that there is quite no reason for admitting anything supernatural or super-rational which were not connected with the appearance of the Redeemer, but were another original thing for itself. Customarily it is treated partly with reference to the individual matters of fact, for which the supernatural is specially claimed, of which here our discourse cannot yet be, partly with reference to the Christian doctrines, which for us are nothing else than enunciations with respect to that self-consciousness and its connection. But if the super-rational in the Christian self-consciousness consists in this, that as it is, it cannot be produced through the activity of reason: still it does not all follow from this, that the expressions with respect to this self-consciousness must also be super-rational. For in the same sense as the Christian self-consciousness, all nature also is super rational, and still we call our expressions with respect to it, by no means equally so but purely rational. The entire act of receiving expressions with respect to our pious self-consciousness, is but just as rational a thing as the former, and the difference. is only this, that this objective consciousness is given originally to him who is affected by nature, but that self-consciousness only to him who is affected by the Redeemer in the manner peculiar to his confessors. From this now it follows of itself, what is not tenable of the ruling view, as if the Christian doctrine consists in part of rational, and in part of super-rational propositions. It is to be sure quite clear, that this can be only a juxta-position, but by no means that propositions of two sorts form one whole; because no connection can have place between a rational and a super-rational thing. We also see this tolerably clearly in all treatises of Christian doctrine, which are divided into a natural theology current as purely rational, not only within, but also outside of Christianity, and into a positive validly super-rational only within it, for both then are and remain sundered from one another. But the appearance, as if such a union were practicable, arises hence, that there are undoubtedly Christian propositions, in which the peculiarly Christian element steps considerably in the background, so that they can also be deemed purely rational in the respect in which others are accounted super-rational. Were that peculiar element, however, not all in them, then of course they would not be Christian propositions. The truth of the case is therefore this, that all Christian propositions are in one respect super-rational, but in another also all rational; but super-rational are they in the same respect, in which also everything experienced by us is super-rational, as it is certainly an inward experience, to which they all go back, viz: that they rest upon a given something, and without this could not have arisen by derivation or collocation from universally recognized and communicated propositions. Else were we certainly able to instruct and argue every man into a Christian, without anything else occurring to him.

Therefore it also belongs to this super-rationality, that a true appropriation of Christian propositions cannot take place in a scientific manner, hence likewise lies outside of reason; but it takes place only so far as each man has himself desired to have the experience, as indeed everything individual and peculiar can be embraced only through the love that desires the perception. In this sense, therefore, the whole Christian doctrine is super-rational. But is the question asked, whether the propositions which express the Christian states of mind and their connection, are not subject to the same laws of mental formation and combination, as everything uttered, so that in such a representation the more perfectly we satisfy these laws, so much the more will every one be obliged rightly to apprehend what is thought and meant, although he cannot convince himself of the truth of the matter, because wanting the fundamental inward experience: then in this sense everything in Christian doctrine must be thoroughly conformable to reason. Accordingly, the super-rationality of all the single Christian doctrinal propositions is the measure by which we can judge whether they indeed express the peculiarly Christian element, and again their conformity to reason is the proof, how far the attempt to transfer the inward movements of the Spirit into the thoughts, has been successful or not; but the assertion that it cannot be demanded to set forth in a manner agreeable to reason, what rises above reason, seems only as an evasion, by which the incidental imperfection of the treatment is to be covered over, just as the opposite one, that everything in the Christian doctrine must in every sense be built upon reason, seems but a shift by which to hide the deficiency in the fundamental experience.

"The common prescriptive remark, that the super-rational in Christianity is not admitted to be contra-rational, appears to be intended to affirm the same thing as our proposition. Because it implies on the one side the clear perception of the super-rational, upon the other the problem to point out the non-contra-rational element therein, which can be attained only through the pure rationality of the exposition.

Prop. IV. "There is no other way to obtain a part in the Christian communion than through faith in Jesus as the Redeemer. 1. "To have a part in the Christian communion is to seek in the institution of Christ approximation to the previously described state of an absolute ease and stability of pious emotions. Because from another than this cause can no one wish to be in the Christian church. But now since each person can enter it only by means of his own free decision, the assured conviction must precede this, that through the influence of Christ, the state of needing redemption may be taken away, and the other introduced, and this assurance is exactly faith in Christ. That is to say, this ex

