credible does the hypothesis of a pre-existent state seem, that he would sooner suppose an interpolation, or that the old apostle dictated one thing and the amanuensis wrote another. Socinus declared of the atonement that if it were not merely once but often written in the Scriptures, he would not believe it. Smalcius said, that if it were not merely once or twice but often and clearly writ ten, that God became man, yet it would be better, because it is absurd, against reason and blasphemous, to invent some mode of interpretation by which these consequences might be avoided. In like manner a modern antagonist of the trinity says of the advocate of this doctrine, that he is compelled to defend his faith by the plea that God is honored by our reception of what shocks the intellect, violates reason, and prepares its advocates for worse and worse delusions.

We propose then to begin our labors by an effort to define the doctrine and to prepare the way for adducing Scriptural proof of its truth, by evincing its rationality. A definition in order to be complete, should show what the thing defined means, and what it does not mean; i. e. it should include its essential ideas and exclude all that are foreign to the subject.

The doctrine, therefore, means that the one God who made and governs the universe, exists in three persons, equal in every Divine attribute and claiming equal Divine honors and worship. It does not mean, as we understand it, that these persons are so separated as to destroy their unity, in essence or substance, nor so united as to destroy their separate existence as three persons. Of course it does not mean that they are three separate Gods and yet one God. Nor does it teach that they are in such a sense one God, as to prevent each person from exercising his own attributes and performing his own works.

We use the word person, because we think it the best word; and because we think it not liable to any reasonable objection. We are indeed aware that some in more modern writings on this subject have lamented its introduction because, they think it calculated to produce misunderstanding. In place of it, some would use the word distinction, as implying less than is meant by person, and as appearing less inconsistent with unity. But this seems needless. The word person is not liable to any fair objection, and does not mean too much. For, as we shall show hereafter, the Bible does reveal to us the nature of personality so far as the word person has a just meaning in our language, and all difficulties arise from assuming unreasonably that the word means more than it does. It implies less than the word being, but more than the word distinction, or than any other word in use.

When we speak of a being we include all that pertains to the being, and we cannot say that these separate beings are one being. On the other hand, if we eschew the word persons and only say

of a being that he has in himself three distinctions we convey no definite inea. Nor do we include as much as the Bible teaches, on the subject of the Trinity-for a being who is in every sense one, in essence, person and attributes, may yet have in himself three distinctions of some kind. The veriest Sabellian will admit three distinctions in God. But when we say of God, that he is one being and yet three persons, we mean that there are three persons properly speaking, so united as to be truly one being. To show that this is possible or reasonable, is evidently not a part of the definition. With equal clearness, to refute the inferences of others from this definition is not a part of the definition; this belongs to another head. We desire merely to state at this time what we meanin what sense we use words-so that when others state our belief they may state our definition as we have stated it and guarded it, and not state their own inferences, as being the doctrine, as we hold it. If then some one should say, if you hold to three divine persons, it after all must mean three Gods-we reply, you can properly mean by this only that our definition leads to such a result, as you view it, certainly you cannot mean that we so teach, for we expressly assert that we do not. If any one therefore attempts to state our belief, the proper way is to state it as we define it. If he wishes to state his own inferences from it, he has our leave, only he should be careful to state honestly that we do not admit that these inferences can be fairly derived from our definition. If he attempt to prove that they can, we shall not object, only we shall attempt in return, in a proper place and way, to show the fallacy of his reasoning, and to vindicate the rationality of our definition by showing that the union of three persons in one being, so as to be properly one God, is not unintelligible, and implies no contradiction or absurdity, according to the common laws of language and usage of words.

We now proceed to show that the doctrine is reasonable. We place this subject next, not because we suppose that it is of course true, merely because it is reasonable: Nor because this alone determines the question whether the Bible teaches it. For the Bible does not of course teach all things which are true, and of course many things which are reasonable are not taught in the Bible; for it was not intended to teach all things, but only things needful for our salvation: Nor because it would follow of course, that the Bible does not teach it, if it is unreasonable, unless we first assume its plenary inspiration for we can suppose as an argument against the Bible, that it should be proved that it is an unreasonable doctrine and yet that the Bible does teach it. Of course we do not suppose that this can in fact be done. But we place this topic here, because if it can be truly shown to be an unreasonable doctrine, in the proper sense of these words, it would be of no use to

attempt to prove it out of the Bible, for it would merely destroy its authority.

The most direct way to overturn the Bible would be, first to show clearly that a certain doctrine is truly unreasonable, and then as clearly to show that the Bible, when fairly interpreted, teaches it. This is plain, because our belief in the being of God and in revelation, is founded on the decisions of reason as to the relation of cause and effect. Reason teaches us that every effect must have a cause, hence, when we see the works of God, reason teaches us his existence, and the nature of his works and plan teaches us his attributes.

Again, our belief in revelation is founded in reason, and rests on the relation of cause and effect. We look at the system revealed, and find it to be so great, and glorious, and perfect, that man in the circumstances of its writers could not make it; and infer reasonably that God is its author. We look at miracles as effects surpassing human or finite power, and infer reasonably that God is their cause. We look at prophecies as surpassing human foresight, and infer reasonably, that He who formed the plan was the author of prophetic revelations. We look at the effects produced by the Bible and find them beyond human power, and conclude that God is the author of a book which he so signally owns and blesses. This is all correct reasoning.

