD or not. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the Revelation in the Written Word of GOD, or the action [is] conformable to the dictates of Right Reason or Holy Writ, we may be assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such; because, though perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from GOD-extraordinarily operating on our minds-yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation which He has given us of Truth. it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves that can warrant it to be a 'light' or 'motion' from Heaven; nothing can do that but [either] the Written Word of GOD without us, or that standard of Reason which is common to us with all men. Where Reason or Scripture is express for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of Divine authority; but it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of Heaven, and of Divine original.

But

CHAPTER XX.

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.

Causes of error.-Knowledge being to be had only of [evident] and certain Truth, Error is not a fault of our Knowledge, but a mistake of our Judgment giving assent to that which is not true.

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The

But if Assent be grounded on likelihood—if the proper object and motive of our Assent be probability, and that probability consist in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters-it will be demanded, how men come to give their assent contrary to probability? For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and [what] a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to. reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, suppose, may be all reduced to these four: (1) Want of proofs; (2) Want of ability to use them; (3) Want of will to use them; (4) Wrong measures of probability. Want of proofs.-First, By Want of proofs,' I do not mean only the want of those proofs which are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others: and in this state are the greatest part of mankind who are

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given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their [humble] condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living.

Objection." What shall become of those who want them?" answered.-What shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance in those things which are of greatest importance to them? [Answer]-No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of Religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge.

People hindered from inquiry.—There are others [who] are cooped in close by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those whose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These, however they may seem high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man, -their Understandings. This is generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken to propagate [alleged] truth without knowledge, where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country, and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do empirics' pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure; but in this are much more miserable than they-in that

they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone, or to choose the physician to whose conduct they would trust themselves.

Want of skill to use [proofs].-Secondly, Those who want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities -who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance its due allowance may be easily misled to assent to positions that are not probable. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie-cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion. [It] is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect, than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about is a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose.

Want of will to use them.-Thirdly, There are [others] that want proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them; who, though they have riches and leisure enough, and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages some men's thoughts elsewhere; laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion for books, study, and meditation, keep others from any serious thoughts at all; and some, out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions which

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best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content themselves, without examination, to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes; nor shall I notice what a shame and confusion it is, to the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things [which] they are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the consideration of those who call themselves 'gentlemen,' that, however they may think credit, respect, power, and authority, [to be] the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition, who surpass them in-KNOWLEDGE. They who are blind will always be led by those that see, or [will] else fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected— the most enslaved-who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing instances, some of the causes have been shown of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the error.

Wrong measures of probability.-Fourthly, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either eTex[odo]-suspend' their assent or give it to the less probable opinion. And to