pression designates in general, in our sphere, only the confident conviction accompanying a condition of the higher selfconsciousness, which conviction is consequently something different from, but precisely on this account also, not less than that which accompanies the objective consciousness. In the same sense was our discourse before this, of faith in God, which was stated to be nothing else, than the confidence with respect to the absolute feeling of dependence as such, i. e. as produced by a Being (Wesen.) external to us, and as expressing our relation to the same. But the faith mentioned in our discourse is a matter-of-fact confidence, only however that of a perfectly internal fact. That is, it cannot be in an individual until through an impression which he receives from Christ, there has been formed in him a beginning, although only an infinitely small one, yet a real anticipation, of the annulment of the state of needing redemption. But the expression, faith in Christ, is here, as faith in God there, the reference of the condition as effect to Christ as original cause. Thus also John describes Him. Thus from the beginning onward, only they have united themselves to Christ in his new community, whose pious self-consciousness was distinctly stamped as a neediness of redemption, and who now had become assured of the redeeming power of Christ in them. So that the more strongly both these things appeared in any one, the more also could he himself through statement of the fact, to which also belong the description of Christ and of his efficiency, call forth the same inward experience in others. They in whom this took place, became believing, the others not. Herein, always since then, has consisted the essence of all direct Christian annunciation and preaching which can take the shape always only of testimony; a testimony of one's own experience, which might awaken the desire in others also, to have the same experience. But the impression, which all persons later upon this way receive from what was effected through Christ, viz: from the common Spirit communicated through him and from the whole community of Christians, supported by the historical statement of his life and being, was precisely the same impression which his contemporaries received immediately from Him. Hence also they who remained unbelieving, were blamed not on this account, because they had not perhaps suffered themselves to be moved by arguments, but only on account of the want of selfknowledge, which must be at the bottom where there is an incapacity to recognize the Redeemer as such, when He is truly and rightly set forth. But this want of self-knowledge, i. e. of a consciousness of the need of redemption, Christ himself had already declared as the limit of His operativeness. And thus is the ground of unbelief as also the ground of faith, the same at all times.'

John 1: 45, 46. 6: 68, 69. Matt. 16: 15, 18. Acts 2: 37, 41.

We conclude these specimens of Schleiermacher's doctrinal views, which however alone, seen out of their scientific connection, and in such comparatively scanty proportions, afford but imperfect data, for an intelligent judgment upon his theological system and Christian stand-point, with the following all-interesting and at least very thought-awakening propositions, the 96th, 98th 100th, 101st of his "Christliche Glaube," viz:

1. "In Jesus Christ the Divine Nature and the human nature were united in one person.

2. "Christ was distinguished from all other men by his essential sinlessness and his absolute perfection.

3. "The Redeemer admits believers into the efficacy of his god-consciousness, and this is his redeeming activity.

4. "The Redeemer takes believers into the communion of his untroubled happiness, and this is his reconciling activity."

ARTICLE VII.

ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF GOD FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

By REV. JAMES M. MACDONALD, Jamaica, L. I.

It would be presuming too far to undertake to offer much that is new on the evidence of the Divine Existence. The ancient philosophers, and such writers as Clarke, Locke, Ray, Derham and Paley, and the authors of the various Systems of Theology, may be supposed to have exhausted the subject. And this, to a certain extent, is true. But it has appeared that something essential is lacking, in the argument for the existence of God, as it is commonly presented;-which it will be our object to exhibit as succinctly as possible. Several valuable contributions, on this subject have, within a few years, been given to the public, which, as well as works that have been longer known, afford most important aid to the student in Natural Theology.

To enter, in a formal manner, on the proof of the being of God may be thought by some as superfluous, if not irreverent. But even admitting that men generally are not open to doubt on this subject, and that it has been most amply discussed, there are, it is to be feared, very many, who, if they were called upon by an ingenious skeptic, to give a reason for their faith, would find the task a difficult one, from having never given the subject, in its argumentative form, a special examination. Moreover, it is worthy of consideration that the subject possesses an intrinsic importance and dignity, and is so fitted to produce a deep and ever-present impression, as completely to repel the idea of the discussion being

either irreverent or useless. But the argument we regard as peculiarly important, because it is adapted effectually to expose the fallacy of those pantheistic and materialistic notions which have prevailed elsewhere, and which there is some danger, may become fashionable in America and Europe. This latter is the principal reason which leads us, at the present time, to invite attention to this subject.

We think it is Chalmers, who somewhere remarks, that it is impossible for any man to assert positively, that there is nowhere any evidence of the existence of an infinite, eternal, and incorporeal Spirit who is the Maker and Upholder of all things. All that any man can do is to declare that he has failed to discover the evidence of the existence of such a being. And this is saying very little-indeed amounts to nothing-when we consider how very limited is man's knowledge of the universe. The survey which he is able to make, in respect to the whole of the Divine works, is comparatively, hardly greater than that made by the "little ant." of the general landscape, from the top of his tiny hill. A thousand stars glitter in the evening sky, not one of which has he ever visited, and where, for all that he knows to the contrary, the being of God, may be luminously inscribed to the eye. So that it is a "fool" indeed, according to the expression of Scripture, one who shows how little he knows, by his very ignorance of his ignorance, who declares positively that there is no evidence of the existence of a God, who is infinite, spiritual, and eternal. Let him wait till he has quarried through every strata of the earth to its core, till he has sounded the depths of the skies, visited and explored the other planets, the great central orb, and every star and planet of other systems, and ransacked every corner of the wide creation; nay, till he has read every line, and knows every item that belongs to the history of our world, written or unwritten, for the whole period of its existence, and has even searched the records of a past eternity, before he dares to assert that space and duration have, nowhere and never, borne up the clear and undeniable inscription that there is a God.

The argument à priori, and its value.

And

To Dr. Cudworth, unquestionably, rather than to Dr. Clarke, belongs the honor of being the author of the argument, from necessity, as it has been termed. In his "Intellectual System," he labors to prove that we can have no proper or distinguishing idea of God, which does not include necessity of existence in it. John Howe, whom Macaulay so justly styles "that great man," in his Living Temple, while he waives the argument, because some had objected to it as a sophism, expresses the opinion that it admits of being managed with demonstrative evidence. Bishop Stillingfleet, in his Origines Sacræ, also argues that necessary ex