Again our principles of interpretation are founded in reason. Words have a meaning assigned to them as signs of ideas; they are united in sentences on fixed principles, and are to be interpreted according to these principles. Therefore every act of interpretation requires the use of reason.

Now if any thing is presented to us which subverts the first principles of reason, no evidence can establish it, for the very laws of belief are subverted-and the book which teaches it can have no force.

And even if the evidence in favor of inspiration seems to remain, yet if the true interpretation compels us to believe that which is against reason, the mind must be balanced and cannot believe either. For example, should the evidence seem to be complete that the Bible is the Word of God, and should it yet assert that two and two are seven, or that a thing existed and did not exist at the same time, we must say: There seems to be evidence which I cannot remove to prove the inspiration of the Bible, yet the same reason that qualifies me to feel the force of this evidence as plainly shows that the thing revealed is false, and I cannot dispose of the evidence on the one hand, nor of the the interpretation on the other. I must therefore let them neutralize each other, and follow the light of reason, or else must give up the unreasonable part and take the rest. But if I give up one part as unreasonable, since it all rests upon the same authority, I cannot reasonably believe the rest

-so my faith must again be neutralized, and I must follow some other guide. Now this is fair and plain dealing, and is far more honorable than the conduct of those who profess to follow the Bible and yet admit that it contains unreasonable doctrines, or who torment its language by harsh and unreasonable interpretations, in order to escape its obvious meaning, and yet avoid a disavowal of its inspiration. It is far better to be honest on this point.

But as the consequences of proving an unreasonable doctrine in the Bible are so great, is it surely desirable to know what is meant by a reasonable doctrine. And here it is obvious to remark, that it is not of course one that accords with our feelings or wishes. This must be admitted by those who claim to be eminently ra tional, for they inveigh much against blind feeling. For, plainly, that cannot be pronounced unreasonable which causes a man to feel unpleasantly, if it is supported by evidence. Yet most who pride themselves on rationality are, we think, led to oppose the Trinity on such grounds, for the doctrine of the Trinity as taught in the Bible, always involves consequences which do not accord with the natural wishes and feelings of men, for it is always associated with the doctrine of human depravity, and is in the centre of a system glorious in holiness and justice in punishing the impenitent, as well as in love and mercy in forgiving the penitent through an atone

ment.

Nor can it be said that, that is reasonable which we should expect God to do and be, and that unreasonable which we should not expect him to be and do, for who is able to see and know all that ought to be, and all that is and may be? If any he can make a revelation, but surely he does not need one. Reason certainly teaches that we need a revelation, not to teach us what we might have known without it, but to teach us that which we could not know without it, and even if it teaches what we should not have thought of, it is no evidence that it is not true. Yet the reasoning of many against this doctrine seems to amount to this, that if it had never been revealed, they should never have found it out, for it is unlike anything which they ever saw or heard of.

But that is truly unreasonable which is against undeniable facts, or fair inferences from such facts, or against those fundamental intuitions, which precede all reasoning and are its basis. For, if it is not against facts, or fair inferences from facts, nor against the primary intuitions of the mind, surely it is not unreasonable. Let us try the doctrine as defined by these tests and see how it can endure the trial.

Is it then against fact? Now all that can be said here is, that so far as we have seen or known human beings, it is a fact that one person is always one being, and without revelation we do not know any other order of created beings. Now it is reasonable to say that it is a fact not observed by us, by the light of nature, that

one being should exist in three persons. But it is not reasonable to say that it is against fact, unless we assume that we know all facts in all worlds, for if we admit that there may be in other worlds facts not observed by us in this world, the very thing in question may be one of those facts, and to assume that it is not is to beg the question.

Is it against any intuitive perception of what is true in the nature of God? The question relates to the Divine mind. Now in order to show that it is against any such perception of what must be true in God's nature, we must know what that nature is.

We know of at least two existences, matter and mind. But we know only their properties and not their natures. No man can say what is the essence of matter. Nor can he of mind. Nor can he say in what manner mind can and must exist. If God chose to create a mind different from the human mind, could He not do it? It so happens that among men every mind has unity in essence and person. But suppose that God should wish to create a mind one in essence, and yet existing in three persons, each able to think, feel, choose, and love, and each equal to the rest— can any one say that it is impossible? If mind has an essence, who can deny the possibility of its existing thus ?

If any one should say that such a mind would be three beings, we reply, If the essence is one, the being is one, even if the persons are three. If any one should say that three persons with distinct attributes and faculties of intellect, susceptibility, and will, cannot exist in one essence, we ask the proof. It is not an intuitive truth. To mention the case of the human mind is to no purpose, for how does it appear that this is the only mode in which a mind can exist ?

It ought, however, to be observed that we do not at this point. assert that it is possible, for the same reason that we cannot assert that it is impossible, namely, that we know nothing as to the nature and essence of mind; all that we know is its effects. The Creator alone understands fully the nature of things, for He gave them that nature. Hence if He asserts that the nature of mind is such that He can create an order of beings having each of them unity of essence, and three persons in that essence, who has the knowledge which can enable him to confront the assertion of God with a denial? Shall a creature, ignorant of his own essence, decide what God can create, and how it shall and must exist?

Angels are pure spirits. Suppose now one of them had insisted that the Creator could not create anything but spirit, because he could not conceive of anything else? Would it prove that God could not create matter? Suppose that the same spirit had reasoned on, after he had seen his first argument answered by fact, to show that matter and mind could not be united in one person, because he could not conceive of it, and because all beings so far as